P 141726Z SEP 01
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3714
INFO SECDEF WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
AMEMBASSY CARACAS 
AMEMBASSY PANAMA 
AMEMBASSY QUITO 
AMEMBASSY LIMA 
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 008352 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/12/11 
TAGS: MOPS MARR PTER PGOV PREL CO
SUBJECT: OPERATION SEVENTH OF AUGUST WINDS DOWN 
 
REFS: A) BOGOTA 7805 B) BOGOTA 7555 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ANNE W. PATTERSON; REASONS 1.5 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) THE COLOMBIAN MILITARY'S (COLMIL) "SEVENTH OF 
AUGUST" OPERATION, LAUNCHED ON AUGUST 17 AGAINST A 
1,300 STRONG FARC FORCE IN THE EASTERN COLOMBIAN 
DEPARTMENTS OF GUAVIARE AND META IS WINDING DOWN.  THE 
JOINT ARMY/AIR FORCE OPERATION WAS EXTREMELY 
SUCCESSFUL, ESPECIALLY IN ITS EARLY STAGES, AS IT 
INFLICTED SUBSTANTIAL CASUALTIES ON SOME OF THE FARC'S 
ELITE MOBILE COLUMNS, AND LED TO THE DEATH OF "URIAS 
CUELLAR," THE FARC'S SECOND MOST IMPORTANT FIELD 
COMMANDER AND HEIR APPARENT TO "MONO JOJOY." 
 
¶2. (C) SINCE THE END OF AUGUST, THE COLMIL HAS BEEN 
ATTEMPTING TO ENCIRCLE THE FARC COMBATANTS AS THEY 
RETREAT BACK TO THE FARC "DEMILITARIZED ZONE" 
("DESPEJE").  THIS EFFORT HAS HAD LIMITED RESULTS FOR 
THE COLMIL, WITH A SMALL NUMBER OF FARC COMBATANTS 
SURRENDERING.  HOWEVER, MOST OF THE RETREATING FARC 
COMBATANTS HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN ABLE TO ELUDE THE 
COLMIL'S ENCIRCLEMENT BY BREAKING UP INTO SMALL GROUPS 
AND USING THE AREA'S DENSE VEGETATION TO THEIR 
ADVANTAGE.  NOTWITHSTANDING THE LIMITED SUCCESS OF THE 
MOP-UP OPERATION, OPERATION "SEVENTH OF AUGUST" IS THE 
COLOMBIAN MILITARY'S BIGGEST SUCCESS AGAINST THE FARC 
IN THE PAST TWO YEARS.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
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OPERATIONAL RESULTS 
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¶3. (C) AS REPORTED REFTELS, ON AUGUST 17, THE COLMIL 
LAUNCHED A MAJOR JOINT ARMY/AIR FORCE OPERATION AIMED 
AT DESTROYING MOBILE FARC UNITS WHICH HAD EARLIER LEFT 
THE FARC "DEMILITARIZED ZONE" TO ATTACK MILITARY 
TARGETS IN THE DEPARTMENTS OF META AND GUAVIARE.  THE 
FARC UNITS WERE UNDER DIRECT ORDERS TO RETAKE THE TOWN 
OF BARRANCOMINAS (GUAINIA DEPARTMENT), LOST TO THE 
COLMIL DURING OPERATION "GATO NEGRO."  ESTIMATES ARE 
THAT THE FARC SUFFERED 150 KILLED IN COMBAT, THE 
LARGEST NUMBER OF FARC KILLED IN AN OPERATION IN RECENT 
HISTORY.  FURTHERMORE, INTELLIGENCE SOURCES INDICATE 
THAT APPROXIMATELY 30 FARC COMBATANTS SURRENDERED 
FOLLOWING THE COLMIL'S INITIAL BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES. 
 
¶4. (C) ACCORDING TO MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, 
FOLLOWING ITS EARLY BATTLEFIELD SETBACKS, THE FARC 
FORCE WAS ABLE TO SPLIT INTO GROUPS OF 50-300, WHICH 
HAVE LARGELY SUCCEEDED IN RETREATING INTO THE 
SURROUNDING JUNGLE AND WORKING THEIR WAY BACK TO THE 
"DESPEJE."  THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE CONTINUE CONDUCTING 
RECONNAISSANCE AND PURSUIT OPERATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO 
LOCATE AND DESTROY SOME OF THESE SMALLER GROUPS. 
ACCORDING TO ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL JORGE MORA, HE HAS 
APPROXIMATELY 750 TROOPS IN BLOCKING POSITIONS TO 
INTERCEPT THE FARC COLUMNS SEEKING TO RETURN TO THE 
"DESPEJE."  ALTHOUGH THE INITIAL ENGAGEMENTS LED TO 
HEAVY FARC LOSSES, THE MOP-UP OPERATION HAS SO FAR HAD 
ONLY LIMITED SUCCESS AND WILL NOT LIKELY YIELD THE 
LARGE NUMBER OF FARC DESERTIONS THAT THE MILITARY WAS 
ORIGINALLY PREDICTING. 
 
 
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FARC FIELD MORALE LOW 
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¶5. (C) THE COLMIL'S SEIZURE OF AT LEAST EIGHT TONS OF 
RATIONS DESTINED FOR THE FARC COMBATANTS, THE FARC'S 
INABILITY TO ACHIEVE ITS GOAL TO RETAKE BARRANCOMINAS 
AND REESTABLISH A MAJOR DRUGS/WEAPONS CENTER ON THE 
BRAZILIAN BORDER, AND THE HIGHLY EFFECTIVE AIR TO 
GROUND ATTACKS CARRIED OUT BY THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE 
HAVE, ACCORDING TO CAPTURED FARC GUERRILLAS, KEPT FARC 
FIELD MORALE VERY LOW.  THE ARMY HAS REPOSITIONED ITS 
TROOPS INTO BLOCKING POSITIONS TO CUT OFF THE FARC'S 
ROUTES OF RETREAT TO THE "DESPEJE," AND CONTINUES TO 
HOPE TO CAPTURE OR KILL GUERRILLAS AS THEY FLEE THE 
COMBAT ZONE.  THIS MOP-UP PHASE IS EXPECTED TO END IN 
THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. 
 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶6. (C) THIS OFFENSIVE REFLECTS THE TACTICAL 
IMPROVEMENTS THAT THE COLMIL HAS MADE OVER THE PAST TWO 
YEARS. INTELLIGENCE WAS VITAL TO LOCATING THE FARC 
COLUMN, AND THE COLMIL WAS ABLE TO EXPLOIT THAT 
INTELLIGENCE BY MAKING USE OF ITS VASTLY IMPROVED 
TRANSPORT CAPABILITIES, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE C-130 
MAINTENANCE PROGRAM CONTINUES TO BE PLAGUED BY A 
SHORTAGE OF PARTS AND SKILLED MECHANICS.  TWO YEARS 
AGO, EVEN IF INTELLIGENCE HAD PROVIDED THE NECESSARY 
INFORMATION, THE COLMIL WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO 
MOVE OVER 3,000 TROOPS IN 48 HOURS TO THE COMBAT ZONE, 
AND THE FARC WOULD HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY ESCAPED. 
 
¶7. (C) AT ONE TIME, THE COLMIL WAS HOPEFUL THAT A LARGE 
NUMBER OF TRAPPED FARC GUERRILLAS WOULD TURN THEMSELVES 
IN, AS HAD OCCURRED LATE LAST YEAR DURING OPERATION 
BERLIN.  IN THIS CASE, THE DIFFICULT TERRAIN ALLOWED 
MOST OF THE GUERRILLA UNITS TO EVADE CONTACT WITH THE 
MILITARY AND THUS RETURN SAFELY TO THE "DESPEJE." 
ALTHOUGH LARGE SCALE DESERTIONS ARE UNLIKELY, OPERATION 
"SEVENTH OF AUGUST" IS, BY ANY MEASURE, ONE OF THE 
COLMIL'S BIGGEST MILITARY SUCCESSES IN THE LAST FEW 
YEARS.  THIS OPERATION WILL LIKELY REINFORCE THE TREND 
OF THE FARC REVERTING TO HIT-AND-RUN TACTICS AND 
AVOIDING FRONTAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR 
GROUND TROOPS BACKED BY SUPERIOR FIREPOWER. 
 
 
PATTERSON 
 
 
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