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Viewing cable 01LIBREVILLE603, OMAR BONGO AND THE GABONESE POLITICAL SCENE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
01LIBREVILLE603 2001-04-23 15:34 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Libreville
R 231534Z APR 01
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4259
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGUI 
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 
AMEMBASSY GABORONE 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY KIGALI 
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY LUANDA 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J3/J4/J5//
DEPT OF TREASURY WASH DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 LIBREVILLE 000603 
 
SIPDIS 
 
PARIS FOR WILLIAMS 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - T. WRAY 
KINSHASA ALSO FOR BRAZZAVILLE OFFICE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/05 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ECON GB
SUBJECT:  OMAR BONGO AND THE GABONESE POLITICAL SCENE 
 
REFS: (A) STATE 56003 (NOTAL) 
      (B) LIBREVILLE 75 (NOTAL) 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR REASONS 1.5 (B, D). 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY: AFTER NEARLY 34 YEARS IN OFFICE, GABONESE 
PRESIDENT OMAR BONGO IS A WILY POLITICIAN WHO STILL HAS A 
FIRM GRIP ON POWER.  HE IS UNQUESTIONABLY "THE BOSS" AND 
MAINTAINS AN EXTENSIVE CIRCLE OF FAITHFUL AND PANDERING 
ALLIES.  MANY REMAIN LOYAL LARGELY BECAUSE THEIR LOYALTY IS 
RICHLY REWARDED WITH FINANCIAL AND JOB SECURITY.  PRESIDENT 
BONGO'S CURRENT TERM ENDS IN 2005, AND SPECULATION SURFACES 
FREQUENTLY AS TO WHETHER HE IS GROOMING SOMEONE TO SUCCEED 
HIM.  ALTHOUGH HE CLEARLY WATCHES THOSE CLOSEST TO HIM TO 
EVALUATE THEIR POTENTIAL, BONGO DOES NOT APPEAR AS YET TO 
HAVE CHOSEN ANYONE IN PARTICULAR, AND IS LIKELY BIDING HIS 
TIME TO SEE WHO EMERGES AS A CAPABLE CANDIDATE WORTHY OF 
HIS SUPPORT.  INEVITABLY, BONGO'S OWN FATE WILL BE TIED TO 
GABON'S FALLING OIL REVENUES, VITAL TO HIS ABILITY TO KEEP 
PEACE IN A COUNTRY WITH STAGGERING DISPARITIES IN WEALTH 
AND SIMMERING ETHNIC PRESSURES.  THE DECEMBER LEGISLATIVE 
ELECTIONS WILL BE AN INDICATOR OF BONGO'S (AND HIS RULING 
PARTY'S) FUTURE, BUT MORE, OF HIS INCLINATION TO ALLOW 
GABON'S SLOW DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS TO CONTINUE.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
BONGO: HE JUST KEEPS GOING AND GOING... 
--------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) PRESIDENT EL HADJ OMAR BONGO IS FIRMLY IN CONTROL 
IN GABON.  WHILE HE IS DEPENDENT ON THE ADVICE AND SUPPORT 
HE RECEIVES FROM HIS INNER CIRCLE, THERE IS NO QUESTION OF 
WHO CALLS THE SHOTS.  THOSE CLOSE TO HIM REFER TO HIM 
UNSELFCONSCIOUSLY AS "LE PATRON" ("THE BOSS") AND REGARD 
HIM WITH A COMBINATION OF AFFECTION AND RESPECT FOR HIS 
POLITICAL WILES, HIS MASTERY OF DETAIL AND HIS PRODIGIOUS 
MEMORY.  AFTER NEARLY 34 YEARS IN POWER, AND WITH THE HELP 
OF GENEROUS OIL REVENUES, BONGO HAS ESTABLISHED A MASTERY 
OF THE LEVERS OF INFLUENCE THAT NONE CAN CHALLENGE. 
GABON'S MINERAL WEALTH HAS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO 
REWARD THOSE CLOSE TO HIM, ENSURING A STRONG SENSE OF 
LOYALTY, AND TO PURCHASE THE COOPERATION OF THOSE IN 
OPPOSITION.  INDEED, HE IS KNOWN AS A "SOFT TOUCH" FOR HIS 
WILLINGNESS TO FINANCE ALMOST ANYONE WITH A PERSUASIVE 
PROPOSAL.  AN EMBASSY CONTACT WHO KNOWS BONGO WELL SAYS 
THAT HE IS PERENNIALLY SURPRISED AT THE NUMBER OF 
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE GRANTED SMALL FORTUNES BECAUSE OF THEIR 
ABILITY TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT THEIR SERVICES ARE 
INDISPENSABLE TO HIS SURVIVAL IN OFFICE.  WHETHER THIS IS A 
REFLECTION OF BONGO'S NAIVETE OR HIS OWN WAY OF ACQUIRING 
 
 
4.  (C) BONGO IS ALSO A CUNNING LEADER WHO ENJOYS 
THOROUGHLY THE GAME OF POLITICS.  HE IS WELL INFORMED AND 
BENEFITS FROM NETWORKS HE HAS PUT IN PLACE BOTH INSIDE AND 
OUTSIDE GABON, INCLUDING AN ARRAY OF FEMALE "FRIENDS" WITH 
WHOM HE MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONS.  BONGO PLACES GREAT 
STOCK IN KNOWING PERSONALLY THE PLAYERS IN ANY ISSUE OF 
IMPORTANCE.  AT THE SAME TIME, HE IS CAREFUL NOT TO 
INITIATE ANY UNDERTAKING -- PARTICULARLY OUTSIDE GABON -- 
WITHOUT A GOOD DEGREE OF CERTAINTY ABOUT THE OUTCOME.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH HE CRAVES THE POSITIVE REFLECTION THAT 
COMES FROM HIS SUCCESSFUL MEDIATION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS, 
BONGO ENGAGES IN SUCH EFFORTS ONLY AFTER CAREFUL 
CONSIDERATION.  IN MEDIATING THE CIVIL WAR IN CONGO/B, FOR 
EXAMPLE, HE MOVED CAUTIOUSLY, MAKING CERTAIN THAT EACH 
INITIATIVE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A THOROUGH ROUND OF MEETINGS 
OF THE KEY PARTIES.  HIS HESITATION TO BECOME INVOLVED IN 
THE CONGO/K DELIBERATIONS SHOWS SIMILAR CAUTION:  UNTIL ALL 
OF THE PARTIES ASK HIM TO BE INVOLVED, AND HE CAN BE 
RELATIVELY CONFIDENT OF SOME POSITIVE OUTCOME, BONGO IS 
LIKELY TO LIMIT HIS INVOLVEMENT.  WHEN HE DOES CHOOSE TO 
ACT, HIS YEARS IN OFFICE, AND THE NOT INCONSIDERABLE 
INFLUENCE AS ELDER STATESMAN THAT HE ENJOYS AMONG AFRICANS, 
ALLOW BONGO A WIDE MARGIN OF MANEUVER.  THE MANTLE OF 
AUTHORITY -- BUTTRESSED BY A PERSONABLE AND EVEN CHARMING 
EXTERIOR -- PROVIDES HIM WITH THE ABILITY TO SPEAK FRANKLY 
TO PEOPLE, SOMETIMES TELLING THEM TRUTHS THAT OTHERS MIGHT 
NOT BE ABLE TO SAY. 
 
-------------------- 
BONGO'S INNER CIRCLE 
-------------------- 
 
5.  (C) BONGO RELIES ON A RELATIVELY SMALL CIRCLE FOR 
ADVICE.  NONETHELESS, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE JANUARY 
OUSTING OF EQUIPMENT MINISTER ZACHARIE MYBOTO (REF B), THE 
LONGEST SERVING MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET, NO ONE 
IN BONGO'S INNER CIRCLE IS UNTOUCHABLE.  MINISTER OF 
INTERIOR ANTOINE MBOUMBOU MIYAKOU IS ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
MOST LOYAL FOLLOWERS AND TRUSTED ADVISORS.  BACKED BY THE 
POLICE AND CONSIDERED BY SOME TO BE UNSCRUPULOUS IN HIS 
ZEAL, MIYAKOU'S LOYALTY KNOWS NO LIMITS.  HE PROVIDES BONGO 
WITH POLITICAL ADVICE AND UNFAILING SUPPORT.  MIYAKOU IS 
ALSO WELL-PLACED TO ASSIST "LE PATRON" BECAUSE OF HIS 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS. 
 
6.  (C) PRIME MINISTER JEAN-FRANCOIS NTOUTOUME-EMANE IS 
ALSO A CLOSE ADVISOR, TO SOME DEGREE BY DEFAULT GIVEN HIS 
POSITION.  BONGO AND THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE AT TIMES HAD 
HEATED PUBLIC DISAGREEMENTS, AND BONGO MAY NOT TRUST (OR 
EVEN LIKE) HIM.  THE PRESIDENT NONETHELESS RESPECTS 
NTOUTOUME-EMANE'S INTELLECT, CONSIDERED BY MANY TO BE THE 
STRONGEST IN THE GOVERNMENT (ONE POPULAR NICKNAME FOR THE 
PM IS "JACKY THOUSAND-ENCYCLOPEDIAS").  FOREIGN MINISTER 
JEAN PING (WHO IN THE PAST ALSO HAD A RELATIONSHIP, 
RESULTING IN A CHILD, WITH PRESIDENTIAL DAUGHTER AND 
ADVISER PASCALINE BONGO) IS UNDOUBTEDLY THE GABONESE EXPERT 
ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND ADVISES BONGO ACCORDINGLY.  HE HAS 
LITTLE INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS, HOWEVER, AND DOES NOT 
APPEAR TO BE PERSONALLY CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT.  REFORM- 
MINDED FINANCE MINISTER EMILE DOUMBA IS BONGO'S PRIMARY 
RESOURCE FOR ECONOMIC ADVICE, BUT IS SIMILARLY OUTSIDE THE 
CIRCLE OF "PRESIDENTIAL INTIMATES." 
 
7.  (C) OTHER INDIVIDUALS UPON WHOM THE PRESIDENT RELIES 
INCLUDE AGING SENATE PRESIDENT GEORGES RAWIRI, WHO IS SEEN 
BY MANY AS THE MAN MOST LIKELY TO REPLACE BONGO IN THE 
SHORT TERM IF THE PRESIDENT WERE SUDDENLY TO EXIT THE 
SCENE.  EDUCATION MINISTER AND GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ANDRE 
MBA OBAME AND PRESIDENTIAL SON AND DEFENSE MINISTER ALI-BEN 
BONGO ALSO PLAY BOTH POLITICAL AND POLICY ADVISING ROLES, 
AND FREQUENTLY WORK TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE COMMON GOALS (SEE 
REF B).  MINISTER OF MINES, ENERGY, AND PETROLEUM PAUL 
TOUNGUI IS AN ADVISOR OF APPARENTLY GROWING INFLUENCE.  HE 
IS INTELLIGENT, TECHNICALLY COMPETENT, AND HEADS THE MOST 
POWERFUL MINISTRY IN THE GOVERNMENT.  OTHER BONGO 
CONFIDANTS INCLUDE FORMER CAMPAIGN ASSISTANT NGOYOU 
MOUSSAVOU, VICE PRESIDENT DIDJOB DIVUNGI DI NDINGE, AND 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL CHAIRMAN LOUIS GASTON MAYILA. 
 
------------- 
RELATIONSHIPS 
------------- 
 
8.  (C) RELATIONSHIPS ARE EVERYTHING IN THIS SMALL 
COUNTRY, WHERE VIRTUALLY ALL OF THE PROMINENT FAMILIES ARE 
RELATED IN SOME WAY TO PRESIDENT BONGO AND TO EACH OTHER. 
AT TIMES GABON CAN SEEM LIKE AN AFRICAN PEYTON PLACE.  IN 
ADDITION TO PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS, ETHNICITY PLAYS A VITAL 
ROLE IN ALLIANCES.  BONGO HAS BEEN VERY CAREFUL TO APPEASE 
DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS BY PARCELING OUT CHOICE POSITIONS 
AMONG THEM.  SOME CONSIDER THE SECRET TO BONGO'S LONGEVITY 
TO BE HIS ABILITY TO BALANCE THE DESIRES OF THE LARGER 
GABONESE ETHNIC GROUPS.  AS A MEMBER OF ONE OF THE 
COUNTRY'S SMALLER GROUPS (BATEKE), HE HAS SUCCESSFULLY 
POSITIONED HIMSELF ABOVE THE ETHNIC FRAY WHILE KEEPING THE 
LARGER GROUPS (E.G., THE FANG AND BAPOUNOU) QUIESCENT.  ONE 
RESULT OF BONGO'S CONSTANT EFFORTS TO APPEASE DIFFERENT 
ETHNIC GROUPS HAS BEEN TO CREATE MINISTRIES HEADED AND 
STAFFED BY ONE ETHNIC GROUP OR ANOTHER.  THOUGH POLITICALLY 
EFFECTIVE, THE PRACTICE HAS NOT LED TO COOPERATIVE OR 
EFFICIENT INTERMINISTERIAL OPERATIONS.  AT THE CABINET 
LEVEL, ETHNIC CONSIDERATIONS CREATE SHIFTING ALLIANCES 
AMONG BONGO ADVISORS.  CURRENTLY, FOR EXAMPLE, ALI-BEN 
BONGO IS CLOSE TO GENERAL NGUETSARA, THE CANTANKEROUS HEAD 
OF THE GENERAL OFFICE FOR DOCUMENTATION AND IMMIGRATION. 
AT THE SAME TIME, ALI-BEN AND EDUCATION MINISTER MBA OBAME 
ARE PERCEIVED AS GOOD (PERHAPS "VERY GOOD," ACCORDING TO 
SALACIOUS RUMORS) FRIENDS, AND ALI-BEN MAINTAINS CLOSE TIES 
TO TRANSPORTATION MINISTER IDRISS NGARI. 
 
---------- 
SUCCESSION 
---------- 
 
9.  (C) OMAR BONGO HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION YET THAT HE IS 
GROOMING SOMEONE PARTICULAR TO SUCCEED HIM IN 2005. 
INDEED, WHETHER BONGO, WHO IS 67, WILL SEEK RE-ELECTION IN 
2005 REMAINS AMBIGUOUS, THOUGH MANY ASSUME HE WILL NOT. 
BONGO IS EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS WHEN IT COMES TO PROTECTING HIS 
OWN IMAGE; HE WOULD NOT WANT TO BE CAUGHT BACKING ANYONE 
BUT THE EVENTUAL WINNER.  BONGO WILL NOT THROW HIS SUPPORT 
BEHIND ANYONE WHO HAS A CHANCE OF LOSING, THEREBY 
TARNISHING THE PRESIDENT'S LEGACY.  AT THE SAME TIME, HE 
APPEARS TO HAVE NO INTEREST YET IN ENDOWING ANY OF HIS 
FOLLOWERS WITH "HEIR APPARENT" CREDENTIALS.  MOST BELIEVE 
BONGO IS BIDING HIS TIME, WATCHING FOR A CANDIDATE TO PROVE 
HIMSELF, BUILD A (NON-THREATENING) CONSTITUENCY, 
DEMONSTRATE HIS CAPABILITIES, AND THEREBY EARN THE 
PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT.  BONGO IS BOTH VERY CAUTIOUS AND A 
REALIST.  ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS HE WILL BE LOOKING FOR 
IN A SUCCESSOR WILL BE THAT INDIVIDUAL'S ABILITY TO PROMOTE 
STABILITY IN THE MIRE OF TURMOIL THAT IS CENTRAL AFRICA. 
BONGO TAKES HIS ROLE AS THE REGION'S "DOYEN " -- A MEDIATOR 
AND PEACEMAKER -- SERIOUSLY.  HE WILL SUPPORT SOMEONE 
WORTHY OF CARRYING ON THAT ROLE. 
 
10.  (C) DEFENSE MINISTER ALI-BEN BONGO IS ONE PERSON 
PRESIDENT BONGO MAY BE WATCHING AS A POSSIBLE SUCCESSOR. 
IF THIS IS THE CASE, BEING THE PRESIDENT'S SON WILL NOT 
NECESSARILY GIVE HIM AN ADVANTAGE OVER OTHERS.  HE WILL 
NEED TO PROVE HIMSELF LIKE THE REST.  A FORMER FOREIGN 
MINISTER, THE YOUNGER BONGO HAS INCREASED HIS VISIBILITY IN 
RECENT MONTHS.  IN FEBRUARY HE ORGANIZED A "NATIONAL 
MILITARY DAY," CELEBRATED BY PARADES TO SHOW OFF NEW 
UNIFORMS HE PURCHASED FOR THE ARMED FORCES.  DURING A 
FEBRUARY TRIP TO GERMANY HE ARRANGED FOR THE GABONESE 
MILITARY TO PURCHASE 600 MERCEDES TRUCKS OVER THE NEXT 
SEVERAL YEARS.  THE YOUNGER BONGO IS EAGER TO INCREASE THE 
MILITARY'S CAPABILITIES AND PROFESSIONALISM, 
ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORTING PARTICIPATION IN U.S. IMET 
TRAINING PROGRAMS AND HOSTING A VARIETY OF MILITARY 
EXERCISES AND CONFERENCES.  ALI-BEN BONGO, WHO CONVERTED TO 
ISLAM WITH HIS FATHER IN THE 1970S, ALSO STYLES HIMSELF A 
LEADER OF GABON'S MUSLIMS AND, IN THAT ROLE, IS A USEFUL 
EAR FOR THE ELDER BONGO IN THAT SMALL (ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF 
THE GABONESE) BUT INFLUENTIAL COMMUNITY. 
 
11.  (C) MINES, ENERGY, AND PETROLEUM MINISTER PAUL TOUNGUI 
ALSO GIVES SIGNS OF RECEIVING GROWING SUPPORT FROM 
PRESIDENT BONGO.  RECENTLY PROMOTED TO THE RANK OF MINISTER 
OF STATE (REF B), TOUNGUI IS A LONGTIME ADVISOR TO THE 
PRESIDENT WITH A REPUTATION AS A CLEVER ADMINISTRATOR AND 
POLITICAL MANEUVERER.  MANY TOOK TOUNGUI'S RECENT PROMOTION 
AS A SIGN THAT PRESIDENT BONGO IS DRAWING HIM CLOSER TO THE 
CENTER OF POWER.  TOUNGUI'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT 
IS FURTHER REINFORCED BY HIS LONG-TERM AMOROUS RELATIONSHIP 
(OR "MARRIAGE", AS IT IS DESCRIBED HERE) WITH BONGO'S 
DAUGHTER AND NOMINAL CHIEF OF STAFF, PASCALINE. 
 
------------------------ 
ECONOMICS AND CORRUPTION 
------------------------ 
 
12.  (C) THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO GABON'S LONG-TERM 
STABILITY (AND TO BONGO'S REGIME) IS THE EXPECTED DECREASE 
IN OIL REVENUES.  BONGO'S ABILITY TO USE THIS CONSIDERABLE 
WEALTH TO REWARD AND ENRICH POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS 
WITHIN THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN THE KEY TO HIS MAINTAINING 
STABILITY AND PRESERVING POWER FOR THE PAST THREE DECADES. 
AFTER REACHING A HIGH OF 18.5 MILLION TONS IN 1998, OIL 
PRODUCTION DECREASED TO 13.5 MILLION TONS IN 2000 AND MAY 
FALL TO AS LITTLE AS 6.5 MILLION TONS IN 2005.  WHILE DEEP- 
WATER EXPLORATION CONTINUES OFFSHORE, THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO 
HOPE THAT GABON WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN ITS CURRENT 
DEPENDENCE ON OIL REVENUES IN THE MEDIUM AND LONG TERMS. 
 
13.  (C) BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF FINANCE MINISTER EMILE 
DOUMBA IN 1999, THE SYSTEM OF DISPENSING GOVERNMENT REVENUE 
WAS COMPLETELY ARBITRARY AND UNDISCIPLINED.  DESPITE 
DOUMBA'S PROGRESS IN REIGNING IN OFF-BUDGET EXPENDITURES, 
PRESIDENT BONGO CONTINUES TO EXERCISE PERSONAL CONTROL OVER 
A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF GOVERNMENT REVENUE.  BONGO 
UNDOUBTEDLY SETS THE TONE AND IS AWARE OF THE WORST 
EXAMPLES OF CORRUPTION WITHIN HIS ADMINISTRATION, BUT 
RARELY TAKES ANY ACTION TO CONTROL IT.  BOWING TO PRESSURE 
FROM THE IMF, AN ANTI-CORRUPTION BILL WAS RECENTLY AND 
BELATEDLY INTRODUCED TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.  THE 
LEGISLATION IS CURRENTLY UNDERGOING "SOFTENING", HOWEVER, 
AND SEEMS UNLIKELY TO HAVE AS MUCH AFFECT ON BONGO'S WAY OF 
OPERATING AS THE LOSS OF OIL REVENUE.  BONGO ALSO 
ENGINEERED PASSAGE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN LATE 
2000 THAT PROVIDES THE PRESIDENT ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FOR 
ACTIONS TAKEN WHILE IN OFFICE.  MANY READ THE MOVE AT THE 
TIME AS A SIGN OF BONGO LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR AN 
EVENTUAL "GRACEFUL" DEPARTURE FROM POWER. 
 
14.  (C) GABON DOES NOT HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO SHOW FOR OVER 
TWO DECADES OF WINDFALL OIL REVENUES, ASIDE FROM THE 
PRIVATE WEALTH ACCUMULATED BY A RELATIVELY FEW INDIVIDUALS 
CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT.  THE LARGE MAJORITY OF THE 
COUNTRY'S WEALTH IS ESTIMATED TO BE HELD BY LESS THAN 
50,000 OF ITS 1.2 MILLION CITIZENS, ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT 
IS CAREFUL NOT TO COLLECT OR PUBLISH STATISTICS THAT WOULD 
ALLOW A RELIABLE ASSESSMENT.  DESPITE THE LACK OF DATA, 
WORLD BANK ANALYSTS PRIVATELY ESTIMATE THAT GABON MAY HAVE 
ONE OF THE HIGHEST INCOME DISPARITIES OF ANY COUNTRY IN THE 
WORLD.  ONE THING THAT IS CLEAR IS THAT ONCE THERE IS NO 
LONGER A STEADY FLOW OF CASH TO CALM THOSE WHO MIGHT 
PROTEST SUCH INEQUALITY, BONGO (OR WHOEVER REPLACES HIM) 
WILL BE LEFT TO RELY ON HIS CONSIDERABLE OTHER SKILLS OF 
PERSUASION TO PREVENT DISSATISFACTION FROM GETTING OUT OF 
CONTROL. 
 
------------------------------ 
UPCOMING LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS 
------------------------------ 
 
15.  (C) THE UPCOMING DECEMBER LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, AND 
THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE OPPOSITION, WILL PROVIDE SOME 
MEASURE OF THE GABONESE PEOPLE'S SATISFACTION WITH THE 
STATUS QUO.  THE ELECTIONS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TEST PRESIDENT 
BONGO'S SKILLS OF PERSUASION AND DEMONSTRATE THE EXTENT OF 
HIS POLITICAL INFLUENCE.  THE ELECTIONS WILL BE THE FIRST 
TO OCCUR SINCE BONGO WAS RETURNED FOR A FIFTH TERM IN 1998. 
THOSE ELECTIONS, THOUGH UNQUESTIONABLY MORE OPEN THAN THEIR 
PREDECESSORS, WERE MARRED BY IRREGULARITIES THAT GENERALLY 
FAVORED THE INCUMBENT, INCLUDING INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE 
ELECTORAL LISTS AND THE USE OF FALSE DOCUMENTS TO CAST 
VOTES.  DESPITE THE FLAWS, MOST INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS 
CONCLUDED AT THE TIME THAT THE RESULT GENERALLY REFLECTED 
THE POPULAR WILL.  THE OPPOSITION BELIEVES THE RULING PARTY 
(PARTI DEMOCRATIQUE GABONAIS -- PDG) FIXED THE 1998 
ELECTIONS, AND MANY GABONESE ANTICIPATE SIMILAR BEHAVIOR 
THIS YEAR.  THE ACCUSATION TENDS, HOWEVER, TO GLOSS OVER 
THE FACT THAT THE OPPOSITION RAN A FRAGMENTED AND FECKLESS 
CAMPAIGN.  BONGO HIMSELF IS CLEARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE 
UPCOMING ELECTIONS, BUT IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL WHETHER HIS 
PARTY FACES ANY REAL DANGER OF LOSING ITS MAJORITY IN 
PARLIAMENT.  THE CAMPAIGN WILL ALSO BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR 
THE OPPOSITION TO DEMONSTRATE WHETHER IT LEARNED FROM ITS 
1998 MISTAKES. 
 
--------------------------- 
OPPOSITION LEADERS IN GABON 
--------------------------- 
 
16.  (C) BONGO'S WIN IN 1998 WEAKENED AND DISHEARTENED THE 
ALREADY FRAGMENTED GABONESE OPPOSITION.  AFTER 34 YEARS OF 
THE SAME PARTY IN POWER, THE POPULATION HAS GROWN 
APATHETIC, WITH MANY YOUNGER PEOPLE REFUSING TO GO TO THE 
TROUBLE TO VOTE.  BONGO'S APPROACH IN DEALING WITH THE 
OPPOSITION HAS MIRRORED HIS MANAGEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT: 
PAYOFFS AND CO-OPTATION.  FEW OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE 
RESISTED HIS TEMPTATIONS, FURTHER REDUCING THEIR INFLUENCE 
WITH A CYNICAL ELECTORATE.  IN THE NEAR TERM, WE EXPECT THE 
OPPOSITION TO REMAIN RELATIVELY WEAK UNLESS RADICAL EVENTS 
SHAKE BONGO'S GRIP ON POWER. 
 
17.  (C) FORMER FINANCE MINISTER AND BONGO ALLY-TURNED- 
OPPONENT JEAN-PIERRE LEMBOUMBA IS NOT PARTICULARLY VISIBLE 
IN THE GABONESE POLITICAL SCENE TODAY.  KNOWN TO HAVE 
AMASSED CONSIDERABLE WEALTH AS A RESULT OF CROOKED DEALINGS 
DURING HIS FINANCE MINISTRY DAYS, LEMBOUMBA NOW LIMITS HIS 
POLITICAL ACTIVITY TO FINANCING OPPOSITION PARTIES AND 
NEWSPAPERS.  RUMORS CONTEND THAT HE MAY HAVE RECONCILED 
WITH BONGO AND MADE A DEAL, PROMISING TO TONE DOWN HIS 
OPPOSITION RHETORIC. 
 
18.  (C) PIERRE MAMBOUNDOU, PRESIDENT OF THE GABONESE 
PEOPLE'S UNION (UPG), IS KNOWN AS THE LEADER OF THE "REAL" 
OPPOSITION.  THE SECOND-PLACE FINISHER IN THE 1998 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, MAMBOUNDOU HEADS THE HIGH COUNCIL 
OF THE RESISTANCE, A GROUP OF TEN OPPOSITION PARTIES THAT 
MEETS WEEKLY TO STRATEGIZE.  A REPUTEDLY HONEST MAN WHO 
SUPPORTS HIS CLAIMS WITH FACTS, HE MAY BE THE ONLY MAJOR 
OPPOSITION FIGURE WHO HAS NOT TAKEN MONEY FROM BONGO. 
 
19.  (C) MANY CONTEND THAT LONG-TIME OPPOSITION LEADER AND 
LIBREVILLE MAYOR PAUL MBA-ABESSOLE IS NO LONGER A SERIOUS 
THREAT TO THE PRESIDENT.  FATHER MBA-ABESSOLE (HE IS ALSO A 
CATHOLIC PRIEST), WHO LEADS GABON'S OLDEST AND LARGEST 
OPPOSITION PARTY, IS WIDELY VIEWED TO HAVE BEEN CO-OPTED BY 
BONGO.  HIS PARTY, LONG CALLED THE NATIONAL RALLY OF 
LUMBERJACKS, RECENTLY CHANGED ITS NAME TO THE LESS COLORFUL 
"RALLY FOR GABON".  THE NAME CHANGE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AN 
AIRING OF THE PARTY'S DIRTY LAUNDRY, WITH THE MORE VOCAL 
CRITICS OF THE REGIME LEAVING TO CHART THEIR OWN POLITICAL 
COURSE.  DURING THIS STRIFE THE PARTY NEWSPAPER "LE 
RASSEMBLEUR" (FORMERLY "LE BUCHERON" -- "THE LUMBERJACK"), 
WHICH FOR YEARS PUBLISHED SCATHING ALLEGATIONS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL CORRUPTION, HAS CONSIDERABLY TONED DOWN ITS 
ATTACKS. 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
20.  (C) OMAR BONGO HAS BECOME ONE OF AFRICA'S (AND THE 
WORLD'S) LONGEST-SERVING HEADS OF STATE BY BUILDING A 
CAREFUL BALANCE OF COMPETING ETHNIC INTERESTS AND OILING IT 
GENEROUSLY WITH PETROLEUM REVENUES.  AS THE OIL MONEY DRIES 
UP, BONGO -- OR HIS SUCCESSOR -- WILL FIND THE MACHINE 
INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO KEEP RUNNING.  FOR NOW, HOWEVER, 
SATISFACTION WITH THE STATUS QUO ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO 
BENEFIT FROM IT, AND FEAR OF THE STRIFE THAT MIGHT REPLACE 
IT ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO DON'T, KEEP BONGO FIRMLY IN 
CONTROL.  FOR THAT REASON THE DECEMBER LEGISLATIVE 
ELECTIONS WILL LIKELY SAY MORE ABOUT THE REGIME'S 
WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE TO RELAX ITS CONTROLS ON GABON'S 
VERSION OF DEMOCRACY THAN THEY WILL ABOUT HOW GABON WILL BE 
GOVERNED IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS. 
 
LEDESMA