This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL NI
SUBJECT: FLOOD DAMAGE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA GRAVE AND 
WORSENING 
 
 
REF: (A)ABUJA 2259 (B) ABUJA 2260 
 
 
 ¶1.  (U) Summary:  The worst flooding in many years has wiped 
out dozens of villages in northern Nigeria, killing over 300 
and displacing 1,600,000.  Floodwaters are rising in some 
areas and receding in others.  There is an urgent need for 
food, potable water, plastic clothing and shelter.  Even 
elderly people say they have not seen flooding like this in 
their lifetimes.  The magnitude of the disaster has 
overwhelmed state and local capacity, and Nigeria's federal 
government does not appear to be responding.  Further 
flooding could take place downstream (toward Lake Chad). 
Economic and social effects will be substantial and 
long-lasting.  If not mitigated, they could be politically 
destabilizing.  The GON will have to play a major role in 
long-term relief for the people (largely subsistence farmers) 
most gravely affected.  The USG can deliver a critical and 
hugely positive impact by engaging energetically now. 
Disaster declaration sent by niact immediate precedence ref 
A; request to use helicopters contracted for Operation Focus 
Relief in support of damage assessment transmitted ref B. 
End Summary. 
 
 
¶2. (U)  Poloff, USAID Deskoff and two Mission FSNs visited 
flooded areas of Kano and Jigawa states on September 6 and 7 
to assess the extent of the damage.  Flooding in both states 
that began August 26 has resulted in approximately 317 
deaths, and roughly 1.6 million displaced persons.  35 of 44 
local government areas (LGA's) in Kano State were affected by 
the flooding, as well as 20 of 24 in Jigawa.  Communities in 
the southern parts of both states have seen floodwaters 
recede, but streams and rivers are continuing to rise.  Many 
communities lying in or along the floodplains in western Kano 
and eastern Jigawa are isolated by as much as one or more 
kilometers of water.  Some have yet to be visited by 
government officials, due to lack of suitable water-craft. 
People remaining in these cut-off villages are especially 
vulnerable to illness resulting from the lack of potable 
water, adequate food and clothing. 
 
 
¶3. (U)  Government officials in both states claim to be 
meeting the immediate needs of the displaced persons. 
However, the dimensions of this disaster clearly outstrip the 
capacity of both local and state governments to respond.  At 
this point, neither the Federal Government, nor NGO's, appear 
to be delivering disaster relief.  From the descriptions of 
local officials, this flood should probably be characterized 
as a 100-year event.  As water continues to accumulate and 
overflow dams in Kano, flooding will likely spread eastward 
through Yobe, Bauchi and Borno states as the water moves 
towards Lake Chad.  While the full dimensions of the disaster 
are not yet clear, its economic and social effects will 
likely be both severe and long-lasting for the affected 
states and their people.  Many people have lost everything, 
since the mud-brick walls of their houses simply dissolved, 
washing away belongings and livestock, though occasionally 
leaving a stranded roof where once a house stood. 
 
 
¶4. (U)  Before the flooding began, excessive seasonal rains 
had already filled reservoirs to capacity and saturated much 
of the ground in the affected areas.  During the week of 
August 26, over ten inches inches fell during a two-day 
period across much of Kano and Jigawa.  These rains caused 
flash-flooding that damaged or destroyed villages situated 
both within and outside floodplains.  While the water has 
receded from some areas, water levels in reservoirs, rivers 
and streams continue to rise elsewhere.  As of September 7, 
Governor Kwankwaso of Kano State reported that water was 
flowing over the tops of Tiga and Challawa dams at a height 
of nearly two meters.  Consequently, the Hadejia and other 
rivers in Kano continue to rise, making it difficult--and 
treacherous-- to access already-isolated villages.  Many 
residents trying to reach villages with supplies via 
makeshift boats have drowned when these fragile crafts 
capsize. 
 
