This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6 
TAGS: PGOV NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ELECTIONEERING IN NIGERIA; PERCEPTIONS 
BEGIN TO SOUR 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 829 
     ¶B. ABUJA 979 
     ¶C. ABUJA 886 
     ¶D. ABUJA 680 
     ¶E. ABUJA 1029 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reason 1.6X6. 
 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Electoral Law, Electoral Commissioners, 
and funding for the Electoral Commission all have one thing 
in common: The actions taken by the Obasanjo Administration 
on these key electoral issues, however innocent, raise the 
perception of possible early election rigging in Nigeria. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2. (C) The election season has already begun in Nigeria. 
Some candidates for the Presidency have already declared, and 
President Obasanjo is expected to announce his plans for 2003 
soon.  Tensions have started to rise as potential candidates 
and their supporters begin to harshly and vociferously 
criticize the Administration.  History and reality dictate 
that the 2003 elections are likely to include some 
less-than-democratic practices, such as vote-buying (packets 
of rice and 200 Naira notes).  However, we have already begun 
to see some troubling decisions by the Administration that, 
even if made for the most innocent reasons, give rise to the 
perception that the President is stacking the deck. 
 
 
¶3. (C) The paradigm was begun with the controversial 
Electoral Act.  Since the same Act placed local polls after 
state and national polls in 2003, it prohibited new parties 
from participating in state and national elections until 
¶2007.  Such an action could be defended as limiting the 
elections to a manageable number of parties.  However, the 
Governors reacted strongly and brought a case before the 
Supreme Court, as it is in their interest to pack new Local 
Government Councils with members who can turn the local 
governments into electoral machines that are supportive of 
the Governors.  National Assembly members seeking more 
financially lucrative gubernatorial posts and an 
Administration seeking to replace certain governors to 
improve reelection prospects, of course, sought a different 
outcome.  The Supreme Court ruled on March 28 that the 
timetable in the Electoral Law was unconstitutional (Ref E). 
Thus, the Governors won round one, and the Supreme Court 
affirmed it constitutional role.  (However, it is entirely 
unclear that the Independent National Electoral Commission 
and the state electoral commissions are prepared to carry out 
local government elections as early as May 18.) 
 
 
====================== 
WELCOME TO THE MACHINE 
====================== 
 
 
¶4. (C) President Obasanjo's decision to fire 34 Resident 
Electoral Commissioners (RECs) of the INEC was equally 
disturbing for many.  While the President has the legal 
prerogative to change RECs, this action implies a desire to 
exert greater control over state elections (since most of the 
released officers were appointed before his Administration). 
Lame claims from the PDP that there was no ulterior motive to 
this action have not resonated.  Count the APP among those 
who suspect the Obasanjo Administration's electoral 
preparations are less than even-handed. 
 
 
¶5. (C) APP National Chairman Yusuf Ali told reporters that 
his party would sue the Federal Government over the hiring of 
34 new Commissioners to replace the 34 Obasanjo fired several 
weeks ago. (Note: Obasanjo fired all but three of 37 INEC 
State Commissioners resident in the 36 States and the Federal 
Capitol Territory.  The Commissioners are the top INEC 
officials in their jurisdiction and are responsible for the 
preparation of the national election in their locales. End 
Note.)  The APP head claimed that the suit was necessary 
because the new Commissioners were PDP partisans who could 
not be trusted to run impartial elections. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Many of the new Commissioners are PDP loyalists and, 
in at least one state, a member of the PDP state executive 
was appointed to fill the INEC post.  But more importantly, 
according to one source, the President has taken steps to 
make sure PDP party officials in the states and at the 
national level are Obasanjo supporters to prevent threats 
from within his own party.   Commenting to PolMilOff, a PDP 
insider who worked on the 1999 Obasanjo campaign said, "We 
may have to pay someone to challenge the President.  Any real 
opponent would consider the chances of winning and decide not 
to run.  After all, it is hard to lose when you control both 
the players and the referees." 
 
 
======================= 
INEC: NO MONEY; NO VOTE 
======================= 
 
 
¶7. (C) The Administration has yet to release the 8-billion 
Naira (USD 75m) promised by President Obasanjo for INEC to 
begin voter registration and other election preparations. 
(NOTE: NSA Aliyu Mohammed told the Ambassador that the 
Administration is aware of N119 billion that has been 
allocated by the President but is "stuck" in the Central 
Bank, inferring that this was an effort to sabotage the 
Obasanjo Administration.  It is possible that the INEC monies 
are part of these delayed/missing funds.  END NOTE).  INEC 
has blamed the lack of funding for the delays in its work, 
and has begun to solicit funds from donors.  As tight as the 
Nigerian budget is, it is hard to ignore the fact that 
incomplete registration of voters, particularly in the rural 
north, will serve the reelection efforts of the 
Administration.  Unless new rolls are completed, an important 
percentage of the voting population, those who have turned 18 
since the last elections, will be disenfranchised from the 
polls.  Moreover, the names of those who have died since the 
last registration exercise will be fair game for those who 
might choose to vote more than once. 
 
 
======= 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
 
¶8. (C) The validity and outcome of an election is often 
decided long before voting day.  The Obasanjo Administration 
is racking up a series of decisions that give rise to the 
perception of possible early rigging.  As sensitive as 
election issues are likely to be, early discussion with the 
GON about the importance of transparent procedures and the 
importance of how GON actions are perceived is critical.  We 
plan to do just that (See septel on the Mission's Elections 
Working Group). 
Jeter