This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ABUJA 001408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 5/2/12 
TAGS: PREL PTER KPAO EFIN NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ENGAGING ISLAM 
 
 
REF: STATE 61142 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: By far the most strategically 
important country in West Africa, Nigeria is a major 
economic partner to the United States (oil imports) 
and has been a cooperative player in conflict 
resolution in the sub-region. Africa's most populous 
state and largest democracy, Nigeria has supported the 
war against terrorism, but most Muslims oppose our 
policies in the Middle East. While Islamic 
fundamentalism exists here, its followers constitute a 
small minority. Most Nigerian Muslims are pro- 
democracy and do not oppose the United States; they 
are "conservative" Muslims. However, chronic 
inequalities in the political economy could fertilize 
radicalism. Northern Nigeria, where most Muslims live, 
lags behind the South in education, economic activity 
and modernization. Our policy objectives should be to 
engage the Government to address the primarily socio- 
economic problems that lead to radicalism. Mainly, we 
need to promote economic growth in the non-oil 
sectors, particularly agriculture. We also need to 
promote education in the North.  Lastly, we must 
better educate Muslims about America, our foreign 
policies and our approach to religious diversity and 
tolerance at home.  End Summary. 
 
 
-------- 
OVERVIEW 
-------- 
 
 
¶2. (U) Home to Africa's largest Muslim population, 
Nigeria is not an "Islamic State" nor is radical Islam 
a major current here. Roughly half of Nigeria's 120 
million people are Muslim, 40 percent are Christian 
with the remainder adhering to local traditional 
religions. Mostly Sunni and followers of the Maliki 
School, Nigeria's Muslims are primarily in the 
Northern half of the country. The South is 
predominately Christian except for the Southwest, 
where the Yoruba ethnic group is split equally between 
Muslim and Christian. Islam in West Africa was first 
established in Nigeria (Borno) and the territorial 
expansion of the Sokoto caliphate under Usman Dan 
Fodio in the early 19th century is a source of pride 
for many Muslims. Due to these historic antecedents, 
Nigerian Muslims see Northern Nigeria as the epicenter 
of Islam in West Africa. 
 
 
¶3. (C) Most Nigerian Muslims are not anti-democratic. 
After nearly 16 consecutive years of military 
governments headed by Muslim generals, democracy 
returned in 1999 with the election of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo, a born-again Yoruba Christian who 
professes a deeply held faith. The Muslim North 
supported both the return of democratic rule and 
Obasanjo's candidacy. Presidential elections are 
slated for early 2003. While Obasanjo's support in the 
North has waned, perhaps considerably, the vast 
majority of Northerners still endorse democratic 
civilian rule. Their estrangement from Obasanjo has 
more to do with his perceived tribalism and nothing to 
do with opposition to the democratic form of 
government because of Islamic religious principles. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Despite most Nigerians' pro-democratic outlook, 
Islam in Nigeria presents important policy challenges 
for the U.S. The most topical challenges have been 
Muslim attitudes toward USG policies in the Middle 
East and, to a much lesser extent, our military action 
in Afghanistan. While Nigeria's Muslims condemn 
terrorism and 9/11, many suspect that USG foreign 
policy is inherently anti-Islamic because of the 
United States' predominately Western political and 
cultural heritage. Prominent Islamic figures have 
sounded this theme and public demonstrations in Kano, 
Katsina and Abuja against USG policy have occurred 
recently. 
 
 
¶5. (C) In addition to Muslim opposition to our 
policies in the Middle East, the advent of criminal 
Sharia codes in twelve Northern states, the incidence 
of communal violence since 1999 and their implications 
for democracy also impact long-term USG policy 
interests in Nigeria. Paradoxically, the return of 
democratic rule in 1999 facilitated the introduction 
of criminal Sharia. 
 
 
¶6. C) Criminal Sharia may appear to be a product of 
Islamic radicalism. However, its emergence actually 
resulted from the combination of political opportunism 
and the socio-economic angst of large segments of the 
population in the north where traditional legal 
structures and law enforcement decayed due to neglect 
by successive military regimes. In short, Sharia began 
as a tack employed by embattled politicians to bolster 
their popularity. However, these politicians 
underestimated the populist reaction. Many Nigerians 
have felt they were being left behind by the dynamics 
of the global economy and modernity. (The IMF and, to 
a lesser degree, the WTO are convenient bogeymen in 
Nigeria.) Many Nigerians also have been frustrated by 
homegrown inequities, particularly the gulf between 
rich and poor. Moreover, they have been disappointed 
in a secular justice system perceived as favoring the 
affluent and allowing them to live above the law. 
Additionally, Muslims worried about the spread of 
evangelical Christianity into traditionally Muslim 
areas. 
 
 
¶7. (C) Against this backdrop, the call for Sharia is 
more "conservative" and "defensive" than it is 
radical. Feeling that change and modernity have been 
more enervating than empowering, some Muslims have 
looked with false nostalgia to a past that never 
actually existed. For, the more historically minded, 
Sharia harks back to when the Sokoto Caliphate was at 
its zenith. For them, Sharia does not mean just harsh 
criminal punishments; more importantly, it is the 
avenue for the return of the practice of giving 
charity to the poor (zakkat), the prohibition against 
usury and the swift application of justice 
notwithstanding one's station in life. In short, 
Sharia's appeal is that the wealthy cannot be a law 
unto themselves but they must help the common and the 
poor. This may have serious political consequences for 
the GON in the future, if action is not taken to 
narrow economic disparities. 
 
 
¶8. (C) Notwithstanding Sharia's primarily 
"conservative" nature, it is evidence of incipient 
political and economic fermentation in Nigeria. 
Nigeria's small but incrementally growing circle of 
Islamic radicals endorse Sharia's promulgation, seeing 
it as a fillip to expand fundamentalism. Part of this 
fermentation has been the level of communal violence 
experienced since the return of democratic rule. Much 
of the violence was sparked by competition between 
ethnic groups over control of local government and 
scarce resources such as land and water. However, the 
violence often assumed a religious dimension when 
competing ethnic groups were from different religions. 
 
 
¶9. (C) Many Nigerians perceive a clash of religions 
taking place in their country. Some staunch Muslims 
talk of bringing Sharia into the Southwest, where 
there are large numbers of co-religionists. 
(Generally, the Yoruba Southwest has been tolerant, 
with intermarriage between the faiths common. 
However, there is evidence of growing religious 
agitation in that region as in many other areas.) 
Conversely, evangelical Christianity is a potent 
stream, coursing into Northern areas that have been 
the traditional reserve of Islam. The Evangelicals 
received succor and funding from sister churches in 
the West, including the United States. Likewise, some 
Muslim fundamentalists receive support or training 
from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Sudan, and Pakistan. In 
many places in the Middle Belt, fundamentalist Islam 
and Christianity collide. Exacerbating pre-existing 
squabbles over control of resources and local 
government, this clash of religious expansionism has 
helped foment communal violence in many instances. 
Compounding the clash of religions is the gap between 
socio-economic conditions in the mainly Christian 
South and the Muslim North. The North lags behind the 
South in important areas like economic activity, 
infrastructure, and education. These gaps feed the 
perception that the North and, thus, Muslims are 
losing ground due to the Christian Southerners closer 
economic and cultural ties to the West. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Herein lies the crux of Nigeria's challenge 
with Islam. The fundamental problem facing the country 
is economic; there is not enough bread, butter or 
jobs. Yet, many Nigerians view events through a 
religious prism. If poverty is not replaced by 
economic growth over time, poor Muslims might begin to 
see the Western-led modern economy as stacked against 
them, in part due to their religious orientation. 
Nigeria's conservative Islam could yield to the more 
radical strain here that promotes anti-Americanism. 
Since America stands at the military and economic 
pinnacle, it would be easier to blame America for 
purposely engineering their socio-economic stagnation 
than to attribute their troubles to more proximate 
domestic conditions at home. 
 
 
--------------- 
ECONOMIC REFORM 
--------------- 
¶11. (C) Economic and agricultural reform is one of the 
Mission's primary objectives and accounts for 
approximately $35 million in assistance this year. 
Assistance has encouraged immediate economic reform in 
some areas, with the GON undertaking significant steps 
to privatize parastatals and liberalize the downstream 
petroleum sector. However, the GON has been reluctant 
to move forward on the exchange rate regime 
(overvalued Naira), tariff reform, agricultural 
policies, and fiscal discipline. The Mission supports 
reform-minded private sector groups such as the 
Nigerian-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry and 
the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, and promotes 
reform with larger bodies such as the Manufacturers 
Association of Nigeria (MAN) and the Nigerian Chamber 
of Commerce, Industry, Mining and Agriculture. In 
addition to continuing current assistance, we 
requested USD 5 million in ESF to fund a 
public/private partnership in Kano, the North's 
largest city. The home of tens of thousands of 
unemployed youth, Kano is a potential source of 
radicalism unless its depressed economy can improve. 
Because of Kano's strategic importance, we want to 
encourage private business to invest in the local 
economy in order to promote economic growth and 
generate employment opportunities for the jobless. 
Additionally, we would like to increase technical 
assistance to Nigeria's moribund agricultural sector. 
Most Nigerians and most Northerners are employed in 
this sector. Yet, agricultural production declined 
under years of policy neglect by past military 
governments. Improvement in agriculture will lift 
Northern Nigeria's economy, provide food security and 
help check radicalism. 
 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL REFORM 
---------------- 
 
 
¶12. (C) The biggest challenge to democracy is not 
Islamic radicalism but the return of the military 
should democracy be seen as dysfunctional, unable to 
deliver practical dividends to the populace. With most 
Nigerians already believing in democracy, our strategy 
is to help secure democratization, primarily through 
the conduct of fair elections in 2003, improving 
governance and promoting the rule of law. The upcoming 
Presidential and National Assembly elections are key 
to democracy's longevity. Consequently, we are funding 
technical assistance for the Independent National 
Electoral Commission and the State Electoral 
Commissions to help ensure they have the technical 
expertise to conduct fair elections. Promoting good 
governance, we have programs with the National 
Assembly and several State Assemblies, including 
Katsina and Adamawa in the North. We are also 
assisting the Federal Government's special anti- 
corruption unit. To help advance the rule of law and 
administration of justice, we fund court management 
programs for three State High Courts (including 
Kaduna). We have also initiated a police-training 
program that brings the concept of community policing 
to Nigeria. 
 
 
-- PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS: Mission programs have 
effectively assisted new democratic institutions adopt 
better procedures and have helped place key issues, 
such as women's rights and freedom of information, on 
legislative agendas (the former more in the South than 
in the North). Historically, however, we have paid 
more attention and allocated more resources to 
development in the Christian South than the Muslim 
North. 
 
 
-- REACTION OF HOST GOVERNMENT AND EFFECT ON OTHER 
INITIATIVES: We have seen little negative reaction to 
our programs. One exception was the publication of the 
results of an USAID-funded public opinion survey 
indicating that most Nigerians believed there was 
significant corruption in the GON. At one point, GON 
officials requested we issue a public disclaimer that 
the survey was not a USG product but the work of 
private academicians. Because of this incident, Post 
will move delicately on USG-funded public awareness 
projects dealing with corruption and other sensitive 
issues. However, this incident has not impeded 
assistance to the anti-corruption unit. There have 
been some suspicion of U.S.-supported projects in the 
North, especially those related to HIV/AIDS and polio 
eradication. However, this suspicion is diminishing. 
 
 
-- DONOR COORDINATION: Mission coordinates democracy 
and governance assistance with other donors to avoid 
duplication; this has helped overall donor efficiency. 
With regard to the 2003 elections, we will work in 
greater concert with other donors to coordinate our 
policy positions and public and private diplomacy as 
well as the assistance programs. 
 
 
-- OPPOSITION FIGURES: Mission has regular contact 
with opposition figures at all levels. There has been 
no negative GON reaction to this engagement. 
Sensitivity to contact with "the opposition" may grow 
as the 2003 elections approach. 
 
 
------------------- 
 EDUCATIONAL REFORM 
------------------- 
 
 
¶13. (C) Education in Northern Nigeria lags behind the 
rest of the country. We need to significantly increase 
our assistance to education in the North, particularly 
the universities located in the region. Currently, 
Post provides information technology assistance to 
Nigerian Universities. ECA information technology 
programs have supported Bayero University, Ahmadu 
Bello University, the University of Jos, and the 
University of Ibadan. (Three of the four mentioned 
universities are in the North.) The close ties with 
universities developed by USIS and PAS over the years 
have paid dividends. No Vice-Chancellor doubts our 
commitment to helping Nigeria's universities. Yet, 
while they know our "will," they do wonder about our 
"wallet." There are several cost-effective steps that 
we can take to further help the schools. More 
programming in information technology should be 
developed for the Northern universities. Also, book 
and database grants need to be increased. We should 
encourage more links to universities in the United 
States through College/University Affiliation Programs 
(CUAP). In addition to our assistance to universities, 
the USAID-funded Literacy Enhancement Assistance 
Programs (LEAP) aims to improve literacy and numeracy 
in both Qur'anic and public schools. Last, extra 
funding could be employed to improve vocational 
education and literacy/numeracy in Northern cities 
like Kano and Kaduna. 
 
 
-- RESISTANCE TO CHANGING EDUCATIONAL PARADIGMS: While 
the Nigerian government supports university autonomy, 
the Union of University Academic Staff resists the 
shift, fearing it will lead to budget cuts. 
Universities have been urged to institute tuition 
fees, a move students and parents vehemently oppose. 
 
 
-- USG ALIGNMENT TO EDUCATIONAL REFORM: Universities 
have openly opposed IMF loans for university reform. 
The schools complain Nigeria should not borrow money 
either from the World Bank or IMF because it would 
give the IFIs control over university education in 
Nigeria. While LEAP, the program to improve literacy 
and numeracy in both Qur'anic and public schools, has 
not been resisted by state and local governments, it 
could be falsely characterized by some as an attempt 
to manipulate Qur'anic education. Mindful of this 
concern, we have worked with Islamic scholars in 
developing the LEAP curriculum. 
 
 
-- IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL INDICATORS: Chronic student and 
faculty strikes have adversely impacted Nigerian 
universities. Due to extended strikes, full time 
Nigerian students can spend six-eight years to obtain 
a four-year degree. The brain drain affects the 
quality of education. Although faculty salaries have 
increased in the past few years, highly qualified 
faculty continue to seek opportunities in other 
sectors or overseas. Deteriorating infrastructure and 
physical plant at the universities also hinder 
education. 
 
 
------------- 
CIVIL SOCIETY 
------------- 
 
 
¶14. (C) Mission has helped NGOS in the following 
areas: freedom of information, electoral law reform, 
anti-corruption legislation, women's rights, and 
conflict mitigation in the important Northern cities 
of Kano and Kaduna. Post would like additional 
resources to expand conflict mitigation and inter- 
faith dialogue in Kano and Kaduna to other areas of 
the North and Middle Belt region. We would emphasize 
the need for nonviolent political activity in the lead 
up to the 2003 elections. In Kaduna and Kano, we also 
would like to bring the conflict mitigation program 
into the primary and secondary schools. Further 
expanding our conflict mitigation efforts, additional 
resources would help us institute a farmer/pastoralist 
dialogue in select areas of the rural North to reduce 
violence between farmers and cattle herders that 
sparks much of the ethno-religious violence in many 
areas. Additionally, we would like more funding to 
provide basic civic education to women's groups and 
youth organizations in the North. Establishment of 
micro-credit programs for farmers and women's groups 
will help employment and income generation. USAID also 
is working with groups attempting to engage government 
on constitutional reform. 
 
 
-- PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS: Mission has experienced 
success in promoting dialogue and peace efforts in 
communities where violence has occurred. This includes 
inter-faith (Muslim-Christian) dialogue in Kaduna and 
in Kano. Also, programs promoting women's 
participation in local governance have been especially 
effective, albeit more in the South than the North. 
Post would like additional resources to expand 
conflict mitigation and inter-faith dialogue in Kano 
and Kaduna to other areas of the North and Middle Belt 
region. 
 
 
-- HOST GOVERNMENT REACTIONS: There have been no 
negative GON reactions. 
 
 
--NGOs OPEN TO USG INVOLVEMENT: A wide range of NGOs 
are interested in USG funding and cooperation. Human 
and political rights groups and health care 
organizations are very open to USG involvement. 
However, local Muslim clerics in rural communities in 
several Northern states have actively opposed polio 
vaccination efforts as "unIslamic." 
Some Islamic leaders have also criticized family 
planning activities. 
 
 
--INVOLVEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY AND 
POLITICAL/ECONOMIC REFORM. Involvement with civil 
society has advanced political and economic reform by 
making government and leaders more responsive to the 
concerns of average Nigerians through the advocacy and 
oversight of these civil society groups. 
 
 
-- WORKING WITH LOCAL OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
TO PROMOTE CIVIL SOCIETY: All civil society programs 
are implemented through international NGOs working 
with local NGOs. Although we do not try to conceal the 
fact of USG funding, the indirect funding helps reduce 
the perception that we are trying to manipulate local 
NGOs. 
 
 
---------------------------------- 
RELIGIOUS MODERATION AND TOLERANCE 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
¶15. (C) Post is engaged with Muslim organizations. We 
also support inter-faith mediation programs. Using the 
American Speaker Program, targeted mailings of policy 
materials, and "Magama" (post's Hausa-language 
magazine) we reach Muslim leaders, clerics, 
communities, and centers of Islamic Studies. 
 
 
--POST DIALOGUE WITH HOST GOVERNMENT ABOUT RELIGIOUS 
ISSUES: Several clerics we reach through programs and 
mailings are also government officials or participants 
in a government-run interfaith committee. There also 
has been policy dialogue with senior GON officials 
about Sharia and ethno-religious communal violence. 
 
 
--SUCCESSFUL CONTACTS AND PROGRAMS IN PROMOTING DEBATE 
ON RELIGIOUS ISSUES/ COMBATING ANTI-AMERICANISM: 
Regular meetings with key Muslim personalities to 
discuss USG policies are helpful. Public statements 
reiterating USG respect for Islam also carry weight. 
The following programs serve to reach Muslim 
communities: the International Visitor Program, the 
American Speaker Program, the Fulbright Senior Scholar 
and Student Program, the Humphrey Fellowship Program, 
and programs organized by the Office of Citizen 
Exchanges. The American Speaker program particularly 
has been effective in promoting healthy exchanges of 
views and in getting the American perspective across 
to local audiences. 
 
 
-- BEST PRACTICES: The Speaker program: Bringing a 
Muslim-American to talk to Muslims about religious 
issues/religious diversity has been more effective 
than bringing a non-Muslim. A Muslim-American has 
instant credibility that a non-Muslim does not. Short- 
term educational and cultural exchange programs 
directed at youth and teachers would help build 
favorable attitudes, especially in Northern Nigeria. 
 
 
--DEGREE OF INFLUENCE USG CAN EXERT ON INTERNAL 
RELIGIOUS DEBATES: Although not nearly as dispositive 
as domestic factors, our influence potentially can be 
significant. Providing authoritative, credible voices 
to discuss religious diversity/tolerance in United 
States is a good step. We would like to initiate 
single country group IV programs with themes such as 
religious freedom in the United States, faith-based 
solutions to social problems such as violence and 
AIDS. Funding to establish links between Islamic 
centers in Nigeria and the United States would 
increase our influence. The VOA Hausa service can do 
more programming about religious tolerance in America. 
We should also explore select cultural events 
compatible with the conservative social environment in 
the North. 
 
 
Additionally, private diplomacy encouraging tolerance 
and dialogue also can influence key figures in both 
Christian and Muslim communities.  Events, such as the 
very successful Iftar dinner the Ambassador hosted 
last December, generated significant goodwill with 
leading Muslims. The Iftar and other gatherings with 
Muslim leaders should be replicated.  Consistent and 
regular dialogue that underscores our religious 
impartiality will serve to enhance our influence. 
 
 
-- GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT: This 
traditionally has not been an effective avenue to 
affect internal debate. However, in that the GON is 
constitutionally required to be religiously neutral, 
there is a potential for cooperation. However, the GON 
usually prefers to conducts its own mediation without 
outside help. Ambassador's and Mission outreach to 
Northern state governments, some for the very first 
time, is winning tremendous influence and access to 
key Northern political elites. 
 
 
------------- 
LOOKING AHEAD 
------------- 
 
 
16.(C) The transfer of the Embassy from Lagos to Abuja 
has already helped improve our contacts with the North 
and we will continue to exploit the benefits that this 
greater proximity provides. Mission further believes 
that we can more effectively engage Nigeria's Muslim 
community via some well-placed additional initiatives. 
Perhaps the most time sensitive and crucial to 
Nigeria's overall stability and support for democracy 
is that we should provide adequate assistance to help 
ensure that the 2003 electoral process is credible. 
Over the longer haul, economic growth will be the most 
effective bulwark against radicalism. In this regard, 
we need to help bolster the agricultural sector and 
help generate investment and trade in non-oil sectors 
of the economy, particularly the North and its 
principal city, Kano. To lay a stronger foundation for 
the North's inclusion in the modern economy, we should 
dedicate more resources to educational reform, 
especially in Northern universities but also in 
primary and secondary schools. The USG should also be 
leading donor efforts in vocational training and 
literacy/numeracy training. We should also seek ways 
to expand inter-faith mediation efforts to promote 
greater religious tolerance. We must also make greater 
efforts to use public diplomacy, particularly visiting 
speakers, to explain to Nigeria's Muslims our Middle 
East Policy, the war on terrorism, and religious 
diversity/tolerance in the United States. 
 
 
¶17. (C) What we should not do is to be seen as too 
judgmental and self-righteous on issues such as 
Sharia. Our approach must understand that moderate and 
progressive Muslims are working to bring Nigerian 
Sharia in conformity with international human rights 
standards. Our approach must be nuanced; we should 
support their efforts through private diplomacy and 
avoid categorical public statements about Sharia that 
can be construed as anti-Islamic and that undermine 
these progressive Muslims. 
JETER