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Viewing cable 02ROME73, RUGGIERO'S DEPARTURE DOES NOT EQUATE TO EUROPE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02ROME73 2002-01-07 13:35 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rome
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IT PREL IT EU EUPGOV ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: RUGGIERO'S DEPARTURE DOES NOT EQUATE TO EUROPE 
WITHOUT ITALY 
 
REF: A) ROME 67 B) ROME 65 C) 2001 ROME 6573 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  00073  01 OF 02  071555Z 
CLASSIFIED BY: CHARGE WILLIAM P. POPE, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY AND COMMENT:  MEDIA ANALYSIS TO THE 
CONTRARY, THE WEEKEND "RESIGNATION" (UNDER DURESS) OF FM 
RENATO RUGGIERO DOES NOT EQUATE TO AN ABOUT-FACE IN ITALY'S 
PRO-EUROPEAN STANCE.  ITALY WILL REMAIN SOLIDLY IN EUROPE -- 
AND IN NATO, AND A SOLID PARTNER OF THE U.S.  RUGGIERO'S 
DEPARTURE IS THE END OF A FORCED MARRIAGE BETWEEN TWO 
STRONG-WILLED INDIVIDUALS, ONE OF WHOM (RUGGIERO) HAD NO 
ORGANIZED POLITICAL SUPPORT.  BERLUSCONI IS LIKELY TO SELECT 
(BUT NOT NECESSARILY SOON) A POLITICIAN TO REPLACE RUGGIERO, 
SOMEONE WHO WILL ENSURE THAT IN FOREIGN POLICY, AS IN 
DOMESTIC, THE GOI SPEAKS WITH ONE VOICE.  AT THE SAME TIME, 
THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO ASSERT ITALY'S 
RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS WITHIN THE INSTITUTIONS TO 
WHICH IT BELONGS, SOMETHING THAT IS ANATHEMA TO ITALY'S LEFT. 
 END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
2.  (C)  DESPITE SOME MEDIA HEADLINES TRUMPETING THE TRIUMPH 
OF THOSE IN THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT WHO ARE "AGAINST 
EUROPE," THE WEEKEND RESIGNATION OF ITALY'S FOREIGN MINISTER 
RENATO RUGGIERO DOES NOT SIGNIFY THAT THE GOI IS TURNING ITS 
BACK ON EUROPE.  THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF SAID ITALY'S 
FUTURE LIES "IN A STRONGER EUROPE" AND STRESSED "ITALY'S 
ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT TO THE EURO, TO EUROPE AND TO NATO."  ALL 
GOI CABINET-LEVEL OFFICIALS HAVE SAID MUCH THE SAME THING -- 
PERCEIVED CRITICISM OR LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THE EURO 
NOTWITHSTANDING.  FINANCE MINISTER TREMONTI, A BLUNT, 
LONG-TIME EURO-SKEPTIC, SAID THE GOI'S "PRO-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
POLICY...HAS BEEN PROVEN...  WE BELIEVE IN THE EURO."  AND 
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FINI ADDED "WE REMAIN TOTALLY COMMITTED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  00073  01 OF 02  071555Z 
TO EUROPE."  WHILE BERLUSCONI AND HIS MINISTERS HAVE 
OCCASIONALLY MADE CLEAR THEIR DESIRE TO ENSURE THAT ITALY'S 
INTERESTS ARE NOTED AND RESPECTED BY ITS EUROPEAN COLLEAGUES, 
THEY HAVE NEVER THREATENED TO TAKE ITALY OUT OF EUROPE.  ANY 
MENTION OF "ITALIAN INTERESTS" AS SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM 
"EUROPEAN INTERESTS," HOWEVER, IS ANATHEMA TO THE ITALIAN 
LEFT.  WHILE NOT WANTING TO GET ON THE BANDWAGON OF SEEING 
PLOTS AND CONSPIRACIES, IT IS A FACT THAT MOST EUROPEAN 
NATIONS ARE CURRENTLY HEADED BY CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENTS, MANY 
OF WHOM HAD, AND PROBABLY RETAIN, DEEP SUSPICIONS OF 
BERLUSCONI HIMSELF AND HIS NORTHERN LEAGUE AND NATIONAL 
ALLIANCE PARTNERS.  THE EUROPEAN MEDIA ALSO TEND TO REFLECT 
SUCH VIEWPOINTS. 
 
3.  (C)  THE BERLUSCONI GOVERNMENT IS WARY THAT THE UNION IS 
MOVING TOO FAR, TOO FAST ON MANY ISSUES, THAT ITALY'S 
INTERESTS ARE NOT BEING CONSIDERED (A REFLECTION PERHAPS OF 
BEING SEEN AS A LESSER PLAYER IN THE EU), AND THAT THE 
COMMISSION IS HAM-STRINGING ITALY IN DEMANDING THAT STABILITY 
PACT TARGETS BE FULFILLED.  FINI CONTINUED HIS QUOTE ABOVE 
SAYING "WE ALSO RESERVE OUR RIGHT TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS, 
JUST AS THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS AND THE BRITISH DO." 
TREMONTI STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT THE SINGLE CURRENCY IS NOT 
THE PANACEA TO EUROPE'S ECONOMIC WOES, THOUGH IT WILL HELP TO 
FACILITATE BUSINESS AND TRADE.  HE WOULD PREFER THAT THE 
COMMISSION STICK TO FUNCTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. 
RETICENCE TOWARD THE EURO AND THE COMMISSION ARE NOT, 
HOWEVER, TANTAMOUNT TO OPPOSING EITHER THE UNION OR THE EURO. 
 AND THE EURO-SKEPTICS IN THE GOVERNMENT HAVE THEIR 
COUNTERBALANCES.  PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC CIAMPI REMAINS ON 
BOARD AND COULD BE EXPECTED TO PUT UP A STRONG FIGHT, AS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        ROME  00073  01 OF 02  071555Z 
WOULD THE ITALIAN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENT, IF SKEPTICISM LED TO 
AN IDEA OF FORSAKING EUROPE -- WHICH THIS GOVERNMENT DOES NOT 
INTEND TO DO. 
 
4.  (C)  RUGGIERO'S DEPARTURE IS THE RESULT OF A CLASH OF 
PERSONALITIES AND STYLES, AS MUCH AS ANYTHING ELSE. 
RUGGIERO, AS NOTED REF A AND C, WAS TO SOME DEGREE FOISTED ON 
BERLUSCONI.  HIS "MEDDLING" IN DEFENSE MATTERS (REF C), AND 
MORE RECENTLY IN THE EURO (REF A) WAS GUARANTEED NOT TO 
ENDEAR HIM TO HIS FELLOW MINISTERS.  IN THE MORE RECENT 
EXCHANGES, HIS TRUMPETING OF HIS OWN POPULARITY (WHICH 
ACCORDING TO RECENT POLLS REMAINS HIGH -- HIGHER THAN 
BERLUSCONI'S), ESPECIALLY AMONG OPPOSITION POLITICIANS, WAS 
EQUALLY CERTAIN TO RAISE THE HACKLES OF HIS BOSS, THE PM.  AS 
A "TECHNOCRATIC MINISTER" (WHETHER OR NOT HE LIKES THE TERM), 
RUGGIERO LACKED A POLITICAL PARTY TO SUPPORT HIM, TO TELL THE 
PM THAT "THIS IS OUR PERSON ON YOUR TEAM AND HE MUST STAY." 
AS THE PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT, RUGGIERO MIGHT HAVE BEEN 
EXPECTED TO SHOW LOYALTY, CALM MATTERS DOWN, OPERATE BEHIND 
THE SCENES.  BUT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE.  WHILE BERLUSCONI MAY 
HAVE PLAYED THE SAME GAME, RUGGIERO HAS AT TIMES ACTED IN A 
PETULANT MANNER, COMING CLOSE TO CHORTLING OVER HIS VICTORIES 
(AS IN THE ARREST WARRANT CASE) IN PUBLIC. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1715 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  00073  02 OF 02  071557Z 
ACTION EUR-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   ACQ-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00 
      DS-00    VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    L-00 
      AC-01    NSAE-00  OMB-01   OPIC-01  PA-00    PC-01    PM-00 
      PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SCT-00   SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00 
      TRSE-00  USIE-00  EPAE-00  SNIS-00  NISC-00  PMB-00   DSCC-00 
      DRL-02   G-00     NFAT-00  SAS-00     /007W 
                  ------------------5446FA  071557Z /75 
O 071335Z JAN 02 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1528 
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY 
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY 
USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 000073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2012 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IT PREL IT EU EUPGOV ITALIAN POLITICS
SUBJECT: RUGGIERO'S DEPARTURE DOES NOT EQUATE TO EUROPE 
WITHOUT ITALY 
 
5.  (C)  RUGGIERO'S DEPARTURE, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        ROME  00073  02 OF 02  071557Z 
BERLUSCONI'S PROMISE TO HOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S PORTFOLIO 
FOR "AT LEAST SIX MONTHS," MAY SIGNAL CHANGES IN THE MFA, BUT 
THESE ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE IN TERMS OF SOME PERSONNEL.  AS 
NOTED REF C, WE WONDER IF INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE PERCEIVED AS 
BEING EITHER "RUGGIERO'S" OR LESS THAN ENTHUSIASTIC IN 
PROMOTING GOI POLICY MIGHT BE CHANGED.  BERLUSCONI ALSO 
INDICATED IN EARLY PRESS INTERVIEWS THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE 
INCREASED EMPHASIS BY ITALIAN AMBASSADORS ON SUPPORTING 
ITALY'S SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESSES AND INCREASING 
EXPORTS.  HE SUGGESTED HE WOULD LIKE TO EVALUATE AMBASSADORS 
ON THESE TERMS AND PERHAPS APPOINT MORE POLITICAL 
AMBASSADORS.  THESE KINDS OF CHANGES DO NOT PORTEND A DRASTIC 
CHANGE IN FOCUS FOR ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, BUT RATHER A 
CHANGE IN NUANCE REFLECTIVE OF BERLUSCONI'S STYLE AND 
PRIORITIES. 
 
6.  (C)  SIMILARLY, RUGGIERO'S DEPARTURE DOES NOT FORETELL A 
WEAKENING OF ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR NATO OR A WEAKER PARTNERSHIP 
WITH THE U.S.  BERLUSCONI BELIEVES HIMSELF TO BE ON CLOSE 
PERSONAL TERMS WITH PRESIDENT BUSH AND HAS EVERY INTENTION OF 
FURTHER CEMENTING THAT RELATIONSHIP.  BERLUSCONI APPEARS TO 
HAVE SOLID PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THIS POSITION, AS OPINION POLLS 
CONTINUE TO REFLECT SOLID BACKING FOR STRONG ITALIAN TIES TO 
BOTH EUROPE AND THE U.S. 
 
7.  (C)  WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT THE OPPOSITION WILL TAKE 
ADVANTAGE OF THE CHANGE TO WORK AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.  AS 
ONE OBSERVER NOTED, "THAT'S THE WAY OF ITALIAN POLITICS." 
BUT THE GOVERNMENT RETAINS ITS STRONG MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT; 
PERHAPS THAT IS WHY BERLUSCONI WAS QUICK TO PRONOUNCE HIMSELF 
READY FOR A PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        ROME  00073  02 OF 02  071557Z 
WE WOULD NOT EXPECT SUCH A DEBATE TO SHOW AN ITALY HOSTILE TO 
EUROPE, TO NATO, OR TO THE U.S.  RATHER, IT IS LIKELY THE 
OPPOSITION WOULD LEVEL ANTI-EUROPE CHARGES AT THE GOVERNMENT, 
WHICH WOULD RESPOND BY DECLARING ITS LOYALTY TO ALL THE ABOVE 
INSTITUTIONS TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY PROTECT ITALY'S 
INTERESTS.  WE ARE MORE LIKELY TO SEE AN ESCALATION OF CLAIMS 
ABOUT WHO IS MORE LOYAL TO EUROPE THAN WHO IS MORE ANXIOUS TO 
LEAVE IT. 
 
8.  (C)  IN TERMS OF PREDICTING THE FUTURE, IT APPEARS 
POSSIBLE THAT BERLUSCONI MAY HOLD THE MFA REINS FOR SEVERAL 
MONTHS.  FOLLOWING THAT, WE THINK IT MOST LIKELY HE WILL 
APPOINT A TRUSTED POLITICAL ALLY TO HEAD THE MFA, SOMEONE HE 
CAN COUNT ON TO PREVENT FUTURE PUBLIC EMBARRASSMENTS OF THE 
KIND HE SUFFERED REPEATEDLY WITH RUGGIERO.  IN THE MEANTIME, 
WE DO NOT EXPECT A WHOLESALE WITCH-HUNT FOR THE "LEFTISTS" 
PERCEIVED BY SOME ON THE RIGHT TO BE INFILTRATING THE 
FARNESINA.  BERLUSCONI MAY NEED SOME OF THE TOP LEVEL TO HELP 
HIM RUN THE PLACE FOR A TIME.  IN THE NEAR TERM, SECRETARY 
GENERAL BALDOCCI WILL LIKELY BE A MORE IMPORTANT PLAYER.  ON 
THE OTHER HAND, POLITICAL DIRECTOR ARAGONA, COORDINATOR FOR 
COUNTERTERRORISM ARMELLINI, AND OTHERS PERCEIVED AS DIRECT 
"RUGGIERO MEN" MAY BE LOOKING FOR NEW POSITIONS OVER THE 
MEDIUM TERM. 
POPE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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 2002ROME00073 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL