This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000926 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:03/18/12 
TAGS: PREL ECOWAS MOPS MASS PHUM LI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: LIBERIAN RECONCILIATION CONFERENCE YIELDS 
UNCERTAIN RESULTS 
 
 
REF: MONROVIA 449 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER.  REASONS 1.5 (B) 
AND (D). 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Initially set for March 14, the Liberian 
reconciliation meeting finally opened March 15. The delay 
was due to an unsuccessful eleventh hour attempt by ECOWAS 
ExecSec Chambas to convince President Taylor to attend. 
Taylor declined but sent a 27-person delegation led by 
Agricultural Minister Roland Massaquoi. The LURD also refused to 
participate once the meeting became billed as a preparatory 
session for Taylor's July meeting in Monrovia. The Abuja 
session was mostly contentious, but at times light-hearted 
as old friends and foes exchanged both barbs and embraces. 
Most of the two-day conference was bogged down in 
procedural debates whether the conference was in 
preparation for the Monrovia event and whether the Monrovia 
delegation should be seated. Predictably short on specifics 
but the product of much parsing, the final communique 
called, inter alia, for a GOL-LURD cease-fire and an 
environment conducive to fair elections (A copy has been 
faxed to AF/W). Chambas has told us the LURD will visit 
Abuja for discussions with ECOWAS, perhaps as early as this 
weekend. Also, the ECOWAS Ministerial on Security will 
discuss Liberia on March 29 in Dakar.  Reftel provides a 
well-written read-out of the conference from one 
participant's perspective.  We hope this message complements 
Monrovia's by providing a sampling of participants' 
comments while actually at the conference. End summary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶2. (C) For a moment it appeared the conference might 
collapse before getting started. While waiting for Chambas 
to return from Monrovia hopefully with Taylor in tow, the 
opening was delayed from March 14 to March 15. Chambas 
returned without Taylor but not completely empty-handed. 
Although refusing to leave Monrovia, Taylor sent a 27 
person delegation headed by Agriculture Minister Massaquoi; 
the group included UPP Presidential candidate Baccus 
Matthews, True Whig Party figure Rudolph Sherman, Krahn 
activist Bai Gbala and other civic and religious leaders. 
Whether the Taylor delegation would be allowed to 
participate became the first procedural bone of contention. 
Opposition figures were incensed that Chambas, after 
consulting with Taylor, had downgraded the meeting to a 
preparatory session, without conferring with any of them. 
They were further angered when the Monrovia delegation 
insisted that it did not speak for the GOL although sent by 
Taylor himself. The first day of the conference was spent 
trying to overcome the opposition's refusal to sit down 
with the Taylor delegation; the issue was not resolved 
until the early morning of March 16 when the Monrovia delegation 
finally agreed that it represented the GOL. 
 
 
 
 
¶3. (C) However, the question of whether the meeting was in 
preparation for the July Monrovia meeting continued to 
hover over the second day. Opposition figures, particularly 
the expatriate Liberians, vigorously protested against the 
notion.  Massaquoui's present only reinforced their 
reservations.  He had organized Taylor's last 
reconciliation meeting three years ago in Monrovia. That 
meeting had done nothing to stop Liberia's current 
troubles; they saw Massaquoi's presence as a reminder or an 
omen that another Taylor-driven Monrovia meeting would be 
no more productive now than three years ago.  Moreover, 
several claimed they would not return to Monrovia until 
steps were taken to ensure their personal security.  They 
were not willing to take Taylor's assurances of personal 
safety at face value; they wanted guarantees from ECOWAS 
and the international community. This desire became a 
central focus of the conference. 
 
 
¶4. (C) The other important procedural issue was the 
composition of civil society participants. While this issue 
did not delay the proceedings, many opposition figures held 
the perception that Chambas had been hoodwinked by Taylor 
and company; they felt he had been induced to include in 
the civil society complement people whose sympathies for 
Taylor did not accurately reflect the civic society 
mainstream. Dusty Wolokollie, an opposition politician 
(LPP) who managed to insert himself in the conference after 
being left off the initial roster, claimed that Chambas 
worked out the list with Taylor and GOL ForMin Captan but 
did not adequately consult with the political parties and 
human rights groups.  Chambas erred by inviting only 
individuals with name recognition but not making sure all 
key institutions and political parties were represented. 
 
 
¶5. (C) Former Interim Government President Amos Sawyer was 
less charitable toward Chambas, according to Conmany 
Wesseh, a close Sawyer aide. During a private aside, Sawyer 
chided Chambas that GOL Formin Captan did not have to 
attend because Chambas was doing Captan's work for him. 
According to Chambas, Sawyer's only refrain during the 
conference was the imperative of forming an interim 
government to prepare for eventual elections. 
 (Comment:  Sawyer's aspersion was unfair but demonstrates 
the animosity and deep feelings that divide the Liberian 
polity. It probably served to remind Chambas, who has been 
away from the Liberian issue for several years, about how 
difficult it is to maintain good relations with both 
opposition and the GOL. The minute a person is seen as 
listening to one side, the other becomes gripped with 
suspicious.  End comment.) 
 
 
----------------------- 
A TALE OF TWO DOCUMENTS 
----------------------- 
 
 
¶6.  (U) In the end, the conference produced two papers: 1) 
The Position Statement signed by civil society leaders, 
including those from the Monrovia delegation and 2) The 
Final Communique agreed to by the political opposition and 
the GOL delegation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Position Statement: In addition to criticizing 
Taylor's government, the paper calls for a regional force 
to guarantee security, a cease-fire between the LURD-GOL, 
credible elections, including a retooled electoral 
commission, restructuring of the security forces by ECOWAS 
and the UN, and the investigation of human rights abuses 
and war crimes by bodies established by the UN and ECOWAS. 
Opposition figure Togba Na Tipoteh told Polcouns that the 
getting the civic society members in the Taylor delegation 
to endorse the position paper was not difficult. Tipoteh 
said he and Amos Sawyer had met privately with some of the 
group during the late evening of March 15 to persuade them 
to back the position statement. A few conference participants 
assigned much more significance to the statement than the final 
communique. Civil society members pledged to present it to Taylor 
and publish it widely in Liberia. Alhaji Kromah claimed Chambas 
had promised to present the position paper to ECOWAS 
Security Ministerial later this month in Dakar. ECOWAS 
would forward the document to the UN to inform discussions 
about Liberia in the Security Council, Kromah hoped. 
However, others were less sanguine.  Laveli Supuwood, 
former Taylor Justice Minister but current Taylor foe with 
ties to the LURD, said that he heard from a member of 
Taylor's team that the document had already been sent to 
taylor who described it and the conference as a "waste of 
time." 
 
 
 
 
¶8. (C) Final Communique: Coming up with the agreed text was 
difficult. Again, the sides debated whether the Abuja 
meeting would be characterized as preparatory for the July 
meeting.  Opposition figures were inflexible; Taylor' 
people were equally adamant.  The compromise was to refer 
to the meeting as preparatory but not specify for what. 
Thus, the communique does not mention the July meeting. The 
GOL team dug in their heels when the opposition wanted 
language about an international stabilization force and 
other proposals from the position statement.  In the end, 
there was very little common ground between the sides and 
no substantive breakthroughs.  Consequently, the communique 
basically restates the statements made by both sides but 
does not reconcile or meld them.  The document's 
penultimate paragraph is a rather anodyne and vague 
prescription for national reconciliation: (a) GOL-LURD 
cease-fire, (b) physical security, (c) protection of 
individual rights and respect for the rule of law and (d) 
free and fair elections.  However, the document mentions no 
mechanisms or next steps for achieving these goals. 
 
 
 
 
¶9. (C) During a March 17 meeting with Ambassador Jeter, 
Chambas dismissed the notion of deploying ECOMOG to provide 
protection for prospective participants in the July 
Monrovia meeting. However, he mused about the possibility 
of deploying an ECOMOG force along the Guinea/Sierra 
Leone/Liberia border to prevent LURD infiltration into 
Liberia.  Jeter told Chambas that this idea had been 
floated before; it was discarded then and it was unlikely 
to be accepted now. 
 
 
------------------------ 
Chambas to Meet the LURD 
------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
¶10.  (C) While the LURD did not participate, they are being 
drawn into the discussion. During a March 17 conversation, 
Chambas told Ambassador Jeter that Supuwood had furnished 
names and phone numbers of the LURD hierarchy. Chambas 
stated they had agreed to visit Abuja for discussions with 
ECOWAS.  From the names Supuwood provided, such as Jackson 
Doe, the LURD seemed more Krahn-dominated than Mandingo. 
This gave rise to the question of Roosevelt Johnson's 
whereabouts, as he now seems to have disappeared from Jos 
(Nigeria). 
 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
CONFERENCE SOUND BITES 
----------------------- 
 
 
 
 
¶11.  (C) Here are a few telling snippets of conversations 
Polcouns had on the margins, the last day of the event: 
 
 
 
 
-- Tipoteh:  Taylor is a con man par excellence.  However, 
we must expose him by making him make pledges at these 
meetings then raising an outcry when he reneges.  Piling 
the blame for Liberia's woes at Taylor's feet will be the 
only way to get the public to endorse a general strike or 
take to the streets. We must build 
a case against him that even he cannot sidestep. 
 
 
-- Gbala: "I do not know what Amos (Amos Sawyer) was 
thinking." By trying to insert the call for an interim 
government and a peacekeeping force in the final 
communique, it appeared that Sawyer was trying to make the 
communique so odious that Taylor could do nothing but 
repudiate it. Both items are bete noire for Taylor as they 
either challenge his legitimacy as the elected president or 
the sovereignty of Liberia itself.  Instead of trying to 
anger Taylor, it would be better to get him to agree to 
promises that he cannot easily reject then hold his feet to 
the fire when he fails to perform. 
 
 
 
 
-- Blamo Nelson (Taylor's Director of Cabinet): The last 
five years have been hellish.  President Taylor has a real 
vision for Liberia and genuinely wants reconciliation but 
both have eluded us thus far. Judging by the level of 
acrimony at this conference, we still have a long way to 
go.  In fact, the conference would have collapsed if the 
GOL team had not compromised throughout.  Yet, we want to 
continue the process with a conference in Monrovia but many 
on the other side will not attend. 
 
 
-- Almost Everyone: We are tired and getting too old for 
this. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
 
¶12. (C) For a moment, it appeared the conference might 
have been stillborn.  Fortunately, it took place. 
While there was no dramatic breakthrough, that ECOWAS 
has created a framework through which the Liberians 
can channel their discussion about the major issues 
confronting them is a modest, but positive step. 
Although the LURD did not attend, their acceptance of 
the Chambas invitation to visit Abuja is a good sign. 
Supuwood said that would return to Guinea to confer 
with LURD and advise them to present reasonable 
demands to Chambas. For real progress to be made, the 
Liberians sooner or later must agree on specific 
confidence-building measures that open the door to 
reconciliation and create a level electoral playing 
field.  Ultimately, that road leads to the Executive 
Mansion in Monrovia and its heretofore incorrigible 
first tenant.  ECOWAS and Chambas definitely have 
their work cut out for them. 
JETER