Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 02ABUJA235, NIGERIA: EMBASSY COMMENTS ON NARCOTICS ANALYSIS

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #02ABUJA235.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
02ABUJA235 2002-01-25 17:03 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET//NOFORN Embassy Abuja
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 000235 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
 
FOR INL A/S BEERS AND AF A/S KANSTEINER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5, 1.6X6 
TAGS: SNAR NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA:  EMBASSY COMMENTS ON NARCOTICS ANALYSIS 
          AND DRUG CERTIFICATION 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter; Reasons 1.6X5, 
1.6X6. 
 
 
1. (S/NF) The following are Embassy,s comments on the CIA 
Assessment dated December 28, 2001 and entitled &Nigeria: 
Avoiding Counterdrug Reforms.8   We understand the 
assessment was first distributed at a January 4, 2002 
INL-chaired interagency meeting on Nigeria,s certification. 
The Embassy welcomes the opportunity to comment o nthe report 
and its conclusions. 
 
 
General Observation 
------------------- 
 
 
2.(S/NF) The Embassy believes the assessment,s conclusion 
that the GON lacks commitment to counter-narcotics law 
enforcement is unsubstantiated and paints a misleading 
picture of GON efforts during the past year.  From our 
perspective, a more appropriate conclusion would have been 
that Nigeria continues to move in the right direction but 
does, in facto, have a long way to go in overcoming serious 
institutional and resource obstacles to a vigorous and 
effective counter-narcotics strategy.  However, given the 
myriad demands on the GON,s finite resources, the degree of 
progress and the level of resource allocation indicates 
political commitment to counternarcotics that, albeit 
incomplete, should be encouraged, not dismissively treated as 
negligible. 
 
 
3. (S/NF) In portraying the Obasanjo Administration as either 
reticent or opposed (due to corruption) to improved drug 
control efforts, the assessment has selectively culled from 
open sources and Embassy reporting instead of weighing the 
entirety of reporting to get a more accurate picture.  The 
notion that President Obasanjo has not supported 
counter-narcotics reforms in the last year is simply not 
true.  In many meetings with the President, we have raised 
our anti-drug concerns and Obasanjo has always responded 
positively and quickly.  Though the President seemed unaware 
of the precise requirements of certification during an early 
July meeting (Abuja 1547), he nonetheless responded 
positively to the reforms that we encouraged, and 
subsequnetly increased the budget of the NDLEA. 
 
 
4. (S/NF) The following are comments linked to specific 
points raised in the assessment: 
 
 
--One Anti-Drug Agency.  The assessment portrays the NDLEA,s 
role as the sole law enforcement agency with an express 
counter-narcotics mandate as a weakness in Nigeria,s 
performance.  This is not the case.  We have never considered 
this a deficiency and we have not encouraged the GON to 
enlist other agencies in the anti-drug effort.  Thus, the 
assessment faults the GON for a perceived lapse of which they 
have never been put on notice.  Moreover, the NDLEA has a 
dedicated staff far superior to that of Nigerian Customs, 
Police or any other law enforcement agency.  The NDLEA 
receives greater resources and better training because of its 
exclusive mandate.  We support this specialization in drug 
control efforts ) it is resource-efficient, limits potential 
corruption, and it has been effective.  Moreover, we should 
not forget that we have the best access and relationship with 
the NDLEA in the history of the Mission; only three years ago 
we had difficulty meeting with the Chairman of the NDLEA, let 
alone getting NDLEA to act. 
 
 
-- The Vice President:  While the Vice President,s alleged 
corruption while in the Customs Service is common knowledge, 
we  have no evidence that Atiku was ever involved in abetting 
drug smuggling.  Nigeria,s ridiculously high tariffs make it 
easy for Customs officers to get rich without involving 
themselves in the drug trade.  Moreover, we have never seen 
any overt or covert attempt by the VP to undermine the NDLEA. 
 To the contrary, he has been helpful in pushing forward 
NDLEA Chairman Lafiaji,s FY2002 request for an additional 
two billion naira in capital expenditures for the NDLEA. 
 
 
--Counter-Drug Positions:  The assessment,s statement that 
&In 2001 key positions in Nigeria,s counter-drug 
bureaucracy went unfulfilled8 needs explanation.  Ibrahim 
Lame, for two years the Senior Special Assistant to the 
President on Drugs and Financial Crimes, was relieved of his 
duties in mid-2001.  The position was subsequently abolished 
because it was redundant and its utility was marginal.  The 
Senior Special Assistant had no control over resources or 
personnel.  He added little to policy formulation, and was 
not a key player.  A Director will head the far stronger 
Financial Crimes Commission, which will control significant 
resources and will have both policy coordination and 
operational roles. 
--Similarly, the statement that &promises to increase the 
counter-drug budget were not kept8 is also inaccurate.  The 
Chairman of the Senate Committee of Drugs and Financial 
Crimes, Lawal Shaibu, working closely with Chairman Lafiaji, 
in early 2001 drafted a proposed supplementary budget request 
of two billion naira (at the time about USD 20 million). 
This was not/not the Federal Government,s request, but 
rather a proposal emanating from the National Assembly. 
Senator Shuaibu and other National Assembly supporters of the 
NDLEA made this substantial request with the full expectation 
that the Presidency could only grant a portion of it given 
overall budgetary constraints.  (Note:  Shuaibu has again 
made such a request for the FY2002 budget now being 
considered )- 1.3 billion naira for the NDLEA. End Note) 
 
 
--Lafiaji: Strong Staying Power.  Chairman Bello Lafiaji has 
already outlasted his past two predecessors and shows no sign 
of leaving the job or waning in his enthusiasm, commitment 
and performance.  He has a high integrity rating.  We have 
seen no credible reports indicating any ties to suspected 
drug traffickers, and as far as we know,  Lafiaji is beyond 
reproach.  This stands in stark contrast to Lafiaji,s 
predecessors.  President Obasanjo has told us that he is 
pleased with Lafiaji,s performance and he has repeated 
expressed his support for the Chairman,s leadership, most 
recently on National television December 18, 2001, when he 
bestowed one of Nigeria,s highest honors ) the Order of the 
Niger ) on the Chairman for his work. 
 
 
--There has been no corroboration of the sensitive 
intelligence report that Lafiaji is under threat of being 
ousted by officials in the Presidency.  Even if some in the 
Presidency oppose Lafiaji, he clearly still enjoys the 
President,s support.  And that,s the point that should be 
made.  In fact, Lafiaji,s role and authority are likely to 
grow with the passing of Attorney General Bola Ige from the 
scene. (Ige was a very strong supporter of Lafiaji,s NDLEA 
leadership.) 
 
 
--Extradition:  Nigeria has never extradited a U.S. fugitive 
for drug trafficking ) the reference to U.S. extraditions 
under the Abacha regime in 1994 is in error.  Nigeria has, 
however, rendered into USG custody several important USG 
fugitives, including drug traffickers sent to U.S. trials in 
1994 under General Abacha,s rule and international terrorist 
(Egypt Air highjacking) Rezaq under Babaginda,s rule.  Most 
recently, in November 2000 President Obasanjo ordered the 
rendition of four fugitives, including two drug traffickers 
on the U.S. President,s list of 12 International Drug 
Kingpins.  The GON carried out these renditions with 
considerable political risk because they wanted to meet our 
requirements but knew that they could not comply under 
current judicial arrangements, with corrupt judges in place. 
The GON offered additional renditions, but we said that we 
could not accept its methods in doing so. 
 
 
--The Obasanjo administration has been and remains committed 
to cooperation in turning over fugitives from U.S. justice. 
The President and the late Attorney General often expressed 
their conviction that Nigeria should not become a haven for 
international criminals.  Yet they conceded, and we have 
acknowledged, that Nigeria cannot develop and 
institutionalize an efficient extradition process that 
provides all the adequate due process safeguards in the near 
term.  Sixteen consecutive years of military rule destroyed 
the judiciary.  We should not pressure a two year-old 
democratically elected government to effectuate extradition 
without due observance of the rule of law. 
 
 
--The paramount importance of the rule of law is something 
that we have been telling the Nigerians.  Previously we 
encouraged, even demanded, that Nigeria hand over -- using 
whatever means necessary -- at least two fugitives in 2000. 
Because we recognize the long-term importance of building an 
appreciation for the rule of law, we no longer want to see 
U.S. fugitives handed over in the way accepted before; we now 
correctly encourage the Nigerians to develop a process that 
observes procedural and substantive due process much like we 
have in the United States.  Thus, because of the balancing of 
these rule-of-law and law enforcement considerations, we must 
give the current Administration a more reasonable amount of 
time before concluding that they are non-cooperative 
regarding extradition. 
 
 
--Corruption:  The Obasanjo Administration has clearly 
improved the fight against corruption in the past year.  The 
Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses 
Commission (ICPC) celebrated its first birthday in September 
2001.  The Commission,s first group of dedicated staff ) 
investigators, prosecutors, and administrators ) was hired 
in December 2001 and starts work on February 1, 2002.  A 
second batch of 200 will be hired in June 2002.   Just last 
week, Obasanjo reportedly approved a 2002 budget request for 
the ICPC of one billion naira (USD 9 million) in capital 
expenditures and 400 million naira (USD 3.6 million) in 
operating expenses.  Though this budget request must be 
approved by the National Assembly, it represents a 250 
percent increase over the USD five million given to the ICPC 
for all of its expenses in 2001.  Corruption 
 
 
5.(S/NF)Comment:  The end-of-the-year assessment of 
Nigeria,s counter-drug performance does not give a complete 
picture.  Some of the report,s inaccuracies could have been 
avoided if the report had been shared in draft with the field 
prior to publication.  Moreover, field visits by relevant 
analysts should be encouraged in order to &ground truth8 
reporting otherwise evaluated from a distance in Washington. 
 
 
Certification in Perspective:  Improvement since 2000? 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
 
6.(S/NF) As Washington readers are aware, in the recently 
passed Foreign Operations Bill, Congress established a new 
standard for narcotics certification -- those countries that 
have not &failed demonstrably8 in their counternarcotics 
efforts.  Nigeria was granted full certification by the 
President on March 1, 2001, passing a higher certification 
standard.  As detailed above and in many Embassy reporting 
cables including reftels, the Obasanjo Administration has 
made limited but substantial reforms on the counter-drug and 
law enforcement fronts.  While the significance of these 
reforms ) some of them limited to pledges as of this writing 
) can be debated, the argument that Nigeria has lost ground 
in its anti-drug efforts since January 2001 is just not 
credible. 
 
 
7.(C) The Ambassador also notes that if the Department of 
Justice and DEA had strong concerns about the GON,s drug 
control performance, these were not apparent during Chairman 
Lafiaji,s November 8 meeting at DEA Headquaters, which the 
Ambassador attended.  Instead, DEA officials praised the 
NDLEA for improvements in its performance. 
 
 
You Bet Things Look Better 
-------------------------- 
 
 
8.(C/NF) Here,s our perspective on the last year of 
counter-drug efforts.  During the past year: 
 
 
--Federal resources devoted to the anti-drug effort have 
increased substantially; 
 
 
--the NDLEA,s operational writ has expanded to all sea 
ports; 
 
 
--the amount of hard drugs seized rose 40 percent; 
 
 
--arrests of drug traffickers rose 26 percent; 
 
 
--drug-related convictions rose 51 percent; 
 
 
--there were no acquittals in the 2,400 drug cases prosecuted; 
 
 
--airport drug interdiction efforts are now so successful 
that more seizures of heroin in U.S. ports of entry are made 
from flights originating from Ghana rather than from Nigeria; 
 
 
--The late Attorney General led a GON team to a Rome meeting 
with the FATF to address international concerns over 
Nigeria,s money laundering controls; 
 
 
--the GON has moved quickly to strengthen money-laundering 
legislation and form a centralized authority to fight 
financial crimes ) all in response to USG and FATF concerns; 
 
 
--the Joint NDLEA-DEA Task Force has been re-energized and is 
now investigating a major Nigeria based trafficker; and 
 
 
--the year-old Anti-Corruption Commission is gaining strength 
and receiving more federal resources. 
 
 
9.(S/NF) We set out certification benchmarks for the GON to 
meet during 2001.  All of these were either met fully or met 
with a good faith effort.  We should not make a certification 
decision on the basis of whether we think many Nigerians are 
&bad8 or whether the country has a large drug and organized 
crime problem.  These are not the criteria; the benchmarks 
are.  Nigeria has made the grade.  It should be certified. 
 
 
 
 
Jeter