This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001437 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2011 
TAGS: PREL NI SL LI ECOWAS
SUBJECT: ECOWAS: KOUYATE ASKS ADVICE ON TAYLOR -- ANY GOOD 
EXIT STRATEGIES? 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter, reason 1.5 (B/D). 
 
 
¶1.  (C) This is an action message;  see paragraph 11. 
 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary.  ECOWAS Executive Secretary Kouyate invited 
Ambassador to his office June 18 to discuss President Taylor 
of Liberia and the regional response to Taylor's government. 
Kouyate suggested either an attempt at an "internal dialogue" 
consisting of prominent Liberians interacting with Taylor on 
national reconciliation, or pressure toward early 
Presidential elections.  He agreed that any ECOWAS effort 
toward "dialogue" could be easily manipulated by Taylor, and 
arouse great suspicion by Conte of Guinea (who was in 
"direct contact" with Liberian dissidents operating on the 
border, said Kouyate).  Kouyate also agreed that early 
elections would also be problematic; Taylor exercised such 
tight control over the Liberian state, a free and fair 
process would be unlikely.   Evincing considerable 
frustration and uncertainty, Kouyate acknowledged that "no 
one has an answer to Taylor."  On reflection, we believe that 
an "internal dialogue" of credible Liberian parties, held in 
Abuja and specifically excluding Taylor, would send the 
Liberian President a strong message and foster greater 
cohesion within the opposition.  We will commend this course 
of action to Kouyate and to the GON unless Washington or 
Monrovia state objections. End Summary. 
 
 
¶3.  (C) ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyate invited 
Ambassador to his office on short notice June 18 to discuss 
President Taylor of Liberia and potential regional responses 
to his government.  Kouyate told Ambassador upon arrival that 
President Konare of Mali was due in later that afternoon to 
discuss Taylor with Nigerian President Obasanjo.  Kouyate had 
been invited to sit in on the meeting.  "They will ask me for 
my opinion," said Kouyate, "and I would like yours." 
 
 
¶4.  (C) In describing regional attitudes generally to Taylor 
and the situation in Liberia, Kouyate said: "We are in a 
waiting mode."  Taylor continued to claim that dissident 
forces inside Liberia had been supplied with "British" arms, 
that he had proof of this, and that this proved British and 
American efforts to overthrow him.  Kouyate dismissed these 
claims, but noted the continuing efforts by Taylor to 
manipulate regional opinion and cast himself and his 
government as victims.  One possible avenue away from the 
present unpleasant reality of a recalcitrant Taylor and 
continuing pressure from the international community, said 
Kouyate, would be some form of "internal dialogue" consisting 
of prominent Liberians, inside and outside the country, 
interacting with the Taylor government.  A preliminary list 
of participants had been drawn up by Togba-nah Tipoteh, a 
leading dissident political activist  Another possibility 
would be early elections in Liberia, with the hope if not the 
expectation that Taylor would lose.  "We need to find an exit 
for Charles Taylor," said Kouyate. (Comment: Tipoteh just 
spent three days in Abuja, and called twice on President 
Obasanjo, an old friend from their days together in the 
African Leadership Forum.  Tipoteh also met with the 
Ambassador and complained bitterly about Taylor's 
authoritarian ways.  He also said that Taylor continues his 
support for the RUF, including harboring Sam Bocherie, whom 
he claims is still in Nigeria, based at Camp Nama.  End 
comment). 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Kouyate agreed with Ambassador that early elections 
would hardly be free and fair given the tight grip Taylor 
exercised over all organs of government, including his feared 
security services.  He equally agreed that any form of 
"dialogue" with prominent Liberians could be easily 
manipulated, particularly if it occurred inside Liberia.  Any 
guarantees from Taylor on the return of prominent exiles 
could not be trusted.  He noted that Konare had asked him 
several times to go to Monrovia and meet with Taylor, and 
each time he "resisted," arguing that a trip to Liberia with 
no important change or concession in prospect would be 
pointless, if not counter-productive.  Taylor's motivations 
would always be suspect in any attempt at reconciliation, and 
Taylor would never share power or agree to step down 
peacefully, he acknowledged.  Ambassador advised that any 
effort at dialogue should be done outside the country to 
limit Taylor's ability to manipulate, divide, and perhaps 
even harm participants. 
 
