This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002974 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR FRAZIER 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2006 
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV CG RW UG NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER KINGIBE SEES A 
CRITICAL PERIOD IN THE CONGOLESE PEACE PROCESS 
 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: During a November 4 encounter, former 
Foreign Minister and informal peace process advisor Baba Gana 
Kingibe told Polcouns that last month's Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (ICD) derailed primarily because of Kabila 
government duplicity.  The next ICD would not take place 
until January. Kingibe worried that, during the interregnum, 
the Congolese rivals would spend too much time flexing their 
muscles and seeking military advantage.  Kingibe claimed 
Kagame and Museveni were malefactors in this process, 
contributing not only to the martial air in the Congo, but 
inching closer to an imprudent collision themselves.  Kingibe 
believed it incumbent on Nigeria, the U.S. and other nations 
to pressure Kabila, the major faction leaders, Kagame and 
Museveni to focus attention on the issues of peace instead of 
grasping for balance of power advantages on the ground.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue - A Stalling Game 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶2. (C)  The October Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Addis was 
handicapped by several factors, Kingibe noted. Lack of 
funding was a problem.  Western donors pledged money but 
actual funding was late or did not come at all.  This 
short-fall inhibited the ability to pay for the travel and 
lodging of all participants; because of the funding gap, the 
conference got off to a bad start and could never regain 
momentum.  African mediators, nonetheless, pushed the 
conference forward, fearing that delay would send the wrong 
signal to the international community and undermine donor 
confidence in the peace process.  Kingibe also felt that 
Masire had not done sufficient preparatory work with the 
major Congolese participants to make sure the conference 
would yield results. 
 
 
¶3. (C)  Despite these problems, the conference might have 
succeeded but for Kabila government duplicity.  During 
earlier stages of conference planning, Kinshasa wanted a 
truncated ICD, gathering only the major faction leaders and a 
few prominent representatives from civil society.  At the 
eleventh hour, however, Kabila's people did an abrupt 
volte-face.  The DROC security chief, who headed the 
delegation, insisted that the Addis session only deal with 
procedural or technical issues since all Congolese groups, 
large and small, were not present.  The Kabila team argued 
that substantive discussions would be futile during an 
abbreviated session, since the participants would have to 
rehash the same issues once a more inclusive ICD took place. 
 
 
¶4. (C)  By the time more participants arrived, the Kabila 
team simply began to stonewall, according to Kingibe.  Their 
change on the conference make-up was a willful dilatory 
tactic.  Kinshasa had asked them to stall because it was 
expecting a large shipment of military equipment (helicopters 
from France and weapons from China.)  Kabila planned to arm 
the Mai Mai "to the teeth" and dangle the promise of weapons 
in front of factional warlord Mbusa, Kingibe stated.  Once 
the team in Addis received word the equipment had arrived, 
they closed their briefcases and essentially deep-sixed the 
ICD.  The Kabila team believed the new arms would shift the 
power balance, opening the door for them to win by force 
concessions they could not then obtain at the negotiating 
table. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
The Game of Shifting Alliances 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C)  Kingibe rued the unsatisfactory ending of the ICD. 
While some talked of holding the next session in November, 
Masire told him that time was required to pick up the pieces. 
 Masire did not contemplate another meeting until January, 
particularly since that session had to be universal in 
attendance.  While the Facilitator would be slogging through 
the tedium of conference planning, the Congolese factions 
would be counting their weapons and looking to acquire more 
real estate to exchange for more favorable political 
concessions later, Kingibe predicted. 
 
 
¶6. (C)  While all the parties agreed that Kabila could remain 
as a caretaker President, they also wanted to maximize their 
positions in the interim government and, thus, situate 
themselves for subsequent elections.  Waxing philosophical, 
Kingibe said that "Where you are in the afternoon, and how 
fast you travel, will dictate where you rest in the evening. 
Ultimately, all the faction leaders wanted to rest in the 
biggest bed in the Presidential palace."  Kingibe lamented 
that the power-oriented focus of the Congolese leaders might 
far outweigh Masire's ability to push the peace process by 
himself. 
 
