This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

190936Z Mar 01

2001HANOI00638 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ0652

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FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2284
INFO NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/FPA// PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 000638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP/BCLTV, EB, DRL, INR 
NSC FOR EAST ASIAN DIRECTORATE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  00638  01 OF 06  190945Z 
STATE PASS USTR FOR DAUSTR DAMOND 
SECDEF FOR ISA/LSTERN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/14/11 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD VM DPOL
SUBJECT: LEADERSHIP OPTIONS BEING HASHED OUT IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM 
 
REF: STATE 40645 (C-AL1-00227) 
 
¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS JAMES BRUNO; 
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY: VIETNAM'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS BEEN 
CLOISTERED AT COMMUNIST PARTY HEADQUARTERS THIS PAST 
WEEK, DELIBERATING ON THE FATE OF GENERAL SECRETARY 
PHIEU AND A NEW LEADERSHIP LINE-UP.  IN THIS "SECOND 
SESSION" OF THE 11TH PLENUM, THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS 
BEEN TRYING TO FORGE CONSENSUS SO THE OPENING OF THE 
NINTH PARTY CONGRESS CAN BE FINALIZED AND, IF 
POSSIBLE, A NEW "TROIKA" OF LEADERS FORMALIZED AT THAT 
TIME.  THE LATTER IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN, THOUGH, AS A 
BROAD MIX OF CANDIDATES IS BEING PUSHED BY DIFFERENT 
GROUPS OF SENIOR LEADERS.  MOREOVER, THE LEADERS HAVE 
ALREADY ANNOUNCED THERE WILL BE AT LEAST ONE MORE 
PLENUM BEFORE THE CONGRESS, AND COMMENTS IN THE MEDIA 
ABOUT THE POLITICAL REPORT AND ECONOMIC PROGRAM 
SUGGEST THEY ARE STILL BEING MODIFIED BY "GOOD IDEAS" 
FROM THE LOCAL LEVELS.  WE JUDGE IT LIKELY PHIEU WILL 
BE REPLACED, THOUGH PERHAPS NOT AT THE CONGRESS IF A 
SUCCESSOR CANNOT BE AGREED UPON.  PHIEU REPORTEDLY IS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00638  01 OF 06  190945Z 
FIGHTING HARD FOR HIS POLITICAL LIFE; HIS SPEECH 
OPENING THE PLENUM EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR FUTURE 
LEADERS TO BE OF THE HIGHEST INTEGRITY. 
 
¶3. (C) SUMMARY (CONT'D): HANOI PARTY CHIEF TRONG, CPV 
ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR AN, PRESIDENT LUONG AND NATIONAL 
ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MANH ARE MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED AS 
PHIEU'S POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS.  DEPUTY PM DUNG SEEMS THE 
MOST LIKELY OF THE SOUTHERN "REFORMERS" TO TAKE THE 
PRIME MINISTER SLOT.  THE FATE OF THE SENIOR ADVISORS 
IS STILL UP IN THE AIR; THEY CONTINUE TO PLAY 
PROMINENT ROLES IN THE JOCKEYING FOR NEW LEADERSHIP 
SLOTS.  WITH THEIR RESURGENT INFLUENCE, IT LOOKS 
INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY THEY WILL GO QUIETLY INTO THE 
NIGHT.  WHOEVER IS LEFT STANDING IN THE POLITBURO AT 
THE END, THIS COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO 
MUDDLE THROUGH WITH ITS GRADUAL APPROACH TO REFORM. 
SINCE CONSENSUS PLAYS SUCH A PARAMOUNT ROLE IN THEIR 
DECISION-MAKING, WE DO NOT EXPECT DRAMATIC CHANGES IN 
THE SHORT TERM NO MATTER WHO IS CHOSEN.  END SUMMARY. 
 
PLENUM FOCUSED ON LEADERSHIP 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) WITH THE THREE SENIOR ADVISORS LOOKING ON FROM 
THE FRONT ROW, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (CPV) 
GENERAL SECRETARY LE KHA PHIEU OPENED THE SECOND 
SESSION OF THE 11TH PLENUM MARCH 13 BY NOTING THE 
PARTY WOULD CONTINUE ITS DISCUSSION OF PERSONNEL 
ISSUES FOR THE UPCOMING NINTH PARTY CONGRESS.  PHIEU, 
WIDELY BELIEVED TO BE FIGHTING FOR THIS POLITICAL 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00638  01 OF 06  190945Z 
LIFE, SAID THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE NEEDED TO PUT FORWARD 
LEADERSHIP CANDIDATES WHO "REPRESENT THE PARTY'S WILL 
AND INTELLIGENCE AND WHO POSSESS ADEQUATE POLITICAL 
AND MORAL BACKGROUND, A DEEP SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, 
AND COMPETENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
POLICIES."  HE STRESSED IT WAS NECESSARY "TO ENSURE 
INHERITANCE AND CONTINUITY OF PARTY LEADERSHIP AND 
POLITICAL STABILITY" WHILE WORKING TO ADVANCE THE "DOI 
MOI" RENOVATION PROCESS.  PHIEU SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT 
THAT THE NEW CENTRAL COMMITTEE MUST NOT INCLUDE ANYONE 
OF BAD CHARACTER, GUILTY OF "OPPORTUNISM, GREED, POOR 
DISCIPLINE, DISUNITY, BUREAUCRATISM, CORRUPTION, 
INCOMPETENCE AND IRRESPONSIBILITY." 
 
