This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002687 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2006 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CG XA NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: NSA MOHAMMED EAGER ABOUT SUDAN, PERPLEXED 
BY DROC 
 
 
REF: ABUJA 2562 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter. Reasons 1.5 (b) and 
(d) 
 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: During an October 16 meeting with Ambassador 
Jeter, NSA Aliyu Mohammed stated that Nigeria, actively 
engaged on Sudan, would host a "3-in-1" conference ultimately 
bringing together the Southern factions, Northern opposition 
and Bashir Government negotiators around one conference 
table.  Mentioning the USG would be invited to observe the 
November 12-17 meetings, Mohammed suggested Special Envoy 
Danforth visit Nigeria before going to Sudan.  While animated 
about Sudan, the NSA merely shook his head about DROC, 
describing it as a thicket of internal and regional intrigue 
from which Nigeria might disengage unless the parties 
demonstrated more seriousness in their negotiations.  End 
summary. 
 
 
¶2. (C)  Visibly pleased with his country's efforts, Mohammed 
declared that Nigeria had progressed far on the Sudan.  Dr. 
S.G. Bugaje, the President's Special Envoy on Sudan, had just 
returned from talks in Cairo and London with various 
opposition groups, Mohammed informed us, calling this the 
last leg in Nigeria's plan to consult the various Sudan 
players.  Now, he asserted, Nigeria had the green light to 
convene the "3-in-1" conference.  The format would be an 
initial  meeting of Southern factions, then a second meeting 
of the National Democratic Alliance would ensue.  Afterwards, 
the opposition (North and South) would meet Government 
negotiators in the third conference.  (Comment.  Apparently, 
the Nigerians have refined their thinking about the 
composition of the second meeting.  In reftel, Mohammed said 
the second stage would be for the Northern opposition.  This 
time he stated it would be for the entire opposition.  End 
comment.) 
 
 
¶3. (C)  The NSA continued that President Obasanjo had drafted 
a letter to President Bush asking for an official USG 
observer presence at the talks.  Mohammed added that IGAD 
states, Egypt and Libya would receive similar letters. 
Former President Carter, having expressed interest in Sudan 
to his old friend Obasanjo, might also attend the conference. 
 
 
¶4. (C)  Ambassador Jeter, joined by PolCouns, asked Mohammed 
if he could visit London October 24 for more detailed 
consultations with the DAS Snyder/Bob Oakley team traveling 
to East Africa for preliminary discussions that will pave the 
way for Senator Danforth's November trip to Sudan.  Grappling 
momentarily with his schedule, Mohammed offered that Dr. 
Bugaje would fly to London if he, Mohammed, could not break 
free.  The NSA then suggested that, once ready to visit 
Africa, Special Envoy Danforth should consult in Abuja with 
President Obasanjo prior to setting down in Khartoum.   After 
raising two possible time frames for a Danforth visit to 
Abuja, November 11-12 (before Sudan) or November 17-18 (after 
Sudan) Jeter and Mohammed decided a third alternative was 
worth exploring - a November - 2 or 3 meeting in Washington 
during President Obasanjo's working visit.  (During a brief 
October 18 meeting, President Obasanjo invited Dansforth to 
come November 17-18 after being informed by Ambassador Jeter 
that Danforth would not be in Washington November 2.) 
 
 
------------- 
A HARD DROC 
------------- 
 
 
¶5. (C)  As discussion moved to DROC, Mohammed's face dimmed. 
Opposition leaders Bemba and Onusumba, meeting President 
Obasanjo last Friday, forecasted the Addis talks would yield 
nothing significant.  With 300 participants, the Addis forum 
was too unwieldy for the intricate, detailed discussions 
needed for a break-through, the opposition duo grumbled.  A 
senior Libya official Mohammed met in Paris provided the same 
gloomy forecast that now seemed unfortunately accurate, 
Mohammed said. 
 
 
¶6. (C)  The NSA commented that in Brussels, the Belgians were 
also pessimistic.  The Belgian Director of Military 
Intelligence told Mohammed that Nigeria's 
reconciliation/power-sharing ideas would not work, in part, 
because the opposition and the Kinshasa government had both 
overestimated their strengths.  Bemba and Onusumba boast they 
control 60 percent of the land between them while Kabila 
trumpets that 70 percent of the population live under his 
control.  Each thinks he holds the trump card.  While Kagame 
and Museveni continue to suborn Bemba and Onusumba, Dos 
Santos and Mugabe lend their support to Kinshasa.  Mohammed 
postulated that too many of DROC's neighbors derived 
geo-political and economic benefit from the country remaining 
the sick man of central Africa.  Some neighbors were wary of 
seeing a united DROC that might dwarf them.  More troubling, 
Kabila's once encouraging pace towards reform and 
reconciliation had assumed a slower gait and might be in 
danger of changing direction altogether, Mohammed lamented. 
 
 
¶7. (C)  Mohammed confided that Nigeria had found the DROC 
peace process more multi-layered and complicated than 
expected.  Unless the parties started to negotiate seriously, 
Nigeria might disengage altogether. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
WADE'S TERRORISM CONFERENCE 
----------------------------- 
 
 
¶8. (C)  The NSA mentioned Obasanjo was in Dakar for President 
Wade's anti-terrorism conference.  Mohammed characterized 
Wade's conference as a good idea undermined by poor 
implementation.  Obasanjo went to Dakar to correct Wade's 
procedural gaffes.  Explaining further, Mohammed stated that 
Wade erred by calling a Heads-of-State meeting first.  The 
correct sequence should have been an experts' session, 
followed by a Ministerial, culminating in a Presidential 
summit.  Second, Wade stumbled into a minor firestorm by 
inviting Morocco to a conference, which should have been 
convoked under the aegis of the Africa Union (AU).  Morocco 
was not an AU member and those African states that support 
Polisario say they would likely boycott the Wade session 
because of the Moroccan invitation, Mohammed claimed. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
DOMESTIC UNREST - A TALE OF CITIES - JOS/KANO 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
¶9. (C)  Turning to matters closer to home, Mohammed stated 
that he had just met a group of concerned citizens from Jos. 
The group contended that the board of inquiry constituted to 
investigate the recent violence in Jos was ethnically-biased. 
 After a long discussion, he believed the concerns of the 
delegation were assuaged and that these prominent citizens 
would now help, rather than hinder, the board's deliberation. 
 
 
¶10. (C)  Dismissing the violence in Kano as the work of 
street youth and quasi-gangs, Mohammed breathed a sigh of 
comparative relief, saying Kano was not nearly one-tenth as 
bad as Jos.  He estimated that less than 100 people were 
killed in Kano, but admitted the GON estimate of 20 deaths 
was an understatement. 
 
 
--------- 
COMMENT 
--------- 
 
 
¶11. (C)  NSA Mohammed appeared optimistic that Nigeria will 
be able to push the Sudanese process along.  We hope so. 
However, he is quickly becoming disillusioned with the 
process in the DROC.  Now that it has become time to talk in 
earnest about the substantive issues leading to peace, the 
Congolese parties seem to be steering towards their 
recalcitrant worst.  We suspect that Mohammed may get a 
similar jolt from the Sudanese in the near future.  Right 
now, progress may seem relatively easy as the Sudanese 
parties probably see Abuja as another opportunity to forum 
shop and while talks are basically focused on procedural 
matters.  However, when the thorny substantial issues hit the 
table, Mohammed will likely find the Sudanese every bit as 
stubborn as the contenders in the Congo. 
Jeter