R 222056Z JAN 01
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0854
AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 
INFO NSC WASHDC
DIA WASHDC
CIA WASHDC
USCINCSO MIAMI FL
USINT HAVANA 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 
AMEMBASSY LIMA 
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 
AMEMBASSY QUITO 
AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 
AMEMBASSY MADRID 
AMEMBASSY MEXICO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000182 
 
USOAS FOR SHANNON 
USCINCSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/12 
TAGS: PREL VE CO
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ AND COLOMBIA: IT WON'T GET BETTER 
 
REF: A) CARACAS 0811 99, B) CARACAS 3265 00, 
C) CARACAS 1940 00, D) CARACAS 3397 99, 
E) CARACAS 3209 99, F) CARACAS 3133 99, 
G) CARACAS 3101 99, H) CARACAS 2921 99, 
I) CARACAS 2813 99, J) CARACAS 2813 99, 
K) CARACAS 2813 99, L) CARACAS 2727 99, 
M) CARACAS 0629 99 
 
CLASSIFIED BY DONNA J. HRINAK, AMBASSADOR.  REASONS: 1.5 
(B) AND (D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) THE RIVALRY BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA HAS BEEN 
LONGSTANDING, WITH ROOTS REACHING BACK AS FAR AS THE BREAK- 
UP OF GRAN COLOMBIA INTO SEPARATE STATES.  OVER THE YEARS, 
THE RIVALRY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES - AND ESPECIALLY 
BETWEEN THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARIES - MANIFESTED ITSELF AS 
A PERSISTENT TENSION.  OVER TIME, HOWEVER, THESE TENSIONS 
HAD BECOME INSTITUTIONALIZED AND MANAGED WITH GREAT EFFORT 
AND ENERGY THROUGHOUT SUCCEEDING VENEZUELAN AND COLOMBIAN 
GOVERNMENTS.  FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS, HOWEVER, THESE 
EFFORTS, AT LEAST ON THE VENEZUELAN SIDE OF THE BORDER, 
HAVE TAKEN A BACK SEAT TO THE SIGNIFICANT AMBITIONS OF 
VENEZUELA'S CURRENT LEADER, PRESIDENT HUGO CHAVEZ.  RECENT 
TENSIONS IN THE RELATIONSHIP ARE NOT JUST THE RESULT OF 
MISCALCULATION OR INEXPERIENCE.  THEY ARE ALSO A DIRECT 
EXPRESSION OF DEEPLY-HELD CONVICTIONS BY CHAVEZ RELATING TO 
HIS ROLE IN THE WORLD, THE DESIRABILITY OF SPREADING HIS 
"BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION" TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AND HIS 
VIEW OF THE FARC AND ELN AS PHILOSOPHICAL KINSMEN IN THE 
LATTER ENDEAVOR.  WE SEE ZERO LIKELIHOOD OF THESE VIEWS -- 
AND RESULTING GOV BEHAVIOR -- CHANGING IN THE FUTURE, AND 
ANTICIPATE FUTURE TENSIONS BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
------------------------ 
A VERY BUMPY ROAD SO FAR 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) THE FIRST SERIOUS DIPLOMATIC INCIDENT BETWEEN 
VENEZUELA AND COLOMBIA OCCURRED JUST ONE MONTH INTO 
PRESIDENT HUGO CHAVEZ'S PRESIDENCY, ON MACH 10, 1999, 
DURING ONE OF CHAVEZ'S FIRST PRESS CONFERENCES, WHEN HE 
MADE A STATEMENT WHICH APPEARED TO CONFER BELLIGERENT 
STATUS ON THE FARC, MUCH TO THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT'S 
PUBLICLY EXPRESSED CONCERN AND CONSTERNATION.  ALTHOUGH 
FOREIGN MINISTER JOSE VICENTE RANGEL TRIED TO DOWNPLAY THE 
INCIDENT, THE EVENT PROVED TO BE ONLY THE FIRST EPISODE OF 
WHAT HAS BECOME AN OFT-REPEATED PATTERN IN VENEZUELAN- 
COLOMBIAN RELATIONS: CHAVEZ OR RANGEL MAKES A REMARK WHICH 
INSPIRES A SHARP PUBLIC REJECTION BY COLOMBIA.  THE 
VENEZUELANS EXPRESS SURPRISE AT THE COLOMBIAN REACTION, 
INSISTING THERE WAS A MISUNDERSTANDING.  THE COLOMBIANS LET 
THE MATTER DROP, AND RELATIONS APPEAR TO RETURN TO THE 
STATUS QUO ANTE, UNTIL A SIMILAR STATEMENT BY CHAVEZ OR 
RANGEL STARTS THE CYCLE AGAIN. 
 
¶3. (C) WE SAY "APPEAR" TO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE 
BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THE INCIDENTS HAVE A CUMULATIVE 
NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE RELATIONSHIP.  (NOTE: WE WOULD 
WELCOME EMBASSY BOGOTA'S COMMENTS ON THIS.)  FURTHERMORE, 
THE CHAVEZ/RANGEL BEHAVIOR THAT LEADS TO THESE DUST-UPS 
WITH VENEZUELA'S NEIGHBOR SHOWS NO SIGNS OF TAPERING OFF. 
INDEED, THE MOST SERIOUS INCIDENT -- WHICH LED COLOMBIA TO 
RECALL ITS AMBASSADOR FOR CONSULTATIONS -- TOOK PLACE ONLY 
LAST NOVEMBER.  (NOTE: THE INCIDENT INVOLVED APPEARANCE BY 
SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE FARC AT A SEMINAR ON PLAN COLOMBIA 
HELD IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PALACE.  THE SEMINAR WAS 
SPONSORED BY THE VENEZUELAN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE LATIN 
AMERICAN PARLIAMENT, BUT IN FACT, WE HAVE INFORMATION TO 
THE EFFECT THAT THE GOV WAS FULLY INVOLVED IN FACILITATING 
THE TRAVEL OF THE FARC MEMBERS.) 
 
 
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CHAVEZ'S LONGED-FOR ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) MANY OF THE STATEMENTS FROM CHAVEZ OR RANGEL THAT 
HAVE CAUSED A NEGATIVE PUBLIC REACTION BY COLOMBIA INVOLVE 
UNASKED-FOR SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS.  THESE 
STATEMENTS IN OUR VIEW REFLECT TWO STRONGLY-HELD 
CONVICTIONS BY CHAVEZ: 1) THAT THE COLOMBIAN PEACE PROCESS 
SHOULD BE INTERNATIONALIZED; 2) THAT HE SHOULD PLAY A MAJOR 
ROLE IN ANY SUCH ESQUIPULAS-TYPE PROCESS.  THE TWO IDEAS, 
OF COURSE, ARE CLOSELY INTERRELATED.  CHAVEZ APPEARS 
SINCERELY CONVINCED THAT PASTRANA CAN'T DO THE JOB ALONE, 
AND THAT INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION BETWEEN THE GOC AND THE 
REBELS IS NECESSARY.  ON THE OTHER HAND, THE IDEA OF A 
STARRING ROLE FOR CHAVEZ CLEARLY CONNECTS WITH HIS MANIFEST 
CONCEPTION OF HIMSELF AS A MAJOR THIRD WORLD LEADER, IN THE 
FOREFRONT OF EFFORTS TO CREATE A "MULTIPOLAR" (V. U.S.- 
DOMINATED "UNIPOLAR") WORLD.  IT IS NATURAL THAT HE WOULD 
SEE NEIGHBORING COLOMBIA, WITH ITS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
WITH SIMON BOLIVAR, AS A NATURAL PLACE FOR SUCH ACTIVISM ON 
HIS PART. IT IS ALSO PERFECTLY RATIONAL FOR A VENEZUELAN 
PRESIDENT TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN COLOMBIA. 
BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE EGO-CENTERED ELEMENTS WE HAVE 
DESCRIBED ABOVE CAN BE IGNORED IN ANALYZING CHAVEZ'S 
POLICIES TOWARDS COLOMBIA. 
 
 
-------------------- 
WHOSE SIDE IS HE ON? 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) THAT'S NOT AN EASY QUESTION TO ANSWER.  THE OFFICIAL 
GOV LINE, BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN PRIVATE TO US, IS THAT 
VENEZUELA'S CONTACTS WITH THE COLOMBIAN REBELS ARE CENTERED 
ON PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF VENEZUELANS WHO SUFFER FROM 
REBEL ACTIVITIES ON VENEZUELA'S SIDE OF THE COMPLETELY 
POROUS BORDER: NEGOTIATING THE RELEASE OF KIDNAPPED 
VENEZUELANS, ETC.  CHAVEZ AND RANGEL HAVE RECENTLY ADMITTED 
THAT RETIRED VENEZUELAN NAVY CAPTAIN RAMON RODRIGUEZ CHACIN 
(LONG CLOSE TO CHAVEZ, WE BELIEVE) FROM TIME TO TIME 
CARRIES OUT SPECIAL MISSIONS FOR THE GOV IN COLOMBIA 
ITSELF.  HOWEVER, CHAVEZ AND RANGEL ASSERT THAT THESE 
MISSIONS ARE PURELY RELATED TO RELEASE OF KIDNAP VICTIMS 
(RODRIGUEZ CHACIN HAS IN FACT NEGOTIATED THE FREEING OF 
PERSONS HELD BY BOTH THE FARC AND THE ELN, INCLUDING A U.S. 
CITIZEN HELD BY THE LATTER) AND THAT THE MISSIONS TAKE 
PLACE WITH THE CONSENT OF THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT, AND 
SOMETIMES EVEN AT ITS REQUEST.  ACTIONS SUCH AS PERMITTING 
REBELS TO MEET WITH VARIOUS OTHER COLOMBIAN POLITICAL 
LEADERS, OR ERSTWHILE LEADERS, IN THE PEACE-PROCESS ARE 
JUSTIFIED AS DISINTERESTED GOOD OFFICES PROVIDED WITH GOC 
KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT AND AIMED AT PERMITTING COLOMBIANS 
THEMSELVES TO WORK OUT A PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO 
THE INSURGENCIES. 
 
¶6. (C) IN FACT, AS WE HAVE REPORTED IN VARIOUS OTHER 
CHANNELS, WE BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST THE SYMPATHIES OF THE 
GOV FOR THE REBELS ARE FAR GREATER THAN THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED 
OFFICIAL LINE SUGGESTS.  FROM HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS ALONE, 
IT IS CLEAR THAT CHAVEZ REGARDS THE FARC AND ELN AS 
LEGITIMATE BELLIGERENTS, AND THAT ANY PEACE SETTLEMENT 
SHOULD NOT JUST INVOLVE THEM TURNING IN THEIR ARMS AND 
TRANSFORMING THEMSELVES MEEKLY INTO POLITICAL PARTIES. 
 
¶7. (C) WHY WOULD CHAVEZ HOLD SUCH VIEWS?  THE FIRST POINT 
TO BEAR IN MIND IS THAT HOWEVER ELUSIVE THE CONCEPT OF HIS 
"BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION" MAY BE FOR OTHERS, IT IS ABSOLUTELY 
CENTRAL TO HIS THINKING AND ACTIONS.  ONE COMPONENT OF IT 
IS A CHAMPIONING OF THE INTERESTS OF THE LOWER CLASSES 
AGAINST ENTRENCHED ELITES.  IF ONE SEES ON ONE SIDE LEFT- 
WING GUERRILLA-FIGHTERS (WHOSE VERY IDENTITY AS SUCH IS 
LIKELY TO APPEAL TO CHAVEZ'S ROMANTIC SIDE), AND ON THE 
OTHER A COLOMBIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM WHICH -- AT LEAST TO 
OBSERVERS IN CARACAS -- LOOKS VERY MUCH LIKE THE ONE CHAVEZ 
DESTROYED IN VENEZUELA," IT IS NOT HARD TO SEE WHICH SIDE 
HIS HEART LEANS TOWARD. WHETHER OR NOT HE SHARES ALL THE 
OBJECTIVES OF THE REBELS, IT SEEMS THAT HE REGARDS THEM AS 
AT LEAST PROTO-BOLIVARIANS, AND ALLIES IN THE GOAL WE 
BELIEVE HE HOLDS OF SEEING A VERSION OF HIS PROGRAM IN 
VENEZUELA SPREAD TO THE OTHER ANDEAN COUNTRIES, AND PERHAPS 
BEYOND.  WHILE CHAVEZ ISSUES FREQUENT PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF 
CONCERN ABOUT THE SCOURGE OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, HE 
CONVENIENTLY IGNORES THE FARC'S SUBSTANTIAL CONNECTION TO 
THE DRUG TRADE.  FINALLY, IT IS NOT HARD TO IMAGINE WHAT 
MIGHT BE THE ADVICE OF HIS CLOSE FRIEND FIDEL CASTRO 
REGARDING THE MOST DESIRABLE OUTCOME IN COLOMBIA. 
 
 
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CHAVEZ AND PLAN COLOMBIA 
------------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) CHAVEZ AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE MADE CLEAR 
THEIR STRONG OBJECTION TO THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF PLAN 
COLOMBIA, WHICH CHAVEZ RECENTLY REITERATED BY PUBLICLY 
STATING THAT HIS POSITION "WOULD NOT CHANGE."  THEY SAY IT 
WILL SIMPLY INCREASE THE VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA, CAUSE AN 
INFLUX OF REFUGEES IN VENEZUELA, AND LEAD TO A POSSIBLE 
TRANSFER TO THIS COUNTRY OF NARCOTRAFFICKING OPERATIONS 
CURRENTLY LOCATED IN COLOMBIA, COMPLEMENTING UNDERLYING 
CONCERNS ABOUT THE COLOMBIAN THREAT TO VENEZUELA.  IT 
SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE CONCERNS ARE SHARED ACROSS A 
VERY BROAD SPECTRUM OF VENEZUELAN SOCIETY, INCLUDING AMONG 
PERSONS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO OTHER CHAVEZ POLICIES RELATING 
TO COLOMBIA. 
 
 
----------------------- 
THINGS WON'T GET BETTER 
----------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) IF OUR ABOVE ANALYSIS IS SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT, THEN 
IT IS PURE WISHFUL THINKING TO IMAGINE THAT CHAVEZ IS 
MERELY ON SOME KIND OF AN UPWARD-TRENDING, ALBEIT SHALLOW, 
LEARNING CURVE AS FAR AS HIS POLICIES TOWARDS COLOMBIA IS 
CONCERNED.  RATHER THAN BEING JUST INADVERTENT MISSTEPS 
BORN OUT OF INEXPERIENCE, WE BELIEVE THOSE POLICIES STEM 
FROM THE DEEPLY HELD CONVICTIONS AND OBJECTIVES WE HAVE 
SOUGHT TO OUTLINE ABOVE.  THEREFORE, DESPITE CHAVEZ'S 
CONSTANT PROTESTATIONS OF HIS DESIRE FOR GOOD RELATIONS 
WITH PASTRANA, WE BELIEVE THE CURRENT PATTERN OF GOV 
BEHAVIOR IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE, AND INDEED ITS NEGATIVE 
ELEMENTS COULD EVEN BECOME MORE PRONOUNCED UNDER CERTAIN 
SCENARIOS. 
 
¶10. (C) VENEZUELAN-COLOMBIAN RELATIONS HAVE LONG BEEN 
MARKED BY THE KIND OF SUSPICION WHICH SEEMS RELATIVELY 
COMMON AMONG NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES IN THE HEMISPHERE.  BUT 
THAT SUSPICION HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN MODERATED BY A 
REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR A MODUS VIVENDI.  THIS IN TURN 
LED TO THE CREATION OVER THE YEARS OF AN IMPRESSIVE NUMBER 
OF POLITICAL BUFFER MECHANISMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, 
INCLUDING A BI-NATIONAL COMMISSION INVOLVING THE 
PARTICIPATION OF NUMEROUS MINISTRIES, STUDY GROUPS, AND IN 
THE AREA OF COUNTER-NARCOTICS, INTELLIGENCE-SHARING 
ARRANGEMENTS AND EXTRACTION AND INSERTION ASSISTANCE, AND 
CROSS-BORDER PURSUIT COOPERATION.  AT LEAST PARTIALLY AS A 
RESULT OF RECENT DISTURBING BORDER INCIDENTS BETWEEN THE 
TWO COUNTRIES' MILITARIES, THE VENEZUELAN-COLOMBIAN BORDER 
AFFAIRS COMMISSION -- WHICH HAD FALLEN INTO DISUSE SINCE THE 
BEGINNING OF THE CHAVEZ ADMINISTRATION -- IS SCHEDULED TO 
MEET ON FEBRUARY 22.  (NOTE:  VENEZUELA SUSPENDED A 
COMMISSION MEETING SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 2000.) 
 
¶11. (C) CAN WE DO ANYTHING?  OUR REPEATED URGINGS, MADE TO 
CHAVEZ NOT MERELY BY THIS EMBASSY BUT BY HIGH LEVEL 
VISITORS, TO THE EFFECT OF FOLLOWING A "NO SURPRISES" (FOR 
PASTRANA) POLICY TOWARDS COLOMBIA HAVE UNFORTUNATELY BORNE 
NO FRUIT TO DATE.  NOR SHOULD THAT SURPRISE US, FOR 
CHAVEZ'S CONCEPTION OF THE "UNIPOLAR" HEGEMONISTIC 
STRIVINGS OF THE UNITED STATES -- OF WHICH HE SEES PLAN 
COLOMBIA AS A PARTICULARLY CLEAR EXAMPLE -- MAKE US ABOUT 
THE LAST SOURCE OF ADVICE HE IS LIKELY TO TURN TO FOR 
MANAGING RELATIONS WITH COLOMBIA OR DEALING WITH THE 
GUERILLAS (OR JUST ABOUT ANYTHING ELSE FOR THAT MATTER). 
IN SHAPING HIS POLICIES TOWARDS COLOMBIA HE WILL CONTINUE - 
- AT THE PRICE, WHICH HE SEEMS WILLING TO PAY, OF LIKELY 
FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE GOC -- TO FOLLOW HIS 
BOLIVARIAN VISION.  IT IS A VISION IN WHICH OUR COUNSEL HAS 
NO PLACE. 
 
 
HRINAK. 
 
 
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