¶5. (U) IN ADDITION TO LEADERSHIP QUESTIONS, THE PLENUM 
HAS FOCUSED ON THE KEY CPV DOCUMENTS TO BE PRESENTED 
AT THE CONGRESS -- THE POLITICAL REPORT, 5-YEAR AND 
10-YEAR ECONOMIC PLANS, AND THE PARTY STATUTE.  IN HIS 
REMARKS PHIEU NOTED THE CPV HAS RECEIVED HUNDREDS OF 
LETTERS AND COMMENTS FROM THE GENERAL PUBLIC -- 
RANGING FROM STUDENTS TO RETIREES AND WAR VETERANS -- 
RESPONDING TO THE PARTY'S CALL FOR FEEDBACK ON THE 
DRAFT POLITICAL REPORT RELEASED FEB. 3.  PHIEU CLAIMED 
THE CPV WILL COLLATE ALL THE IDEAS AND SUGGESTIONS 
PRESENTED, AND WILL "INCORPORATE" THESE IDEAS IN 
REVISING THE REPORT. 
 
¶6. (SBU) IN HIS REMARKS, PHIEU NOTED THE CPV "DOES NOT 
HAVE MUCH TIME FOR THIS PLENUM."  TENTATIVELY THIS 
PLENUM IS SCHEDULED TO GO UNTIL MARCH 20.  PHIEU ALSO 
CONFIRMED THAT A 12TH PLENUM WILL BE HELD BEFORE THE 
CPV CONGRESS.  REPORTS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING FOR SOME 
TIME IN HANOI THAT THE CONGRESS MIGHT BE HELD IN EARLY 
APRIL, BUT BECAUSE OF APPARENT DIFFICULTY IN REACHING 
AGREEMENT ON LEADERSHIP CHANGES, WE HAVE RECENTLY 
HEARD REPORTS THE CONGRESS COULD SLIP TO JUNE.  A BUSY 
SCHEDULE OF ASEAN MEETINGS HANOI IS HOSTING IMPINGES 
ON THE CALENDAR IF THERE IS MUCH DELAY.  (HANOI IS 
HOSTING ASEAN SENIOR OFFICIALS' MEETINGS IN MID-MAY, 
WITH THE ASIAN MINISTERIAL, POST-MINISTERIAL AND ASEAN 
REGIONAL FORUM MEETINGS IN LATE JULY.) 
 
PHIEU ON THE DEFENSIVE 
---------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) ONE OF THE GREAT DRAMAS OF THIS PLENUM SESSION 
IS THE FATE OF PHIEU AND WHETHER HE WILL BE ABLE TO 
HOLD ON TO HIS JOB.  IN OCTOBER LAST YEAR, THE THREE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00638  02 OF 06  190946Z 
SENIOR ADVISORS, INCLUDING HIS FORMER MENTOR LE DUC 
ANH, CIRCULATED A LETTER AMONG THE LEADERSHIP ACCUSING 
PHIEU OF LACKING ABILITY IN MANAGEMENT OF PARTY AND 
STATE AFFAIRS.  DIFFERENT THEORIES CIRCULATE IN HANOI 
AS TO WHAT CAUSED ANH IN PARTICULAR TO TURN AGAINST 
HIS FORMER PROTEGE.  SOME HAVE SUGGESTED THAT PHIEU 
LOCKED THE GVN INTO A BAD DEAL WITH THE CHINESE ON 
BORDER DEMARCATION WITHOUT FULLY CONSULTING HIS 
COLLEAGUES.  OTHERS POINT TO HIS OVERALL LACK OF 
MANAGEMENT ABILITY AND VISION.  (COMMENT: WE BELIEVE A 
KEY FACTOR MAY BE THAT PHIEU "OVERREACHED" IN HIS 
EXPLORATORY EFFORTS TO ASSUME THE ROLE OF STATE 
PRESIDENT AS WELL AS GENERAL SECRETARY, A LA JIANG 
ZEMIN IN CHINA.  SUCH A MOVE, WIDELY AND GENERALLY 
FAVORABLY DISCUSSED UNTIL LAST FALL, WOULD HAVE BEEN A 
DRAMATIC DEPARTURE FOR THE HIGHLY CONSENSUAL 
LEADERSHIP OF THE CPV, WITH ITS LONG HISTORY OF A 
CAREFULLY BALANCE AMONG SENIOR LEADERS.  PHIEU MAY 
HAVE LOST ANH'S SUPPORT AND THAT OF OTHER ADVISORS AND 
POLITBURO LEADERS IN PART BECAUSE OF PERCEIVED HUBRIS 
THAT HE WANTED TOO MUCH POWER.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶8. (C) WHATEVER THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, IT APPEARS CLEAR 
THAT ONCE THE SENIOR ADVISORS SIGNALED THEIR 
DISAPPROVAL OF PHIEU'S PERFORMANCE, THIS OPENED THE 
FLOODGATES TO DIFFERENT GROUPS WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP 
WHO HAD VARIOUS GRIEVANCES AGAINST HIM.  THESE 
INCLUDE, ON THE ONE HAND, THE POWERFUL UNIFORMED 
MILITARY, WHO HAVE NEVER CLAIMED PHIEU AS ONE OF THEIR 
OWN.  (NOTE: PHIEU MADE HIS CAREER AS A POLITICAL 
COMMISSAR IN THE ARMY AND WAS SEEN AS NOT ADVANCING 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00638  02 OF 06  190946Z 
THE MILITARY'S INTERESTS WHILE GENERAL SECRETARY.  IN 
THIS REGARD, THE SWEDISH DCM SAID SHE WAS RECENTLY AT 
A GATHERING OF CPV AND MILITARY OFFICIALS WHOM SHE HAS 
KNOWN FOR YEARS.  THE EXTENT OF ANTIPATHY TO PHIEU WAS 
STRIKING.  IN HER PRESENCE, TWO OF THE MILITARY CADRE 
SPOKE OUT PUBLICLY AND SAID HE NEEDED TO GO.  END 
NOTE.) 
 
¶9. (C) REFORMERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, RESENT PHIEU'S 
HIGHLY IDEOLOGICAL VIEWS AND HIS CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO 
REFORM; THEY POINT TO HIS CLUMSY REMARKS TO PRESIDENT 
CLINTON, HIS LACK OF VISION, AND HIS CONTINUAL HARPING 
ON "SELF-CRITICISM," A STAPLE THROWBACK OF LENINIST 
CONTROL.  (OTHERS CRITICIZE THIS CAMPAIGN BECAUSE IT 
HAS BEEN SO INEFFECTIVE IN DEALING WITH MALFEASANCE 
AND CORRUPTION IN THE RANKS OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS.)  AND THERE ARE, OF COURSE, ALSO MANY 
PERSONALISTIC REASONS WHY INDIVIDUAL LEADERS HAVE 
GRIEVANCES AGAINST PHIEU; HE MADE ENEMIES, FOR 
EXAMPLE, BY GOING AFTER ALLIES OF PM KHAI SUCH AS 
NGUYEN THAI NGUYEN, WHO WAS ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH 
BEING A SPY FOR CHINA.  (COMMENT: ARGUABLY, THE 
PERSONALISTIC REASONS -- OF SELF-INTEREST, PERSONAL 
RIVALRY AND GRIEVANCE -- MAY BE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL. 
IDEOLOGY OFTEN SEEMS TO TAKE A BACK SEAT HERE TO OTHER 
MOTIVATIONS.  END COMMENT.) 
 
JOCKEYING OVER THE BIG THREE 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) THE WIDE RANGE OF OPPOSITION TO PHIEU SUGGESTS 
HE WILL NOT SURVIVE LONG IN HIS POSITION.  AFTER THE 
FIRST SESSION OF THE 11TH PLENUM IN JANUARY, THERE 
WERE CREDIBLE REPORTS HE HAD OFFERED TO STEP DOWN. 
ONE ACCOUNT OF A STRAW POLL AMONG POLITBURO MEMBERS 
REVEALED ONLY ONE MEMBER -- PHIEU HIMSELF -- 
SUPPORTING HIS CONTINUING IN HIS JOB.  OTHER REPORTS 
SUGGESTED OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS -- INCLUDING 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SPEAKER NONG DUC MANH, HANOI PARTY 
CHIEF NGUYEN PHU TRONG, AND CPV ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR 
NGUYEN VAN AN -- ENJOYED MUCH HIGHER JOB APPROVAL AND 
WERE POSSIBLE CANDIDATES TO REPLACE HIM. 
 
¶11. (C) IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS, HANOI HAS BUZZED WITH 
WIDELY VARYING SCENARIOS ABOUT WHO AMONG THE POLITBURO 
WOULD ASCEND TO PHIEU'S JOB, AS WELL AS THE OTHER TWO 
"TROIKA" POSITIONS -- PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER. 
THESE SCENARIOS REVOLVE AROUND DIFFERENT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00638  03 OF 06  190946Z 
CONFIGURATIONS OF THE FOLLOWING: HANOI PARTY CHIEF 
TRONG, CPV ORGANIZATION DIRECTOR AN, PRESIDENT LUONG, 
ASSEMBLY SPEAKER MANH, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DUNG, AND 
HO CHI MINH CITY PARTY CHIEF NGUYEN MIEN TRIET. 
TRONG, AN, LUONG AND MANH SEEM THE MOST CREDIBLE 
CANDIDATES FOR GENERAL SECRETARY. 
 
¶12. (C) WHILE NONE OF THESE LEADERS STANDS OUT AS A 
PROHIBITIVE FAVORITE, TRONG CERTAINLY IS A LEADING 
CONTENDER TO REPLACE PHIEU.  TRONG HEADED THE CPV'S 
IDEOLOGY DEPARTMENT AND BEFORE THAT WAS EDITOR OF THE 
"COMMUNIST REVIEW."  AS HANOI PARTY CHIEF HE OCCUPIES 
A GOOD VANTAGE POINT FOR LOBBYING HIS CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE COLLEAGUES.  THIS PAST YEAR, TRONG HAS 
SERVED AS HEAD OF THE PLATFORM COMMITTEE DRAFTING THE 
COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL REPORT FOR THE CPV CONGRESS. 
HIS IS A STRONGLY IDEOLOGICAL VOICE THAT WOULD ENSURE 
CONTINUITY AT THE TOP -- AND IDEOLOGICAL "BALANCE" TO 
MORE TECHNOCRATIC MEMBERS LIKELY TO FILL THE OTHER TWO 
SLOTS.  WHEN HE MET THE AMBASSADOR LAST YEAR FOR A 
COURTESY CALL AFTER MONTHS OF REQUESTS, TRONG REVEALED 
LITTLE ABOUT HIMSELF.  HE CHATTED STIFFLY ABOUT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN HANOI AND HIS COMMENTS WERE TYPICAL OF 
CPV JARGON.  HIS DEMEANOR MATCHED HIS REPUTATION: ONE 
OF THOSE SUSPICIOUS OF THE U.S. AND INSISTENT THAT 
REFORM MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH VIETNAM'S SOCIALIST 
HERITAGE. 
 
¶13. (C) RECENTLY NGUYEN VAN AN, WHO HAS BEEN IN THE 
SHADOWS OF INTERNAL CPV AFFAIRS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL 
YEARS, HAS RE-EMERGED TO CHALLENGE FOR THE TOP CPV 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00638  03 OF 06  190946Z 
SLOT.  AN WAS A FINALIST FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARY 
SLOT IN DECEMBER 1997, WHEN PHIEU WON OUT IN A CLOSE 
VOTE WITHIN THE POLITBURO.  AS HEAD OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE'S ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT, AN LIKEWISE 
OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT POST WITHIN THE PARTY AND 
SOURCES SUGGEST HE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN 
PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS.  ONE 
SOURCE WITH CLOSE FAMILY CONNECTIONS TO SENIOR CPV 
LEADERS TOLD US THAT SENIOR ADVISORS LE DUC ANH AND VO 
VAN KIET REPORTEDLY ARE UNITING BEHIND AN AS THEIR 
FAVORED CANDIDATE FOR GENERAL SECRETARY.  UNDER THIS 
SCENARIO, IF AN ASCENDS TO THE TOP SPOT, THE THREE 
SENIOR ADVISORS WOULD MAINTAIN THEIR POSITIONS AS 
"EMINENCE GRIS" OVERSEEING MATTERS FROM THE WINGS. 
(AT THIS POINT, IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE SENIOR 
ADVISORS WILL RETAIN THEIR FORMAL ROLES.  ONE OF THE 
REPORTED CONDITIONS RAISED EARLIER REGARDING PHIEU'S 
DISMISSAL WAS FOR THE THREE ADVISORS TO STEP DOWN AND 
FOR THOSE POSITIONS TO BE ABOLISHED.  UP TO NOW, 
HOWEVER, THEY CONTINUE TO EXERCISE CONSIDERABLE 
INFLUENCE IN THE PRESENT DELIBERATIONS.)  AS 
DOCUMENTED IN PREVIOUS EMBASSY REPORTING ABOUT 
POLITBURO MEMBERS, AN IS ONE OF THOSE LEADERS WHO IS 
LARGELY HIDDEN FROM THE PUBLIC AND FOREIGN OBSERVERS. 
WE DO NOT HAVE A GOOD TAKE ON HIS IDEOLOGICAL 
BEARINGS. 
 
¶14. (C) BOTH PRESIDENT LUONG AND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
SPEAKER MANH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED REPEATEDLY IN THE 
PAST MONTHS AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR OTHER TOP JOBS. 
BOTH COULD BE POSSIBLE COMPROMISE CANDIDATES TO MOVE 
TO GENERAL SECRETARY, ALTHOUGH NEITHER HAS THE PROFILE 
ONE WOULD NORMALLY EXPECT FOR THE JOB.  LUONG IS A 
LOW-KEY TECHNOCRAT WHO LONG SERVED AS A DEPUTY PM AND 
HAS GOTTEN GENERALLY GOOD REVIEWS FOR HIS SERVICE AS 
PRESIDENT; MANH IS FINISHING TWO TERMS AS SPEAKER, AND 
IS RANKED BY HIS PEERS AS ONE OF THE MORE POPULAR CPV 
LEADERS.  (COMMENT: NEITHER OF THESE TWO IS 
PARTICULARLY DYNAMIC, BUT IN VIETNAM'S POLITICAL 
CUPOLA, SOMETIMES "STEADY, SOLID BLANDNESS" IS AN 
ATTRACTIVE ATTRIBUTE.  END COMMENT.)  MANH, AN ETHNIC 
TAY WHO IS THE LONE MINORITY MEMBER IN THE POLITBURO, 
COULD EITHER BENEFIT OR BE HURT BY LAST MONTH'S 
DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.  SOME IN THE 
CPV MAY SEE HIS ELEVATION -- EITHER TO GENERAL 
SECRETARY OR PRESIDENT -- AS A WAY TO MAKE A SYMBOLIC 
 
SIPDIS 
GESTURE TO THE COUNTRY'S MINORITIES.  ON THE OTHER 
HAND, WE HAVE HEARD COMMENTS FROM ETHNIC KINH CADRE IN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00638  04 OF 06  190946Z 
HANOI THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD NOT SIT WELL WITH THE 
COUNTRY'S MAJORITY. 
 
¶15. (C) DUNG, AS FIRST DEPUTY PM, IS THE MOST LOGICAL 
CANDIDATE TO MOVE UP TO PRIME MINISTER, THOUGH SOME 
RECENT SCENARIOS EVEN SUGGEST PM KHAI COULD BE 
PERSUADED TO STAY ON IN THAT POSITION FOR A SHORT 
INTERIM.  DUNG, SEEN BY THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY AND 
MANY WESTERN OBSERVERS AS ONE OF THE MOST PROMISING OF 
THE NEXT GENERATION OF REFORMERS, REPORTEDLY MAY FACE 
OPPOSITION AMONG MORE IDEOLOGICAL MEMBERS OF THE 
LEADERSHIP.  IDEOLOGICAL MEMBERS CAUTIOUS ON REFORM 
MIGHT PREFER A POTENTIALLY LESS DYNAMIC PM; FOR THIS 
GROUP, A "SAFER" CHOICE MIGHT BE THE TECHNOCRATIC 
LUONG, WHO PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS DEPUTY PM.  (NOTE: A 
VIETNAMESE-AMERICAN WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE TAUGHT DUNG IN 
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL INSISTS HE DID NOT GRADUATE FROM 
JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL.  END NOTE.)  ON THE OTHER HAND, 
TRIET HAS EARNED STRONG KUDOS FROM THE REFORM CAMP FOR 
HIS LEADERSHIP IN HCMC, AND HE IS A PLAUSIBLE 
CANDIDATE, AS IS FORMER HCMC PARTY CHIEF TRUONG TAN 
SANG, NOW IN HANOI AS HEAD OF THE CPV ECONOMIC 
COMMISSION.  ONE OF SANG'S 1997 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
CPV LEADERS TO DISCLOSE THEIR WEALTH HAS NOW BEEN 
RESURRECTED FOR INCLUSION IN THIS YEAR'S CPV 
DOCUMENTS. 
 
¶16. (C) AS THE ABOVE SUGGESTS, THE RANGE OF 
COMBINATIONS IS WIDE, AND IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN 
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WILL BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT 
ON SUCCESSORS TO THE CURRENT TEAM.  IN FACT, GIVEN THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00638  04 OF 06  190946Z 
DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING CONSENSUS AMONG DISPARATE 
FACTIONS, WE HAVE HEARD FROM SEVERAL PARTY-CONNECTED 
SOURCES THAT THE MOST LIKELY RESULT AT PRESENT IS THAT 
THE CPV CONGRESS MAY BE DELAYED UNTIL JUNE, WITH THE 
CURRENT THREE LEADERS REMAINING IN PLACE FOR THE TIME 
BEING.  THE POLISH AMBASSADOR HEARD FROM A SENIOR CPV 
CONTACT THAT A JUNE CONGRESS LOOKS LIKELY AT THIS 
POINT, AND IN FACT, PHIEU MAY INTENTIONALLY BE 
DRAGGING OUT THE STALEMATE IN THE HOPES OF BUYING TIME 
FOR HIM TO STAY IN PLACE BECAUSE OF DEADLOCK. 
 
RETIREMENT COMING SOON FOR OTHERS IN THE POLITBURO 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶17. (C) WHEREAS THE FATE OF THE TOP THREE LEADERS 
REMAINS UNCERTAIN, A NUMBER OF OTHER POLITBURO MEMBERS 
CLEARLY ARE SLATED FOR RETIREMENT FROM THE POLITBURO. 
(NAMING NEW LEADERS TO GOVERNMENT POSTS WOULD HAVE TO 
BE "FORMALIZED" BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THOUGH THE 
REAL DECISIONS ARE TAKEN BY THE CPV.)  THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE DECIDED AT ITS LAST PLENUM SESSION TO 
REQUIRE THOSE POLITBURO MEMBERS OVER 70 YEARS OLD TO 
RETIRE (THOUGH IT LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A FEW 
EXCEPTIONS) AND TO ENCOURAGE THOSE OVER 65 TO STEP 
DOWN.  AMONG THOSE REPORTEDLY RETIRING ARE FATHERLAND 
FRONT HEAD PHAM THE DUYET, DEPUTY PM NGUYEN MANH CAM 
(WHO HAD BEEN MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE VICE PRESIDENT), 
LONG-TIME HEAD OF THE HO CHI MINH POLITICAL ACADEMY 
NGUYEN DUC BINH, AND CPV IDEOLOGY HEAD (AND FORMER 
HANOI PARTY CHIEF) LE XUAN TUNG.  DUYET'S STATUS HAS 
BEEN DEBATED FOR MONTHS, BUT IT NOW APPEARS HE WILL BE 
EASED OUT. 
 
¶18. (C) RUMORS CIRCULATE ABOUT POSSIBLE RETIREMENT FOR 
DEFENSE MINISTER PHAM VAN TRA AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC 
SECURITY LE MINH HUONG.  BOTH OF THEM HAVE RUMORED TO 
BE ON THE WAY OUT BEFORE, BECAUSE OF AGE AND IN 
HUONG'S CASE, REPORTS OF SOME HEALTH PROBLEMS. 
HOWEVER, BOTH OF THEIR MINISTRIES ARE IMPORTANT 
INSTITUTIONAL POWERS WITHIN THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP, 
AND THEIR SLOTS WOULD CERTAINLY BE FILLED BY THEIR 
SUCCESSORS, IF THEY DO INDEED STEP DOWN.  CHIEF OF THE 
ARMY'S GENERAL STAFF LE VAN DUNG CERTAINLY IS A 
CANDIDATE BY POSITION TO REPLACE TRA AS DEFENSE 
MINISTER (AND THUS ON THE POLITBURO), BUT HE IS SEEN 
AS UNSOPHISTICATED BY MANY OF HIS KEY PEERS.  (DAO HAS 
HEARD FROM SEVERAL SOURCES THAT DUNG EARNED HIS STARS 
HEROICALLY ON THE BATTLEFIELD, BUT HIS PRESENT WORK AS 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  00638  05 OF 06  190947Z 
CHIEF OF STAFF SEEMS A VALIDATION OF THE "PETER 
PRINCIPLE.")  LT. GENERAL PHAM THANH NGAN IS WIDELY 
SEEN AS A RISING FIGURE AMONG THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
OFFICIALS IN THE CPV.  HE HOLDS PHIEU'S OLD POSITION 
AS POLITICAL COMMISSAR OF THE MILITARY; HE ALSO 
PREVIOUSLY SERVED AS AIR FORCE COMMANDER.  WE EXPECT 
HE WILL REMAIN IN THE LEADERSHIP AND IS A CANDIDATE TO 
RISE IN INFLUENCE.  BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE TIES TO 
PHIEU, HOWEVER, HE MIGHT BE HURT BUREAUCRATICALLY IF 
THE GENERAL SECRETARY IS FORCED TO STEP DOWN NOW. 
CONVERSELY, HE MIGHT RISE AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR 
PHIEU'S STEPPING DOWN. 
 
¶19. (C) FOR OTHERS AMONG THE LEADERSHIP, IT IS EVEN 
MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO GAUGE.  NGUYEN THI XUAN MY, 
THE ONLY WOMAN EVER APPOINTED TO THE POLITBURO, IS IN 
CHARGE OF THE CPV CONTROL COMMITTEE, AND IN THIS 
CAPACITY COULD BE BLAMED FOR ONGOING CORRUPTION IN CPV 
RANKS.  ONE LONG-TIME FOREIGN OBSERVER PREDICTS SHE 
WILL RETIRE.  (HOWEVER, THE GVN HAS INDICATED ITS 
INTEREST IN INCREASING THE NUMBER OF WOMEN IN THE 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND OTHER HIGHLY VISIBLE POSITIONS, 
AND THIS SUGGESTS SHE MIGHT REMAIN -- OR BE REPLACED 
BY ANOTHER PROMINENT WOMAN LEADER.)  PHAN DIEN, PARTY 
CHIEF IN DANANG, HAS PRESENTED A CONFIDENT IMAGE TO 
WESTERN VISITORS WHO HAVE MET HIM IN RECENT MONTHS, 
SUCH AS THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR, AND WE SPECULATE HE 
WILL REMAIN ON THE POLITBURO. 
 
POLICY CONTINUITY RATHER THAN DRAMATIC CHANGES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  00638  05 OF 06  190947Z 
 
¶20. (C) WHAT WE HAVE SEEN OF THE POLITICAL REPORT AND 
FIVE- AND TEN-YEAR ECONOMIC PLANS SUGGEST THERE WILL 
BE NO DRAMATIC CHANGES COMING OUT OF THE PARTY 
CONGRESS.  AND IN FACT THAT IS WHAT ONE NORMALLY 
EXPECTS OUT OF THIS POLITICAL SYSTEM.  THE PARTY'S 
ENTIRE PROCESS OF "CONSULTATION" OVER A WHOLE YEAR, 
INVOLVING COMMENTS AND DISCUSSION BY CPV CADRE AT ALL 
LEVELS AND BY OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED "PUBLIC" VOICES, 
TENDS TO MAKE THE PARTY CONGRESS DOCUMENTS A BIT OF 
ALL THINGS TO ALL PEOPLE.  FOR EXAMPLE, THE POLITICAL 
REPORT HAS SECTIONS ON EVERYTHING INCLUDING BUILDING 
AND REFINING SOCIALISM, HOW TO REFORM SOES, HORTATORY 
STATEMENTS ABOUT DEFENDING NATIONAL SECURITY, AND HOW 
TO PROMOTE AN AUTHENTICALLY VIETNAMESE CULTURE 
RENAISSANCE.  TAKEN AS A WHOLE, IT DOESN'T GIVE MUCH 
OF A GUIDE FOR SPECIFIC ACTION. 
 
¶21. (C) AS WE HAVE NOTED BEFORE IN OUR REPORTING, ONE 
OF THE POSITIVES WE SEE IN THE DOCUMENTS IS AN 
INCREASED RECOGNITION OF VIETNAM'S NEEDS TO EMBRACE 
THE POTENTIAL INHERENT IN THE "KNOWLEDGE-BASED 
ECONOMY."  THIS FOCUSES BOTH ON DEVELOPING AND 
MARKETING VIETNAM'S HUMAN RESOURCES POTENTIAL IN TERMS 
OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE 
OF VIETNAMESE CITIZENS.  THIS IS REFLECTED PRACTICALLY 
IN THE GOVERNMENT'S NASCENT EFFORTS TO DEVELOP GREATER 
CAPACITIES IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING SUCH 
INITIATIVES AS BREAKING GROUND ON HIGH-TECH PARKS IN 
HO CHI MINH CITY AND HANOI AND IN EFFORTS TO REPLICATE 
BANGALORE'S OUTSOURCING OF SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT, FOR 
EXAMPLE. 
 
¶22. (C) THE CONGRESS, HOWEVER, IS UNLIKELY TO RESULT 
IN ANY DRAMATIC BOOST TO THE ECONOMIC REFORM AGENDA. 
MUCH MORE INFLUENTIAL OVER TIME, BY FAR, WILL BE THE 
ROLLING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BILATERAL TRADE 
AGREEMENT AS ECONOMIC REFORMERS IN KEY MINISTRIES AND 
OFFICES (AND INDEED MORE PROGRESSIVE REGIONS SUCH AS 
GREATER HO CHI MINH CITY) PRESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 
TARGETS IN THEIR AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY.  BY 
CONTRAST, THE CONGRESS IS MUCH MORE ABOUT CONTINUITY 
THAN CHANGE.  IN ADDITION, SEEMINGLY TOTALLY DIVORCED 
FROM THE PARTY'S RHETORIC, THE GVN HAS SIGNED AN IN- 
PRINCIPLE AGREEMENT ON A NEW STRUCTURAL PROGRAM WITH 
THE IMF AND THE WORLD BANK.  THE TIMING OF THE SIGNING 
OF THIS AGREEMENT INDICATES THE REFORMERS WANT TO 
ASSURE THE STRUCTURAL PROGRAM IS A "FAIT ACCOMPLI" FOR 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  00638  06 OF 06  190947Z 
THE PARTY CONGRESS. 
 
¶23. (C) REPORTS COMING OUT OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE 
11TH PLENUM SUGGEST THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS 
LEANING TOWARD ABOLITION OF THE FIVE-MEMBER POLITBURO 
STANDING BOARD AS UNWORKABLE AND INSTEAD RETURNING TO 
A SECRETARIAT THAT WILL STAFF THE WORK OF THE 
POLITBURO.  WHAT THIS MEANS FOR DECISION-MAKING IS 
UNCLEAR.  DECISIONS BY THE WHOLE POLITBURO INSTEAD OF 
A STANDING COMMITTEE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE ANY MORE 
ENLIGHTENED, EFFECTIVE, OR TIMELY.  AND, IT IS 
UNCERTAIN WHETHER THE SECRETARIAT WOULD HAVE ANYTHING 
OTHER THAN "STAFF" RESPONSIBILITIES. 
 
COMMENT: MORE OF THE SAME 
------------------------- 
 
¶24. (C) COMMENT: IF ALL GOES ACCORDING TO FORM, THE 
BIGGEST DECISION OF THIS PLENUM LIKELY WILL BE "NO 
DECISION."  WHILE WE JUDGE THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT 
AMONG MOST OF THE CPV LEADERSHIP THAT PHIEU SHOULD GO, 
IT IS MUCH LESS CLEAR A CONSENSUS CAN BE FORGED ON HIS 
SUCCESSOR.  THAT IS LIKELY TO TAKE SOME MORE TIME, AND 
WE FIND VERY CREDIBLE THE REPORTS WE HEAR THAT THE 
PARTY CONGRESS MAY SLIP UNTIL AS LATE AS JUNE.  AND 
EVEN THEN, THERE MAY BE NO AGREEMENT ON THE TOP SLOTS. 
THE LACK OF CONSENSUS AMONG THIS STALEMATED 
LEADERSHIP, WHICH IS ADDICTED TO "CONSENSUS" DECISIONS 
THAT INVOLVE LEAST-COMMON-DENOMINATOR GRADUALISM, 
SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN UNPOPULAR PHIEU COULD 
MANAGE TO HOLD ON FOR PERHAPS EVEN ANOTHER YEAR OR SO, 
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PAGE 04        HANOI  00638  06 OF 06  190947Z 
BEING REPLACED WELL AFTER THE NINTH PARTY CONGRESS. 
THE PRECEDENT EXISTS FOR SUCH A MIDTERM REPLACEMENT, 
SINCE PHIEU HIMSELF WON OUT OVER AN IN A SPLIT 
POLITBURO VOTE IN DECEMBER 1997, SOME 18 MONTHS AFTER 
THE EIGHTH CONGRESS. 
 
¶25. (C) IN ANY EVENT, ONE THING IS CERTAIN: THERE WILL 
BE NO DRAMATIC POLICY CHANGES COMING OUT OF THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS.  WE WILL SEE A GRADUAL 
CHANGE OF EMPHASIS, PERHAPS, AND IN TIME GENERATIONAL 
CHANGE WILL BRING (HOPEFULLY) FRESHER PERSPECTIVES TO 
THE FORE.  BUT IN THE SHORT TERM, THE NEW COLLECTIVE 
POLITBURO LIKELY WON'T ACT MUCH DIFFERENT THAN THE 
CURRENT VERSION.  IT WILL CONTINUE TO TRY TO BALANCE 
THE DISPARATE "FACTIONS" OF THIS DIVIDED CPV BY 
MUDDLING THROUGH WITH ITS OXYMORONIC "STATE-LED 
MARKET-ORIENTED SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT."  END COMMENT. 
HARTER 
 
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