 
 
 
¶6.  (C)  Kouyate also freely acknowledged that any move 
toward "dialogue" with Taylor could be easily misinterpreted 
by President Conte of Guinea, who would assume that an 
unearned rehabilitation of Taylor would result, with no gain 
for regional peace and security, particularly on his border 
with Liberia.  Conte, whom Kouyate said was in "direct 
contact" with Liberian dissidents on the border, had to be in 
agreement or efforts at reconciliation would fail.  In a side 
note, Kouyate agreed that Alhaji Kromah, now travelling in 
the region and seeking a hearing and support from regional 
interlocutors, was hardly a factor within his own ULIMO 
faction these days, and that Conte had much the greater 
influence.  In fact, Conte believed that the current 
offensive against Taylor would finish the Liberian President, 
evidenced by his recent remark to Kouyate that "this time we 
have him (Taylor)." 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Kouyate argued that the Nigerian Government was no 
less committed to continuing pressure on Taylor than the 
international community.  He noted that Ambassador Ralph 
Uwuechwe, Obasanjo's Advisor for Conflict Reconciliation, had 
made an unhelpful statement (saying, in effect, that Nigerian 
does not support sanctions).  But it was not at all clear 
that Uwuechwe's statement represented the GON position on the 
issue.  Further, Kouyate could not recall a single time, when 
Obasanjo met face to face with Taylor, when the two men did 
not violently disagree. "Obasanjo knows who he is dealing 
with," said Kouyate.  Nigeria was never against sanctions 
Kouyate said, but he did harbor the belief that the threat of 
sanctions would be more effective. 
 
 
¶8.  (C)  Kouyate noted that French Foreign Minister Vedrine 
would visit Nigeria at the end of the month, and this would 
be a good opportunity to seek a common policy on Taylor with 
the French.  Both Obasanjo and Kouyate would see Vedrine and 
look for common positions.  Ambassador interjected that 
accelerated timber sales from Liberia now constituted a key 
component of Taylor's revenue stream, and timber sales had 
been excluded from sanctions at French request.  This needed 
to be brought up.  (Comment: Kouyate has noted before that he 
also looks to the U.S. to put pressure on the French to 
desist from GOF support for Taylor. End comment). 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Kouyate closed by saying that the present political 
and economic situation in Liberia was "terrible," and the 
prospect of more refugees and internally displaced persons 
would only grow.  Sanctions had not been intended to hurt the 
average Liberian, but they were hurting them, he implied. 
While there was no point to dialogue with Taylor that only 
divided ECOWAS, and thereby helped Taylor, some effort needed 
to be made. 
 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment.  Kouyate, normally confident in his 
opinions and incisive in his analyses, appeared to us to be 
genuinely at a loss for workable solutions, and seeking 
advice for a difficult situation for which he has no ready 
answers.  He also seemed well aware of the potential for 
decisions by ECOWAS regarding Taylor that could be unhelpful, 
if not downright counter-productive.  The USG will need to be 
sensitive to the urge toward "solutions" within ECOWAS while 
focusing on the specific problems of any potential 
initiatives.   We look forward to a read-out from Kouyate on 
the Obasanjo/Konare meeting.  End comment. 
 
 
¶11. (C) On reflection, we believe that an "internal dialogue" 
involving credible Liberian political players could be a 
welcome development.  This dialogue should pointedly exclude 
Taylor and should take place outside of Liberia,  perhaps in 
Abuja if the Nigerians agree.  A dialogue excluding Taylor 
should not alienate Conte and would send the Liberian 
President a message that the region is willing to engage his 
opposition, particularly those with democratic credentials. 
The Embassy proposes to recommend this course of action to 
ECOWAS and to the Nigerian government, if Washington and 
Embassy Monrovia perceive no objection.  Please advise. 
 
 
 
 
Jeter