 
¶7. (C)  Adding Nigeria's confirmation to what we have 
learned,  Kingibe stated that Kabila and Museveni had struck 
a deal, rendering Kagame the odd-man-out.  The deal was good 
for Kabila because it lessened the heat from Kampala.  As a 
by-product of the deal and of recent arms shipments, Kabila 
resupplied the Mai Mai.  Kabila and Museveni were also 
enticing Mbusa.  Meanwhile, Kagame has not been sitting idle 
himself.  He has brought Bemba's MLC and Onusumba's RDC-G 
closer to him.  He too is courting Mbusa, who, according to 
Kingbe, is relishing his "nonaligned" role and concomitant 
ability to pit both sides in a bidding war for his hand in a 
marriage of convenience. 
 
 
------------------- 
Meddling Neighbors 
------------------- 
 
 
¶8. (C)  Kingibe chastised Kagame and, to a greater extent, 
Museveni for the irksome role they are playing in the Congo. 
Kingibe thought Kagame's intervention was more understandable 
than Museveni's, given the presence of the FAR and 
Interahamwe and the tragedy that was Rwanda a few years ago. 
Museveni, on the other hand, had let the scope of his 
ambition exceed his sense of proportion and Uganda's national 
interests.  Moreover, several Ugandan generals were profiting 
from illicit trafficking in Eastern Congo.  These mercantile 
officers encouraged Museveni's over-extension in the Congo to 
perpetuate their enrichment, Kingibe offered.  On a lesser 
level, Zimbabwe still remained engaged despite its internal 
woes.  Kabila's Justice Minister, Kingibe pointed out, was 
close to several Zimbabwean leaders, including Mugabe. 
Because these Zimbabweans were making money in the Congo, 
they would come to the aid of Kabila, politically and even 
militarily, to the extent they could.  Kingibe dismissed 
Angola as progressi 
vely disinterested and dwindling in importance. 
 
 
------------------------------------- 
Raising the Problem of Peace 
------------------------------------- 
 
 
¶9.  (C)  Kingibe believed that preventing major slippage in 
the peace process during the IDC hiatus would require skilled 
diplomacy.  While not costing much materially, nations 
claiming to support the Congolese peace process must 
demonstrate political will at this time.  Given the major 
actors' proclivity for military diversions, he contended a 
sustained diplomatic effort was needed to keep the issues of 
peace on the front burner and to prevent the Congolese actors 
from tinkering too heavily with the balance of power on the 
ground.  Every hour you force them to discuss peace is one 
less hour they can play at war, Kingibe declared.  Kingibe's 
strategy included: 
 
 
-- Pressuring Kagame and Museveni to play more positive roles 
and not use the Congo as a proxy for bilateral power plays. 
They must discourage the armed groups within their spheres of 
influence from an escalation of hostilities. 
 
 
-- Urging Masire to travel the region to discuss with all key 
players the issues for the next ICD and solicit their views. 
 
 
-- Encourage the Zambian government to hold a senior-level 
conference in December to review progress on implementing the 
Lusaka Accord. 
 
 
Kingibe thought these efforts would help moderate the players 
while filling in time until the ICP could resume.  Kingibe 
also felt the USG could best use its diplomatic weight to 
encourage Museveni and Kagame to behave better.  For its 
part, Nigeria was arranging a meeting in Abuja of the Kabila, 
Bemba, Onusumba trio as soon as their travel schedules 
coincide. 
 
 
------------- 
Comment 
------------- 
 
 
¶10. (C)  Kingibe confirmed, from the Nigerian perspective, 
much of what we already knew.  It is helpful to know that 
Abuja views events in the Congo much the same as we do. 
Kingbe's assessment that the ICD hiatus might invite a period 
of heightened adventurism bears attention.  Some diplomatic 
pressure at this juncture may be worthwhile to prevent a 
slide in the peace process.  End comment. 
Jeter