 
¶5. (U)  In southern Kano some LGA's appeared to be coping 
relatively well with the crisis.  In Warawa, many displaced 
persons had been received by local villages, and those who 
had not were living in primary schools with clean wells. 
Those living at the schools appeared to need clothing, food, 
medicine, sleeping mats and mosquito nets.  Many of the men 
were sleeping outdoors, and the people there reported 
increased incidence of malaria.  In the Kura Local 
Government, Emboffs visited a large village that had been 80 
percent destroyed by the flooding, and remained completely 
surrounded by water.  Few in the North know how to swim, and 
the team was forced to borrow a large canoe and push-pole in 
order to access the village, as the boatman was gone and 
no-one would assist for fear of drowning.  That particular 
village had no potable water as all wells had been flooded. 
The well being used had foul water a few feet down, when 
normally the water was 24 feet below the surface.  Food and 
clothing supplies in the village were inadequate.  The local 
government chairman claimed that a team of doctors was 
visiting each of the affected villages daily, but that seemed 
unlikely, given the difficulty of accessing some of the 
villages surrounded by water.  The crops in these areas did 
not appear to be a total loss, as the flash-flooding receded 
fairly quickly, and only crops left in standing water 
appeared to be severely damaged. 
 
 
¶6. (U)  In Wudil, situated at the western end of the Hadejia 
flood plain, there were several camps for displaced persons 
set up in primary schools, but people there complained of 
inadequate food, clothing and medical attention.  Many 
villages surrounding Wudil were totally destroyed by flash 
flooding, and some were surrounded by water.  We stopped to 
listen to Friday's Juma'at prayers in Wudil, and the local 
Imam called on all Muslims to take in anyone they knew who 
was affected by the floods and ensure that they had adequate 
food and shelter. 
¶7. (U)  The flooding in Ringim, Jahun and other LGA's near 
the Hadejia floodplain is severe.  Poloff was able to visit a 
town of 20,000 people on the edge of the floodplain near 
Jahun that had two to three feet of water standing in the 
streets.  Villages deeper within the floodplain are entirely 
inaccessible, and the waters there continue to rise due to 
rain runoff from the Tiga and Challawa dams in Kano.  In 
Dutse, government officials reported that they had ordered 
twenty rubber boats with motors from the Delta region in 
order to access and provide aid to the stranded villages. 
Roads and bridges traversing the floodplain are reported to 
be submerged, stopping all north-south traffic in Jigawa. 
Standing on the southern edge of the floodplain, Poloff 
observed water stretching north to the horizon. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Federal Government involvement, including the 
Nigerian Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), was practically 
nil.  Deputy Speaker Chubidom Nwuche, an ethnic Igbo, visited 
flooded areas at the same time as the Mission's team, but the 
National Assembly has a limited ability to respond with any 
short-term aid.  The Nigerian military was not engaged in any 
flood relief efforts.  Governor Victor Ibechi of Akwa Ibom 
visited Dutse and brought a truckload of corn to support 
Jigawa's relief effort.  Governor Kwankwaso of Kano State 
appeared to be more engaged in flood relief than his 
counterpart in Jigawa, where the damage is much more severe 
and widespread.  By September 7, Kwankwaso had already 
identified land and begun the process of construction of some 
resettlement villages for Kano's displaced persons. 
 
 
¶9. (U)  Comment: The economic and social effects of this 
disaster will be substantial and long-lasting.  If short-term 
flood-response were viewed as a test of Nigeria's democratic 
institutions, the Federal Government has made the poorest 
showing.  There appears to be little or no co-ordination of 
relief efforts between Abuja and the state and local 
governments.  Abuja will have to become involved with 
long-term aid efforts, as the states are not likely to be 
able to support 1.6 to 2 million displaced persons who will 
have little or no income until next year's harvest.  Governor 
Kwankwaso expressed concern that, if they are not adequately 
cared for, these people would migrate to Kano, where they 
would be unemployed, impoverished, and restless.  It is clear 
that in both the short and long terms, the people of Kano, 
Jigawa, and possibly Yobe, Bauchi and Borno states will need 
assistance beyond what the Federal, State and local 
governments can provide.  By septel, the Mission is 
requesting authority to release $25,000 to the Nigerian Red 
Cross/Red Crescent societies, and the support of an OFDA 
assessment team.  This is a rare opportunity for the USG to 
build goodwill in the North, where many Muslims view us as 
fundamentally anti-Muslim.  An effective long-term disaster 
assistance program would also contribute substantially 
towards maintaining stability and peace in a potentially 
volatile region of Nigeria.  End Comment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrews