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Viewing cable 01HANOI2789, FATHER NGUYEN VAN LY: WHY AND WHAT NEXT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01HANOI2789 2001-10-24 10:20 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

241020Z Oct 01

 2001HANOI02789 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0206

PAGE 01        HANOI  02789  01 OF 02  241032Z 
ACTION EAP-00   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    ACQ-00   CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00  DS-00    
      EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  INR-00   VCE-00   NSAE-00  
      SS-00    SNIS-00  NISC-00  DSCC-00  DRL-02   NFAT-00  SAS-00   
        /002W
                  ------------------347C08  241033Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4498
INFO ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY VATICAN
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HANOI 002789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV AND DRL/RF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2011 
TAGS: PHUM PINS PREL VM HUMANR RELFREE
SUBJECT: FATHER NGUYEN VAN LY: WHY AND WHAT NEXT 
 
REF:  A.  HO CHI MINH CITY 1201 AND PREVIOUS 
 
-     B.  HANOI 2276 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POL/C SCOTT BELLARD,  REASON: 1.5 
(D) 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY.  FATHER LY'S HARSH SENTENCE STEMS FROM 
THE VERY DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS THE VIETNAMESE HAVE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02789  01 OF 02  241032Z 
ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN 
RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.  IT ALSO REFLECTS 
HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY TO CHALLENGES TO NATIONAL UNITY. 
THE TIMING IS UNLIKELY RELATED TO THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT OR THE CONSIDERATION OF 
THE VIETNAM HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, NOR IS THE SENTENCE MEANT 
PRIMARILY TO SEND ANY SIGNAL TO THE U.S. (ALTHOUGH IT 
CLEARLY DOES).  PASSAGE OF THE VHRA WOULD EXACERBATE 
VIETNAMESE SENSITIVITIES AND MAKE THE GVN MORE, NOT 
LESS, INCLINED TO GET TOUGH ON WOULD-BE ACTIVISTS AND 
REFORMERS.  CONSISTENT USG MESSAGES OF OPPOSITION TO 
FATHER LY'S SENTENCE AND CALLS FOR HIS RELEASE WILL BE 
INEFFECTIVE AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM BUT ARE 
NONETHELESS NECESSARY.  THE GVN IS UNLIKELY TO WELCOME 
OR AGREE TO A VISIT BY THE U.S. COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BUT IT IS WORTH MAKING 
A VIGOROUS CASE FOR IT WITH THE VIETNAMESE NOW.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
3.  (C)  THE FIFTEEN YEAR CUMULATIVE SENTENCES LEVIED 
ON FATHER NGUYEN VAN LY ON OCTOBER 19 (REF A) REPRESENT 
A BLOW TO VIETNAM'S HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE IN 2001 
AND A SETBACK TO THE OVERALL TREND OF EXPANDED 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES OVER THE PAST DECADE.  EMBASSY HAS 
ALREADY NOTED OUR DEEP REGRET ABOUT THIS DEVELOPMENT TO 
THE MFA.  BOTH THE EMBASSY AND CONGEN HO CHI MINH CITY 
WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO IN DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR GVN 
OFFICIALS IN HANOI AND IN HUE. 
 
4.  (C)  SOME OFFICIALS AT THE MFA, BUT PERHAPS FEW AT 
OTHER GVN AGENCIES OR WITHIN THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02789  01 OF 02  241032Z 
PARTY, UNDERSTAND THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS 
VERDICT ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND ESPECIALLY ON 
THE ONGOING SENATE DELIBERATIONS ABOUT THE VIETNAM 
HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, WHICH THE GVN AND VCP ACROSS THE 
BOARD OPPOSE STRENUOUSLY.  BUT THE VIETNAMESE VIEW OF 
FATHER LY'S CASE DIFFERS FUNDAMENTALLY FROM OUR OWN; 
TO THE GVN AND VCP, THIS IS NOT A RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
ISSUE BUT RATHER A CASE INVOLVING ILLEGAL POLITICAL 
ACTIVISM AIMED AT UNDERMINING THE STATE AND SOWING 
DISUNITY AMONG THE PEOPLE. 
 
5.  (C)  THE VIETNAMESE VIEW IS THAT FATHER LY (AND 
ALL THOSE IN THE OFFICIAL CHURCHES AND OTHER AUTHORIZED 
RELIGIOUS ENTITIES) HAS THE FREEDOM TO PRACTICE HIS 
FAITH -- AS LONG AS RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES DO NOT VEER 
INTO WHAT ARE DEEMED POLITICAL REALMS.  IN THEIR 
MINDSET, ANYTHING THAT IS PERCEIVED AS EVEN REMOTELY 
CHALLENGING THE LEADERSHIP OF THE VCP, UNDERMINING THE 
AUTHORITY OF THE STATE, OR VIOLATING NATIONAL 
SOLIDARITY FALL INTO THE LATTER CATEGORY.  THEY SEE 
FATHER LY AS A LONG-TIME MALCONTENT (WHO FAILED TO 
LEARN A LESSON EVEN FROM AN EARLIER 10 YEAR SENTENCE 
FOR ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES), WHO INCREASINGLY IN 
2000 AND 2001 REFUSED TO HEED THE "WELL-INTENTIONED" 
WARNINGS OF THE VCP AND GVN AGAINST CONTINUING SUCH 
"SUBVERSIVE" ACTIVITIES.  THEY ESPECIALLY SEE HIS 
FEBRUARY TESTIMONY TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS BORDERING ON 
TREASON, SINCE THEY BELIEVE HE WAS SEEKING TO GET THE 
U.S. TO INTERVENE IN VIETNAMESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS, A 
CARDINAL SIN HERE. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02789  01 OF 02  241032Z 
 
6.  (C) TO THE EXTENT THAT AVERAGE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE 
KNOW ABOUT FATHER LY (MORE NOW FOLLOWING HIS TELEVISED 
CONVICTION), THEY PROBABLY ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT 
HE WAS INDEED ENGAGED IN SOMETHING HE SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN AND WAS ASKING FOR TROUBLE.  EVEN THE BISHOP OF 
HUE AND OTHER CATHOLICS HAVE INDICATED PRIVATELY TO 
EMBOFFS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT 
FATHER LY WAS GOING TOO FAR AND PUSHING TOO HARD FOR 
CHANGE IN WAYS THEY BELIEVED UNHELPFUL TO THE CHURCH'S 
FUTURE HERE.  PROBABLY A LARGE MAJORITY OF VIETNAMESE 
TODAY ARE PLEASED WITH THE GREATER PERSONAL LIBERTIES 
COMPARED WITH ONLY A DECADE AGO, AND WORRY MORE ABOUT 
THEIR ECONOMIC WELL-BEING THAN THEY DO ABOUT EXPANDING 
THE SPHERE OF POLITICAL AND OTHER FREEDOMS.  THE GVN 
WILL HAVE ITS EYE ON FATHER LY'S LOCAL SUPPORTERS, WHO 
MIGHT CONCEIVABLY WISH TO PROTEST, AND AUTHORITIES WILL 
DEAL FIRMLY WITH ANY NASCENT SIGNS OF DISSATISFACTION. 
 
7.  (C) THE SEVERITY OF THE SENTENCE CLEARLY REFLECTS 
THE HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY THIS YEAR -- FOLLOWING THE 
ETHNIC DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS IN 
FEBRUARY -- TO PERCEIVED CHALLENGES TO THE AUTHORITY OF 
THE GVN AND VCP.  IT ALSO MARKS OFFICIAL EXASPERATION 
THAT FATHER LY DID NOT EVEN TO TRY TO PLAY BY THE RULES 
DESIGNED TO "HELP" HIM TO REFORM, E.G., OBEY THE 
GUIDELINES OF HIS "ADMINISTRATION PROBATION." 
 
8.  (C)  THE COURT IN HUE IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE MADE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02789  02 OF 02  241033Z 
THIS DECISION IN A VACUUM;  THE SENTENCE PROBABLY 
REFLECTS A CONSENSUS WITHIN SENIOR LEVELS OF THE GVN 
AND VCP.  IT WAS MEANT TO SEND A MESSAGE, PROBABLY NOT 
TO THE U.S. BUT TO WOULD-BE ACTIVISTS AND REFORMERS IN 
VIETNAM, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN AND AROUND HUE WHO KNOW 
AND MIGHT SUPPORT FATHER LY.  THAT IS WHY THE NEWS 
ABOUT FATHER LY'S SENTENCE WAS BROADLY CARRIED IN THE 
NATIONAL MEDIA, INCLUDING TELEVISION.  THE MESSAGE IS: 
DO NOT CHALLENGE THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE AND PARTY, 
AND ONLY ENGAGE IN THOSE ACTIVITIES THAT THE STATE AND 
PARTY HAVE AUTHORIZED FOR YOUR OWN GOOD.  THE CASE AND 
TRIAL LIKELY PROCEEDED AT THEIR OWN PACE AS LOCAL 
AUTHORITIES PREPARED AND PRESENTED THE CASE AGAINST 
HIM;  THE TIMING PROBABLY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE 
RECENT U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE BILATERAL TRADE 
AGREEMENT OR ONGOING SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE VHRA. 
BUT PASSAGE OF THE VHRA WOULD FURTHER RAISE VIETNAM'S 
IRE AGAINST PERCEIVED US INTERFERENCE AND MAKE THE GVN 
MORE, NOT LESS, LIKELY TO REACT HARSHLY TO NEW 
PERCEIVED THREATS TO ITS AUTHORITY AT HOME. 
 
9.  (C) EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT THERE NEEDS TO BE A 
CONSISTENT MESSAGE FROM THE USG, CONGRESS, AND THE U.S. 
COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SHOWING 
OUR CLEAR-CUT OPPOSITION TO THIS SENTENCE, OUR 
CONVICTION THAT FATHER LY AND ALL VIETNAMESE CITIZENS 
SHOULD HAVE GREATER RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS AND OTHER 
LIBERTIES INCLUDING FREEDOMS OF ASSOCIATION AND SPEECH, 
AND OUR CALL FOR HIS RELEASE.  SUCH A MESSAGE WILL NOT 
BE SUCCESSFUL, BUT IT MIGHT AT LEAST FORCE AUTHORITIES 
TO BE MORE CAREFUL IN THEIR CARE OF FATHER LY IN 
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PRISON, A SMALL VICTORY.  VIETNAM WILL NOT WANT ITS OWN 
PEOPLE, MUCH LESS THE USG, TO BELIEVE THAT IT CAVED IN 
TO FOREIGN PRESSURE ON THIS CASE.  UNFORTUNATELY, 
FATHER LY IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN PRISON FOR THE 
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.  PERHAPS HIS BEST HOPE FOR EARLY 
RELEASE MIGHT BE ON MEDICAL GROUNDS, SINCE EVEN THE GVN 
WOULD NOT WANT TO HAVE TO EXPLAIN HIS DEATH IN PRISON. 
HOWEVER, MOST RECENT ACCOUNTS HAVE INDICATED THAT HE 
WAS IN GOOD HEALTH. 
 
10.  (C)  EMBASSY WOULD WELCOME A VISIT SOON BY THE 
U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS 
AN EXCELLENT MEANS TO MAKING SURE THAT THE GVN BETTER 
UNDERSTANDS THE US COMMITMENT TO PROMOTING RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM IN VIETNAM AND ELSEWHERE.   CHANCES OF 
VIETNAMESE WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO SUCH A VISIT ARE 
SLIM, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE IMMINENT RELEASE OF THE 2001 
REPORT, HOWEVER.  EMBASSY NONETHELESS BELIEVES IT WOULD 
BE WORTHWHILE TO MAKE THE REQUEST AND PURSUE IT 
VIGOROUSLY HERE AND IN WASHINGTON. 
 
PORTER 
 
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