This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000695 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, AF/RA AND AF/E 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO JEFF MILLINGTON, OFFICE OF SUDAN SPECIAL 
ENVOY 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME, OSLO FOR AFRICA WATCHERS 
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT 
NSC FOR FRAZER AND MILLER 
DIA FOR J.GERHARD 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2012 
TAGS: PREL PINS MASS MOPS CG SU BY ZI NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED ON NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d). 
 
 
¶1. (U) This message was delayed in transmission, but contains 
information that may be of value to end-users. 
 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Jeter and NSA Mohammed February 6 
discussed the Ikeja cantonment tragedy and Nigeria's request 
for large-scale EOD assistance.  Mohammed also briefed the 
Ambassador on measures taken in northern Nigeria to forestall 
reprisals in the wake of the Yoruba-Hausa ethnic clashes in 
Lagos.  The two also discussed various regional conflicts. On 
Sudan, Ambassador Jeter informed the NSA about Senator 
Danforth's efforts to obtain the agreement of Bashir and 
Garang to our proposed four confidence building measures; for 
his part, Mohammed said that Nigeria was content with its 
current behind-the-scenes role of nudging the parties toward 
dialogue, whatever the forum.  On DROC, Mohammed thought the 
key to progress was to get Kabila, Bemba, and Onusumba to 
talk, implying he did not think the Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
would yield much fruit without these three reaching an 
understanding.  Mohammed stated Nigeria was deeply concerned 
about Zimbabwe and that an avenue for a graceful Mugabe exit 
was needed.  Closer to home, Sierra Leone was on the mend 
with the official declaration of the war's end.  Meanwhile, 
Charles Taylor, because of his own internal problems, was 
being less of a problem elsewhere in the region.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
=============== 
IKEJA AND LAGOS 
=============== 
 
 
¶3. (C) After discussing the Ikeja explosion and President 
Obasanjo's special appeal for assistance, Nigerian National 
Security Advisor, retired LTG Aliyu Mohammed expressed his 
concern about the ammunition depot in his hometown, Gusau 
(Zamfara State).  He said the depot had been there for years, 
and the town grew around the site as the population expanded. 
 Now, instead of being on the outskirts, the depot was 
practically in the middle of the state capital.  He voiced 
interest in an EOD support team assessing all munitions 
facilities in Nigeria.  (COMMENT:  Such assessment visits are 
now incorporated into the overall support concept of our EOD 
assistance to Nigeria.  END COMMENT.) 
 
 
¶4. (C) When Ambassador Jeter expressed concern that the 
Yoruba-Hausa conflict in Lagos could spark reprisal attacks 
in the North, Mohammed retorted that the GON had enlisted the 
support of Northern governors and traditional leaders to do 
their statesmen-like best to make certain that there were no 
violent repercussions in the North, as had happened in the 
past.  Additionally, the police were being visibly deployed 
in strategic locations to deter incitement of violence. 
 
 
=============== 
POLICE TRAINING 
=============== 
 
 
¶5. (C) NSA Mohammed was grateful when the Ambassador informed 
him the Embassy would begin a police-training program 
including curricula development, a centralized criminal 
database and the placement of a U.S. advisor in Police 
Headquarters.  He volunteered to inform the President 
immediately. 
 
 
===================== 
FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES 
===================== 
 
 
¶6. (C) SUDAN: After stressing that our policy was not to 
create another peace initiative in competition with IGAD or 
the Egyptian initiative, Ambassador Jeter told Mohammed about 
Special Envoy Danforth's January trip to the area and the 
progress made, particularly on the Nuba mountains cease-fire. 
 Mohammed thought that maintenance and expansion of the 
ceasefire was critical.   After its plans to host an 
all-Sudanese conference were aborted late last year, Nigeria 
had been content with limiting its efforts to encouraging all 
parties to communicate.  Mohammed informed us that Tripoli 
was trying to become more active in promoting the Egypt-Libya 
Initiative (ELI).  Tripoli had called a March /April meeting 
on Sudan and had invited Nigeria to be an observer. The NSA 
extended an invitation to Senator Danforth to visit  Abuja on 
any future trips to Africa. 
 
 
¶7. (C) DROC: Mohammed said Nigeria continued to encourage 
Osunumba and Bemba to meet Kabila.  However, they continued 
to balk at any venue where Kabila was accorded the status of 
Head of State.  They felt this gave Kabila an undeserved aura 
of legitimacy when, in fact, he was handed power only because 
of his father's demise. Since Kabila was not democratically 
elected and because he controlled less than half the national 
territory, Kabila should be treated as one of three equal 
faction leaders. 
 
 
¶8. (C) ZIMBABWE: Mohammed expressed strong concern about 
Zimbabwe.  He revealed that Obasanjo had hosted MDC President 
Morgan Tsvangirai for two days in Abuja prior to the 
President's late January trip to Harare.  When President 
Obasanjo met with Mugabe, according to the NSA, Obasanjo 
recommended that Mugabe consider retirement.  However, Mugabe 
responded that he was committed to run, having passed the 
point of no return with regard to keeping his word to his 
followers.  Mugabe said that he could only consider retiring 
after winning the election.  Mohammed opined that Mugabe was 
old and that part of him wanted to leave politics, but the 
other part feared his vulnerability to prosecution by his 
opponents should he leave the Presidency.  Moreover, Mugabe 
and his henchmen were profiting from trade in Congolese 
diamonds due to his close relationship with Kabila.  This 
lucrative interest would likely die once Mugabe left high 
office.  While eventually Mugabe must go, Mohammed wondered 
how the MDC could govern if it came to power in the short 
term.  "All of the government structures in Zimbabwe," 
including the police and security services, were "100 percent 
ZANU-PF," implying that any MDC government could be paralyzed 
by a disloyal civil service and security apparatus. 
 
 
¶9. (C) LIBERIA:  "We don't trust Taylor," Mohammed said.   If 
the Liberian President had his druthers, he would try to sate 
his large appetite for power at the expense of his neighbors. 
 However, Taylor has to think small now due to the pressures 
on him.  Worried about the LURD and afraid of being labeled a 
terrorist supporter in the aftermath of September 11, Taylor 
was trying to convince the world that he was reforming, to 
preempt further international pressure and isolation. 
 
 
¶10. (C) Mohammed also had no compliments for Burkina Faso's 
Blaise Campaore.  While Campaore had invited some of Taylor's 
political opposition to set up shop in Burkina, the NSA did 
not believe Campaore had broken from Taylor.  Nigeria 
continued to support holding an ECOWAS-sponsored Liberian 
reconciliation meeting in Abuja as soon as this could be 
arranged. 
Jeter