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210705Z May 02

2002HANOI01290 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4140

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FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6534
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AIT TAIPEI 0689
SECDEF WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL SHENYANG 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM, AND EAP/RSP-TC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/07 
TAGS: PREL PINS CM VM CVR APEC
SUBJECT:  VIETNAM, THE PRC, AND TAIWAN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  01290  01 OF 03  210840Z 
 
¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RAYMOND BURGHARDT, 
REASON: 1.5 (D). 
 
¶2. (C)  SUMMARY.  VIETNAM HAS HAD AN OFTEN-TORTUOUS 
HISTORY WITH CHINA, INCLUDING WITH THE PRC, AND IS 
AWARE OF THE DISPARITY OF THE IMPORTANCE WITH WHICH THE 
TWO COUNTRIES VIEW ONE ANOTHER.  MANY HERE MINIMIZE 
ACKNOWLEDGING THE PRC AS A POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC MODEL 
(ALTHOUGH IT IS).  RELATIONS WITH BOTH BEIJING AND 
TAIPEI ARE NOW BACK ON TRACK.  THE SOUTH CHINA SEA IS 
SEEN AS VIETNAM'S GREATEST EXTERNAL SECURITY THREAT, IF 
NO LONGER AN IMMINENT ONE.  VIETNAM WATCHES WITH 
INTEREST AND CONCERN EVENTS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT, 
RECOGNIZING THE POTENTIAL FOR REGIONAL INSTABILITY THAT 
WOULD AFFECT VIETNAM.  WHILE FORMALLY COMMITTED TO A 
POLICY OF "ONE CHINA," VIETNAMESE LEADERS PROBABLY DO 
NOT CARE DEEPLY ABOUT WHETHER REUNIFICATION EVER TAKES 
PLACE, AS LONG AS THE TWO SIDES CONTINUE TO IMPROVE 
RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH VIETNAM.  SEPTEL 
WILL EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND OTHER RELATIONS.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶3.  (C)  VIETNAM'S SHORT-, MID-, AND LONG-TERM 
INTERESTS ARE HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON AN INCREASINGLY 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC, ON AVOIDANCE OF 
TERRITORIAL CONFLICTS WITH THE PRC IN THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA AND THE LAND BORDER, AND ON PEACE AND PROSPERITY ON 
BOTH SIDES OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT.  YET ONLY A DECADE 
AGO, THE GVN WAS BARELY ON SPEAKING TERMS WITH THE PRC, 
GIVEN LINGERING ENMITY OVER THE 1979 BORDER WAR AND 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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STAUNCH DISAGREEMENT OVER VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF 
CAMBODIA.  IN THAT SAME ERA, THE GVN HAD ONLY FLEDGLING 
UNOFFICIAL TIES WITH TAIWAN, NOW PROBABLY VIETNAM'S 
LARGEST INVESTOR.  (TAIWAN DID NOT OPEN ITS 
"UNOFFICIAL" OFFICE HERE UNTIL 1993; ITS TIMING 
PROBABLY HAD SOME CONNECTION WITH THE EXPECTED LIFTING 
OF THE US TRADE EMBARGO.)  CHINA SCHOLARS HERE HAVE 
SAID THAT IT NEVER OCCURRED TO HANOI TO SEEK DIPLOMATIC 
RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN DURING THE NADIR OF VIETNAM/PRC 
RELATIONS IN THE 1980'S, NOR EVEN TO COURT UNOFFICIAL 
TIES UNTIL SEVERAL YEARS AFTER THE DOI MOI PERIOD 
BEGAN. 
 
HISTORY HURTS 
------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  VIETNAMESE FREELY ADMIT THE PERVASIVE 
SOCIETAL, CULTURAL, AND LINGUISTIC INFLUENCE OF CHINA'S 
THOUSAND-YEAR OCCUPATION OF THE NORTHERN PARTS OF WHAT 
IS NOW VIETNAM.  OFFICIAL HISTORIES, HOWEVER, ALSO TEND 
TO HIGHLIGHT THE VALIANT AND EVENTUALLY SUCCESSFUL 
VIETNAMESE EFFORTS TO WARD OFF CHINESE AGGRESSIONS, 
BOTH IN THE "REGAINING" OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE MID- 
TENTH CENTURY A.D. AND IN SUBSEQUENT CHINESE INVASIONS 
THROUGH THE 15TH CENTURY.  MANY VIETNAMESE TALK ABOUT 
THIS HISTORY AS IF IT WERE FRESH IN THEIR MEMORIES 
RATHER THAN EVENTS FROM VIETNAM'S SOMEWHAT MYSTIC PAST; 
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT A THINLY VEILED RESENTMENT OF THE 
BIG DRAGON TO THE NORTH IS DELIBERATELY INCULCATED IN 
VIETNAMESE STUDENTS.  THE SLIGHTS AND MISFORTUNES 
SUFFERED AT THE HANDS OF THE CHINESE PLAY WELL INTO 
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VIETNAM'S NOTABLE VICTIM MENTALITY, WHICH ALSO 
EVIDENCES ITSELF WHEN TALKING ABOUT FRENCH COLONIALISM 
AND THE "AMERICAN WAR." 
 
¶5.  (C)  IN MORE RECENT HISTORY, VIETNAMESE ARE OFTEN 
PRICKLY WHEN PEOPLE MAKE COMPARISONS BETWEEN THE PRC'S 
SUCCESSFUL MODERNIZATION SINCE 1978 AND VIETNAM'S STILL 
MORE MODEST DOI MOI SINCE 1986.  THEY ARE CORRECT IN 
ASSERTING THAT VIETNAM'S OWN COURSE IS TAILORED TO ITS 
UNIQUE NATIONA CHARACTERISTICS, WHILE NONETHELESS 
EXPRESSING ADMIRATION FOR THE PRC'S SUCCESSES.  THEY 
WILL ADMI PRIVATELY TO WATCHING CLOSELY POLICY DEBATES 
WIHIN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP) -- MOST 
REENTLY, ON THE TENDENTIOUS TOPIC OF ADMISSION INTO 
THE PARTY OF CAPITALISTS -- AND THERE IS LITTLE IF ANY 
DOUBT THAT DOI MOI WAS INITIALLY GRAFTED FAILY 
DIRECTLY FROM DENG XIAOPING'S EARLIEST REFORM.  YET 
DENGIST THEORIES AND THOUGHT -- MUCH LESSMAOIST 
WRITINGS -- RECEIVE SCANT ATTENTION IN 
IETNAMESE IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING (STILL A MUST FOR 
HIGHER EDUCATION AS WELL AS FOR ADVANCEMENT WITHIN HE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4141 
 
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R 210705Z MAY 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6535 
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
AIT TAIPEI 0690 
SECDEF WASHDC 
DIA WASHDC 
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL SHENYANG 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HANOI 001290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM, AND EAP/RSP-TC 
 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  01290  02 OF 03  210840Z 
CIVIL SERVICE).  THE FOCUS REMAINS INSTEAD HEAVILY ON A 
COMBINATION OF TRADITIONAL MARXIST/LENINIST THEORY AND 
HO CHI MINH THOUGHT. 
 
FELLOW TRAVELERS OF TWO SORTS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  SINCE RELATIONS WITH THE PRC HAVE IMPROVED IN 
THE 1990'S, VIETNAM HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE SOLIDARITY OF 
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THE NOW CLOSER 
TIES BETWEEN BEIJING AND HANOI.  THERE ARE A STEADY 
STREAM OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN BOTH 
DIRECTIONS, AND IT WAS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE PRC WAS 
ONE OF THE FIRST COUNTRIES THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV), NONG DUC MANH, 
VISITED AFTER TAKING OFFICE IN 2001.  (WE HAVE HEARD OF 
NO PLANS FOR HIM TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES, FOR 
EXAMPLE, DESPITE THE 2001 ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE US- 
VIETNAM BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT.)  ONE VIETNAMESE 
CHINA EXPERT NOTED THAT VIETNAM'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
PRC IS "MOSTLY IMPORTANT ON A POLITICAL LEVEL," SINCE 
ECONOMIC AND TRADE TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE 
FAR MORE MODEST THAN WITH THE U.S. OR JAPAN.  BEIJING'S 
AMBASSADOR HERE, NOW ON HIS THIRD TOUR IN VIETNAM AND A 
HANOI UNIVERSITY GRADUATE, MAY BE THE MOST FLUENT 
VIETNAMESE SPEAKER IN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS. 
 
¶7.  (C)  YET AS THE VIETNAMESE HAVE TURNED MORE TO A 
MARKET-STYLE ECONOMY, HANOI HAS ALSO BEEN KEEN TO COURT 
TAIWAN AND TAIWANESE INVESTORS.  IT NOW MAINTAINS A 
LARGE AND SURPRISINGLY ACTIVE "UNOFFICIAL" OFFICE IN 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  01290  02 OF 03  210840Z 
TAIPEI, HEADED BY A SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICER. 
IN ADDITION TO TRADE WORK, THE ELEVEN VIETNAMESE 
EMPLOYEES AT THE OFFICE ARE PARTICIPANTS AT CHINA- 
WATCHING ACTIVITIES AT TAIWAN "GOVERNMENT-RUN" THINK 
TANKS.  THE TAIPEI ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE (TECO) 
IN HANOI IS MUCH SMALLER, AND WITH NO FLUENT VIETNAMESE 
SPEAKERS ON ITS STAFF, BUT OBSERVERS HAVE NOTED THE 
AGGRESSIVENESS OF TECO STAFF IN SEEKING CONTACTS AND 
INFORMATION HERE.  THE DIRECTOR WHO LEFT EARLIER THIS 
YEAR HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE HEAD OF TAIWAN'S MILITARY 
INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT.  THE TAIWAN TRADE MINISTER, 
ACCOMPANIED BY A LARGE ENTOURAGE OF BUSINESS LEADERS, 
USUALLY VISITS VIETNAM EVERY YEAR. 
 
THREAT LEVEL 
------------ 
 
¶8.  (C)  ACCORDING TO ONE VIETNAMESE ACADEMIC 
SPECIALIZING IN CHINA STUDIES, "THE US AND VIETNAM ARE 
THE TWO COUNTRIES THAT ARE MOST CONCERNED WITH CHINA." 
(IN CONTRAST, VIETNAM IS PROBABLY NOT EVEN IN THE TOP 
FIVE OR TEN OF BEIJING'S CONCERNS, THEY ADMIT.) 
DESPITE THE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION OF THEIR LAND BORDER 
DEMARCATION IN 1999, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TONKIN GULF 
MARITIME BORDER AGREEMENT HAS BEEN DELAYED BY 
DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON FISHING RIGHTS. 
BOTH THE LAND AND MARITIME AGREEMENTS GENERATED 
LEADERSHIP CONTROVERSY HERE, POSSIBLY CONTRIBUTING TO 
LE KHA PHIEU'S EARLY REMOVAL AS PARTY LEADER LAST YEAR. 
THE AGREEMENTS ARE FAVORITE TARGETS OF CRITICISM BY 
OVERSEAS VIETNAMESE AND SOME INTERNAL ACTIVISTS. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL CHINA WATCHERS HERE, CONFLICTING 
CLAIMS IN WHAT THE VIETNAMESE REFER TO AS THE "EAST 
SEA" -- COMMONLY KNOWN ELSEWHERE AS THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
-- REMAINS THE "BIGGEST SECURITY PROBLEM" FOR VIETNAM. 
ONE OBSERVER CLAIMED THAT "YOU CAN'T SAY IT WILL NEVER 
BE RESOLVED," WHILE ADMITTING THAT SUCCESS IN THIS 
ENDEAVOR MIGHT WELL NOT TAKE PLACE IN HIS LIFETIME. 
 
¶9.  (C)  ANOTHER ACADEMIC POINTED TO THE INHERENT 
DIFFICULTIES IN SEEKING RESOLUTION EVEN IN AN ASEAN 
FRAMEWORK, AS NOW SEEMS TO BE THE HOPE.  SOME OBSERVERS 
-- BUT NOT MANY -- HAVE OPINED THAT US OR JAPANESE 
INVOLVEMENT IN THIS ISSUE COULD SPEED ITS RESOLUTION. 
IN ANY EVENT, FEW CHINA WATCHERS HERE PUT THE RISK OF 
ARMED CONFLICT OVER THE EAST SEA AS HIGH, AND NOW 
(UNLIKE SEVERAL YEARS AGO) ASSUME THAT BEIJING AND 
HANOI WOULD NOT ALLOW ISOLATED INCIDENTS AS MIGHT TAKE 
PLACE TO ESCALATE INTO LARGER CONFLICT OR JEOPARDIZE 
BILATERAL TIES. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4142 
 
PAGE 01        HANOI  01290  03 OF 03  210840Z 
ACTION EAP-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AF-00    AIT-03   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DS-00 
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R 210705Z MAY 02 
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6536 
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE 
AIT TAIPEI 0691 
SECDEF WASHDC 
DIA WASHDC 
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 
AMCONSUL SHENYANG 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HANOI 001290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP/CM, AND EAP/RSP-TC 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  01290  03 OF 03  210840Z 
¶10.  (C)  WHILE CLOSELY WATCHING THE SITUATION IN THE 
TAIWAN STRAIT, CHINA EXPERTS IN VIETNAM RATE THE THREAT 
LEVEL TO VIETNAM AS FAR LOWER THAN THE EAST SEA ISSUE. 
THEY ACKNOWLEDGE, HOWEVER, THAT ANY TENSIONS OR 
CONFLICT IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT WOULD NECESSARILY AFFECT 
SHIPPING IN THE REGION, AND HENCE VIETNAM'S ABILITY TO 
PURSUE EXPORT-LED GROWTH. 
 
ONE CHINA -- DO WE CARE? 
------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C)  WHILE REGULARLY AND OPENLY EXPRESSING SUPPORT 
FOR "ONE CHINA," VIETNAM PROBABLY DOES NOT CARE DEEPLY 
ABOUT WHETHER OR WHEN THE TWO SIDES REUNIFY, AS LONG AS 
THEY AVOID OPEN CONFLICT, CONTINUE THE IMPROVEMENT OF 
TIES WITH EACH OTHER -- AND WITH VIETNAM -- AND DO NOT 
POSE A THREAT TO REGIONAL TRADE AND SECURITY.  MOST 
OBSERVERS HERE SEE THE PRC AS BEING INCREASINGLY 
"FLEXIBLE" IN ITS APPROACH TO TAIWAN.  SOME, HOWEVER, 
EXPRESS GROWING DOUBT THAT THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF 
MAINLANDERS HAS THE SAME ZEAL FOR REUNIFICATION AS 
THEIR ELDERS. 
 
¶12.  (C)  GVN POLICY ADVISERS CLAIM THAT VIETNAMESE 
LEADERS NEVER OFFER OPINIONS TO BEIJING OR TAIPEI ABOUT 
REUNIFICATION (DESPITE VIETNAM'S EXPERIENCE WITH ITS 
OWN REUNIFICATION).  CHINA WATCHERS HERE SO FAR DO NOT 
EXPECT ANY SURPRISES ON TAIWAN POLICY -- OR OTHER 
POLICIES -- IN BEIJING EVEN AFTER PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN 
STEPS DOWN; THEY USUALLY STRESS WHAT THEY SEE AS THE 
COLLECTIVE PRC AND CCP LEADERSHIP, WHICH MITIGATES 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  01290  03 OF 03  210840Z 
AGAINST BOLD OR EXTREME MEASURES.  (FEW WOULD DARE 
OPENLY DRAW THE NATURAL COMPARISON WITH VIETNAM'S OWN 
LEADERSHIP, HOWEVER.) 
 
PROGNOSIS:  GOOD 
---------------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  FEW STORM CLOUDS (OTHER THAN THE DIMINISHING 
PROSPECT OF SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT) APPEAR ON THE 
HORIZON IN HANOI'S RELATIONS WITH BEIJING AND TAIPEI. 
THE PRC'S GROWING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASEAN IS SEEN HERE 
AS A PLUS, AS IS THE PARTICIPATION OF BEIJING, TAIPEI, 
AND HANOI IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
FORUM.  INCREASED FLOWS INTO VIETNAM OF CHINESE 
TOURISTS, BUSINESSPEOPLE, AND INVESTORS AND EXCHANGES 
OF OFFICIALS (OR NON-OFFICIALS, AS THE CASE MAY BE WITH 
TAIWAN) NOT ONLY IMPROVE VIETNAMESE BILATERAL TIES WITH 
EACH BUT ALSO BUTTRESS THE OVERALL TREND IN VIETNAMESE 
FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1990 OF DIVERSIFICATION AND 
MULTILATERALIZATION.  BUT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE 
VIETNAMESE TO LET DOWN THEIR GUARD ENTIRELY OVER THE 
LONG-TERM ASPIRATIONS OR DESIGNS OF THEIR LOOMING 
NEIGHBOR TO THE NORTH. 
BURGHARDT 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL