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Viewing cable 00HANOI2777, BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE FIRST LADY'S FORUM: PROFOUND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE "TWO VIETNAMS"

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00HANOI2777 2000-12-26 10:29 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Hanoi
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

261029Z Dec 00

2000HANOI02777 - CONFIDENTIAL
 
 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ1873

PAGE 01        HANOI  02777  01 OF 06  261043Z 
ACTION DRL-02   

INFO  LOG-00   NP-00    AID-00   AMAD-00  ACQ-00   CIAE-00  SRPP-00  
      DS-00    EAP-00   EB-00    EUR-00   FBIE-00  VC-00    TEDE-00  
      INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   VCE-00   NSAE-00  OIC-02   PM-00    
      P-00     SP-00    SS-00    PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-02   NFAT-00  
      SAS-00     /007W
                  ------------------AFB4FC  261043Z /38    
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1582
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
APEC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
DEPTTREAS WASHDC
DEPTLABOR WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//J5/FPA//
DIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 
AMEMBASSY PARIS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 HANOI 002777 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/S, S/PICW (LOAR), P, E, S/P 
STATE ALSO FOR EAP (BOYCE), EAP/BCLTV, DRL, EB, INR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HANOI  02777  01 OF 06  261043Z 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ANE (FERRARA) 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OFFICE OF THE FIRST LADY (VERVEER) 
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC (PRITCHARD), NEC (ROSEN) 
NSC FOR LIEBERTHAL, CHRISTY AND SCHWARTZ 
LABOR FOR U/S SAMET/BENJAMIN 
USDOC FOR 4431/MAC/AP/OKSA/HPPHO 
TREASURY FOR OASIA 
SECDEF FOR ISA/EAP STERN 
USDA FOR FAA/AO/SHUETE 
PARIS FOR SUE BREMNER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2020 
TAGS: PGOV KWMN PREL PHUM SOCI ELAB PINR VM DPOL
SUBJECT: BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE FIRST LADY'S FORUM: PROFOUND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE "TWO VIETNAMS" 
 
REF: A) HANOI 2776   B) HANOI 2775   C) HANOI 2667 
 
D) HANOI 2639   E) HANOI 2590   F) HO CHI MINH CITY 1766 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS JAMES BRUNO; 
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
2. (C) THE DRAMA BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE FIRST LADY'S 
WOMEN'S FORUM REVEALS A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONAL 
RESTRICTIONS ON WOMEN AND MEN IN VIETNAM TODAY.  OVER LUNCH 
BEFORE THE EVENT, IN CANDID DISCUSSIONS IN ENGLISH WITH 
SENIOR STAFF OF THE FIRST LADY'S OFFICE, THE SEVEN 
VIETNAMESE PANELISTS IN ATTENDANCE SHARED BALANCED 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02777  01 OF 06  261043Z 
ASSESSMENTS ABOUT THE CHALLENGES FACING VIETNAMESE WOMEN. 
BY CONTRAST, WHEN THEY SPOKE AT THE FORUM ITSELF, IN THE 
PRESENCE OF SENIOR COMMUNIST PARTY OFFICIALS, MOST OF THE 
PANELISTS' PRESENTATIONS WERE BLAND AND PROPAGANDISTIC. 
ONE PANELIST SAID LATER THAT, ON THE WAY TO THE PUBLIC 
EVENT, SHE WAS TOLD BY A COLLEAGUE THEIR PRESENTATIONS 
SHOULD BE IN VIETNAMESE (AS AN ISSUE OF "SOVEREIGNTY"). 
SHE ALSO OBSERVED THAT THREE PARTICIPANTS READ TEXTS 
STAMPED "OFFICIALLY APPROVED" BY THE AUTHORITIES, EVEN 
THOUGH ONLY ONE OF THE THREE WAS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL. 
SIMILAR TO THE CHOREOGRAPHED REACTIONS FOR STUDENTS IN THE 
AUDIENCE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH (REF B), VIETNAMESE 
AUTHORITIES DELIBERATELY SCRIPTED KEY PANELISTS. 
 
3. (C) THE STRIKINGLY DIFFERENT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE COMMENTS 
OF SOME FORUM PARTICIPANTS HIGHLIGHT WHAT ONE PANELIST 
LATER CALLED THE TWO VERY DIFFERENT "CULTURES" OF VIETNAM 
-- ONE OFFICIAL, FORMAL AND INSISTENT ON CENTRALIZED 
CONTROL; THE OTHER INFORMAL, OPEN TO CANDID DIALOGUE AND 
INCREASED DEALINGS WITH THE U.S.  THE WOMEN IN THE FORUM 
REPRESENTED THE COMPETING WORLDVIEWS OF THESE "TWO 
VIETNAMS" -- ONE WHICH LOOKS LARGELY TO THE PAST; THE OTHER 
FOCUSED ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE FUTURE.  THE 
FORWARDING-LOOKING CAMP INCLUDED A GROUP OF ENTREPRENEURIAL 
WOMEN OF DIFFERENT GENERATIONS WHO READILY AGREED TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THE FORUM AND CLEARLY RELISHED PROSPECTS FOR 
GREATER ENGAGEMENT WITH THE U.S.  IN THE OTHER CAMP WERE 
PATERNALISTIC OFFICIALS WHO SOUGHT TO CONTROL AND LIMIT THE 
MESSAGE, PUBLICITY AND ATTENDEES FOR THE FORUM.  PARANOID 
ABOUT MAINTAINING CONTROL, INSISTENT ON MICRO-MANAGING 
EVERY FACET, OFFICIALS REPRESENTING THIS CAMP HAGGLED FOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HANOI  02777  01 OF 06  261043Z 
HOURS OVER THE SHAPE OF THE TABLE FOR THE EVENT.   IN MANY 
WAYS, THE DIFFERENT CULTURES OF THE "TWO VIETNAMS" 
SYMBOLIZE BROADER DIFFERENCES IN SOCIETY THAT WERE ON 
DISPLAY DURING THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT AND FIRST LADY -- 
BETWEEN AN ENTREPRENEURIAL PEOPLE EAGER FOR GREATER 
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE U.S. AND A PATERNALISTIC STATE 
INSISTENT ON STABILITY AND CONTROL.  END SUMMARY. 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST LADY'S WOMEN'S FORUM 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C) THE FIRST LADY'S FORUM WITH WOMEN LEADERS IN HANOI, 
HELD NOVEMBER 18 AS PART OF THE PRESIDENT'S HISTORIC VISIT 
TO VIETNAM, HIGHLIGHTED MAJOR CHALLENGES FACING VIETNAMESE 
WOMEN AS THEY SEEK FULL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
EQUALITY (REF A).  LIKE THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP IN GENERAL, 
HANOI HAD NOT SEEN ANYTHING QUITE LIKE THIS ROUNDTABLE 
DISCUSSION, PULLING TOGETHER SEVEN WOMEN AND ONE MAN FROM 
DIFFERENT GENERATIONS AND A RANGE OF PROFESSIONS AND 
PERSPECTIVES.  THE DISCUSSION FRAMEWORK AND THE UNIFYING 
COMMENTS BY MRS. CLINTON HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANT 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF VIETNAMESE WOMEN IN IMPROVING WORKING 
CONDITIONS AND PRESSING FOR EQUALITY IN LAW AS WELL AS 
REALITY.  THE FORUM ALSO FOCUSED ON CONTINUING CHALLENGES, 
INCLUDING PROBLEMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE SPREAD OF 
HIV/AIDS. 
 
5. (SBU) INCLUDED IN THE FORUM WERE SEVERAL OF THE MOST 
PROMINENT WOMEN OFFICIALS IN VIETNAM, INCLUDING MINISTER OF 
LABOR NGUYEN THI HANG AND VIETNAM WOMEN'S UNION PRESIDENT 
HA THI KHIET, WHO GAVE WELCOMING REMARKS.  BOTH OF THEM ARE 
MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
VIETNAM (CPV).  PANELISTS INCLUDED A THREE-TERM MEMBER OF 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, A LONG-TIME LEADER OF THE VIETNAM 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, AN EXECUTIVE VICE 
PRESIDENT OF ONE OF VIETNAM'S PRIVATIZED FORMER STATE-OWNED 
FIRMS, AND THE HEAD OF A QUASI-OFFICIAL NGO ADVOCATING FOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02777  02 OF 06  261043Z 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS.  THREE YOUNGER PANELISTS WERE A MALE 
RESEARCHER ON HIV/AIDS, A WOMAN CONSULTANT AT UNDP, AND A 
15-YEAR-OLD GIRL WHO WAS VIETNAM'S DELEGATE TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL YOUTH PARLIAMENT. 
 
6. (C) COMING ON THE HEELS OF MRS. CLINTON'S ELECTION TO 
THE U.S. SENATE, THE FORUM SYMBOLIZED FOR VIETNAMESE WOMEN 
THE GROWING POLITICAL CLOUT OF WOMEN LEADERS AROUND THE 
WORLD, AND THIS MESSAGE WAS NOT LOST ON THE FORUM'S 
ATTENDEES.  SEVERAL STUDENTS AND WOMEN PROFESSIONALS IN 
THEIR 20S AND 30S TOLD EMBOFFS AFTER THE FORUM THEY WERE 
INSPIRED BY MRS. CLINTON'S CALL FOR WOMEN TO IMPROVE THEIR 
EDUCATION AND SKILLS AND TO SEEK GREATER LEADERSHIP IN 
SOCIETY.  HOWEVER, MANY IN THE AUDIENCE ALSO EXPRESSED 
DISAPPOINTMENT THERE WAS SO LITTLE CANDOR AND INTERACTION 
AMONG THE PANELISTS AND BETWEEN THE PANELISTS AND THE 
AUDIENCE.  IN RETROSPECT, IT IS CLEAR THIS WAS A DELIBERATE 
EFFORT ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES. 
 
IN VIETNAM THE SHAPE OF THE TABLE STILL MATTERS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7. (C) IN THE WEEKS PRIOR TO THE FORUM, REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE FIRST LADY'S OFFICE AND EMBASSY ENGAGED IN PROTRACTED, 
HAIR-SPLITTING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE SIDE OVER 
EVERYTHING ABOUT THE FORUM -- THE PARTICIPANTS, MESSAGE AND 
FORMAT, EVEN THE SHAPE OF THE TABLE.  THE FIRST LADY'S 
STAFF CAREFULLY CHOSE THE PANELISTS SO THEY WOULD REPRESENT 
A BROAD MIX OF PERSPECTIVES, OCCUPATIONS AND GENERATIONS. 
THIS WAS DONE SUCCESSFULLY, AND SEVERAL YOUNG WOMEN IN THE 
AUDIENCE REMARKED AFTERWARDS THIS WAS ONE OF THE MAIN 
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PAGE 04        HANOI  02777  02 OF 06  261043Z 
ATTRACTIONS OF THE EVENT.  HOWEVER, REACHING AGREEMENT WAS 
A PAINSTAKING PROCESS.  AS IS THEIR CUSTOM, VIETNAMESE 
OFFICIALS WANTED TO ARRANGE THE PROGRAM AND COMPOSITION OF 
THE PARTICIPANTS WHO WOULD "HOST" MRS. CLINTON, AND MFA 
OFFICIALS STRONGLY INSISTED THAT OTHER PANELISTS BE ADDED 
TO THE EVENT. 
 
8. (C) COMMENT: THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS WAS REVEALING FOR 
WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT OFFICIAL VIETNAM'S CONCERNS.  FOR ONE 
THING, IT POINTS UP THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THE 
NATIONALISTIC VIETNAMESE TO PRESERVING THE SYMBOLISM OF 
EQUALITY AND MUTUAL RESPECT.  THUS, VIETNAM, AS THE 
OFFICIAL HOST FOR CLINTONS' VISIT, BELIEVED ITS ROLE WAS TO 
DETERMINE WHAT MRS. CLINTON WANTED TO DO AND THEN TO 
ARRANGE THE REQUISITE EVENTS FOR HER.  IN SIMILAR TERMS, 
THE VIETNAMESE SIDE FELT IT SHOULD PROVIDE THE "OFFICIAL" 
ANSWER TO THE FIRST LADY'S QUESTIONS AT THE FORUM.  THE 
ARGUMENT OVER THE SHAPE OF THE TABLE ILLUSTRATES THESE 
CONCERNS, AS DESCRIBED BELOW.  END COMMENT. 
 
9. (C) THE EVENING PRIOR TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE PRESIDENT 
AND THE FIRST LADY, THE TWO SIDES CONTINUED NEGOTIATING 
BASIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FORUM -- WHO THE PARTICIPANTS 
WOULD BE, WHAT QUESTIONS THEY WOULD FOCUS ON, INDEED 
WHETHER THE HOST VIETNAMESE SIDE WOULD ALLOW MRS. CLINTON 
TO HAVE SUCH A FORUM WITH WOMEN OF HER OWN CHOOSING.  THE 
NEGOTIATIONS BOGGED DOWN OVER THE COMPOSITION OF THE PANEL, 
BUT EVEN MORE SO OVER HOW THE PANELISTS WOULD BE SEATED. 
 
10. (C) THE FIRST LADY'S ADVANCE STAFF WAS INTENT ON 
LIMITING THE NUMBER OF PANELISTS TO NO MORE THAN SEVEN, 
WHILE THE GVN SIDE PRESSED FOR FURTHER ADDITIONS OF HIGH- 
LEVEL OFFICIALS WHO THEY BELIEVED NEEDED TO BE INCLUDED FOR 
PROTOCOL REASONS.  AFTER FIVE HOURS OF BARGAINING, THE U.S. 
HAD AGREED TO EIGHT PANELISTS PLUS THE HEAD OF THE WOMEN'S 
UNION TO MAKE WELCOMING REMARKS.  HOWEVER, THE TWO SIDES 
WERE AT AN IMPASSE OVER WHO WOULD ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  02777  03 OF 06  261044Z 
HIV/AIDS, WITH THE U.S. SIDE PROPOSING ONE RESEARCHER AND 
THE GVN SIDE WANTING THAT PERSON BUT ALSO INSISTING ON 
ADDING ANOTHER MAN.  THE FIRST LADY'S REPRESENTATIVE WARNED 
THAT HE WAS CLOSE TO CALLING OFF THE EVENT AND INSTEAD 
HAVING THE FIRST LADY CONDUCT A SMALLER PRIVATE FUNCTION 
WITHOUT GVN PARTICIPATION. 
 
11. (C) AFTER PROBING THE GVN SIDE ONE LAST TIME FOR 
FLEXIBILITY, IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT THE GVN WAS NOT 
ATTACHED TO THE SECOND PANELIST; RATHER, WHAT WAS IMPORTANT 
WAS THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONS AT THE SEMI-CIRCULAR 
TABLE (COUNTING MRS. CLINTON AND THE MODERATOR) BE AN EVEN 
NUMBER.  THIS WAS SO THAT MRS. CLINTON WOULD NOT BE 
CENTERED IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TABLE, BUT THAT MRS. CLINTON 
AND A VIETNAMESE COUNTERPART WOULD BE EQUALLY SPACED TO ONE 
SIDE.  ONE U.S. PARTICIPANT PROPOSED A COMPROMISE WHEREBY 
THE TABLE WOULD BE ARCHED SO THAT MRS. CLINTON AND THE 
LABOR MINISTER BE EQUIDISTANT FROM THE CENTER, WITH FIVE 
PERSONS ARRAYED TO ONE SIDE AND SIX TO THE OTHER.  THE GVN 
NEGOTIATOR EXCUSED HERSELF FOR FIVE MINUTES TO CALL HER 
SUPERIORS ON HER CELL PHONE.  SHE CAME BACK SAYING THAT WAS 
FINE.  (COMMENT: AMAZINGLY, THE GVN SIDE WAS WILLING TO 
RISK CALLING OFF THE FIRST LADY'S DIALOGUE ON WOMEN'S 
ISSUES BECAUSE OF THE SYMBOLISM THAT SHE NOT BE CENTERED IN 
THE MIDDLE OF THE TABLE.  THIS ECHOED THE MONTHS-LONG 
ARGUMENTS OVER THE SHAPE OF THE TABLE IN THE PARIS PEACE 
TALKS DECADES BEFORE.  END COMMENT.) 
 
CONTRAST BETWEEN A CANDID LUNCHEON AND A SCRIPTED FORUM 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
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PAGE 04        HANOI  02777  03 OF 06  261044Z 
12. (C) PERHAPS THE MOST INSTRUCTIVE LESSONS TO COME OUT OF 
THE FORUM WERE ABOUT THE CLASH OF WHAT ONE OF THE PANELISTS 
LATER CALLED THE "TWO CULTURES OF VIETNAM."  THIS PANELIST 
(STRICTLY PROTECT) LATER TOLD US THAT SHE HAD BEEN VERY 
DISAPPOINTED BY HOW SHE FELT THE "AGREED PURPOSE" OF THE 
FORUM HAD BEEN UNDERMINED BY HER FELLOW PANELISTS.  SHE WAS 
STRUCK BY THE DRAMATICALLY DIFFERENT TONE OF THE PUBLIC 
REMARKS MADE BY SOME PANELISTS IN THE FORUM, AND THOSE MADE 
IN PRIVATE AT THE LUNCH HOSTED BY MODERATOR VI PETERSON, A 
TRADE CONSULTANT AND SPOUSE OF THE AMBASSADOR.  (SHE CITED 
IN PARTICULAR THE CONTRASTING REMARKS OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
MEMBER NGO BA THANH AND VUONG THI HANH OF THE CENTER FOR 
EDUCATION PROMOTION AND EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN.)  AT THE 
LUNCH, ATTENDED BY THE FIRST LADY'S CHIEF OF STAFF MELANNE 
VERVEER AND S/PICW COORDINATOR THERESA LOAR, THE PANELISTS 
HAD GIVEN CANDID ASSESSMENTS IN ENGLISH OF HOW VIETNAMESE 
WOMEN HAD MADE IMPORTANT PROGRESS IN RECENT YEARS BUT YET 
MUCH STILL REMAINED TO BE DONE.  (NOTE: THE LABOR MINISTER 
AND VIETNAM WOMEN'S UNION PRESIDENT DECLINED TO ATTEND THE 
LUNCH.  ASSEMBLY MEMBER THANH WAS THE ONLY GOVERNMENT 
REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND.  END NOTE.) 
 
13. (C) AT THIS PRE-FORUM LUNCHEON, WHICH WAS SEEN AS A 
"WARM-UP" FOR THE FORUM ITSELF, ONE OF THE MAJOR THEMES 
BOTH EXPRESSED AND DEMONSTRATED BY THE WOMEN'S STORIES WAS 
THE CREATIVITY, RESOURCEFULNESS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL ENERGY 
OF THESE WOMEN.  MANY OF THEM HAD BEEN TRAILBLAZERS IN 
PRIVATIZING COMPANIES, ORGANIZING RURAL WOMEN TO SPEAK UP 
FOR THEIR RIGHTS, AND PRESSING FOR ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS 
GUARANTEEING WOMEN EQUAL RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW.  OUR 
PANELIST SOURCE SAID SHE LEFT THE LUNCHEON FEELING SHE 
WOULD BE PARTICIPATING IN SOMETHING TRULY HISTORIC IN 
VIETNAM.  (COMMENT: THIS WAS EXACTLY THE SENTIMENT OF THE 
FORUM ORGANIZERS.  IN RETROSPECT, IT SEEMS THAT THE GVN'S 
TOUGH NEGOTIATIONS OVER THE PARTICIPANTS WERE FOLLOWED UP 
BY "SCRIPTING" A NUMBER OF THE PARTICIPANTS.  END COMMENT.) 
 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  02777  04 OF 06  261044Z 
14. (C) THE PANELIST TOLD EMBOFF THE CONTRAST WAS DRAMATIC 
AND IMMEDIATELY FELT.  AFTER FINISHING THE LUNCHEON, ON THE 
WALK TO THE FORUM ITSELF, SHE WAS TOLD BY A SENIOR FELLOW 
PANELIST THAT ALL THEIR PRESENTATIONS SHOULD BE IN 
VIETNAMESE.  "THIS IS AN ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY," THE SENIOR 
VIETNAMESE TOLD HER, IMPLYING THAT THEY SHOULD ONLY SPEAK 
VIETNAMESE IN A PUBLIC EVENT IN THEIR COUNTRY.  THE 
PANELIST WHO SPOKE WITH US DISAGREED, FEELING THEY WOULD 
HAVE A MORE CANDID INTERACTION WITH MRS. CLINTON IF THEY 
SPOKE IN ENGLISH, BUT SHE WAS PRECEDED BY OTHERS WHO SPOKE 
FIRST IN VIETNAMESE. 
 
15. (C) FURTHERMORE, IN CONTRAST TO THEIR REMARKS IN 
PRIVATE, SEVERAL OF THE FORUM PARTICIPANTS REVERTED TO 
SLOGANEERING, PRAISING THE "CENTRAL ROLE" OF THE CPV IN 
LEADING THE CAMPAIGN FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY.  THE INITIAL 
PRESENTATIONS -- BY WOMEN'S UNION PRESIDENT KHIET AND LABOR 
MINISTER HANG, WHO AS CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS WERE THE 
HIGHEST-RANKING CPV MEMBERS ATTENDING -- INCLUDED 
PREDICTABLE NODS TO THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY, BUT WERE NOT OVERLY IDEOLOGICAL.  HOWEVER, THE 
FOLLOWING THREE PRESENTERS, ONE AFTER ANOTHER, LAUNCHED 
INTO EXTENSIVE REMARKS THAT CONTRASTED DRAMATICALLY WITH 
THEIR PRIVATE REMARKS AT THE LUNCHEON. 
 
16. (C) NGO BA THANH, NOT A MEMBER OF THE CPV AND IN MANY 
SETTINGS FIERCELY INDEPENDENT AND KNOWN AS A CRUSADER FOR 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS, DISCOURSED AT LENGTH ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF 
THE CPV IN THIS REGARD, AT ONE POINT SAYING THAT EQUITY HAD 
BEEN ACHIEVED AND ENSHRINED IN FOUNDING CPV DOCUMENTS IN 
1945.  LIKEWISE, BOTH PHAM CHI LAN, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE 
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PAGE 04        HANOI  02777  04 OF 06  261044Z 
VIETNAMESE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, AND VUONG THI 
HANH REMARKED ON THE "PROMINENT ROLE" OF THE CPV IN 
ADVANCING WOMEN'S RIGHTS "UNDER THE REVOLUTION."  THE 
PANELIST WHO SPOKE WITH US SAID SHE WAS SURPRISED TO SEE 
THAT THANH, LAN AND HANH HAD TEXTS STAMPED "OFFICIALLY 
APPROVED" SIGNIFYING THAT THEY HAD BEEN VETTED BY 
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES.  SINCE THESE PANELISTS WERE NOT 
REPRESENTING GOVERNMENT OFFICES, SHE FOUND THIS TO BE 
TELLING.  (NOTE: THANH IS A SELF-DESCRIBED "INDEPENDENT" 
MEMBER OF THE ASSEMBLY, LAN IS A LEADER OF THE QUASI- 
OFFICIAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AND HANH HEADS UP AN 
INDIGENOUS NGO.) (COMMENT: AT ONE LEVEL, IT IS NOT 
SURPRISING THE GVN AUTHORITIES WOULD SEEK TO INFLUENCE SUCH 
A HIGH-PROFILE FORUM AS THIS ONE.  BUT WE WERE STRUCK BY 
THE SHARP CONTRAST BETWEEN WHAT FORUM PARTICIPANTS SAID IN 
PRIVATE AND WHAT THEY SAID IN A PUBLIC SETTING UNDER THE 
WATCHFUL EYES OF SENIOR CPV OFFICIALS.  END COMMENT.) 
 
COMMENT: BEHIND THE SCENES: PORTRAITS OF THE "TWO VIETNAMS" 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
17. (C) THE CONTRAST BETWEEN THE PUBLIC SPEECHES BY SEVERAL 
PANELISTS AND THEIR CANDID PRIVATE REMARKS HIGHLIGHTS THE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMPETING VIEWS OF THE "TWO 
VIETNAMS" -- ONE OFFICIAL, FORMAL AND INSISTENT ON 
CENTRALIZED CONTROL; THE OTHER INFORMAL, OPEN TO CANDID 
DIALOGUE AND INCREASED DEALINGS WITH THE U.S.  THE FORMER 
VIEW IS CAUTIOUS, PATERNALISTIC, XENOPHOBIC AND HIGHLY 
SUSPICIOUS OF WESTERN INTENTIONS.  THIS IS THE DOMINANT 
VIEW AMONG CPV HARDLINERS AND WAR VETERANS, AND THROUGH 
THEM, THE SECURITY MINISTRIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, ELEMENTS 
OF THE PARTY'S MASS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STATE ORGANS THAT 
ENFORCE STATE CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS AND OTHER PUBLIC 
SPEECH. 
 
18. (C) BY CONTRAST, THE OTHER VIEW IS MORE OPEN, ENGAGING, 
ENTREPRENEURIAL AND EAGER TO HAVE VIETNAM INTEGRATE MORE 
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PAGE 03        HANOI  02777  05 OF 06  261044Z 
FULLY WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD.  IN THIS CAMP, WE 
BELIEVE, ARE THE VAST MAJORITY OF VIETNAM'S YOUNGER 
POPULATION, WHO HUNGER FOR THE PROMISES OF BETTER JOBS AND 
A BETTER LIFE, INCLUDING NOT ONLY MATERIAL WELL-BEING, BUT 
ALSO THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE GREATER CONTROL OVER THEIR 
DESTINIES.  THIS CAMP FINDS SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT AMONG 
TECHNOCRATS AND MANY YOUNGER OFFICIALS IN THE CPV AND 
GOVERNMENT.  HOWEVER, AS ONE OF THE PANELISTS POINTED OUT 
TO US, WORKING IN THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT TODAY REQUIRES 
AT LEAST TACIT DEFERENCE TO THE DOMINANT OFFICIAL CULTURE 
OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND, FOR SOME POSITIONS, PARTY 
AFFILIATION AND MEMBERSHIP ARE REQUIRED.  THE MORE 
ENTREPRENEURIAL CAMP FOCUSES ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF THE 
FUTURE, WHILE THE OTHER CAMP LOOKS LARGELY TO THE PAST, 
RECYCLING OLD-FASHIONED IDEOLOGY TO WHICH VIRTUALLY NO ONE 
SUBSCRIBES TODAY.  DURING THE VISIT, THE MESSAGES OF THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE FIRST LADY WERE FOCUSED ON REACHING OUT 
TO THIS YOUNGER GENERATION.  THE EFFUSIVE POPULAR REACTION 
THEY RECEIVED REVEALS THE RESONANCE OF THEIR MESSAGE. 
 
19. (C) THE DIFFERENT CULTURES OF THE "TWO VIETNAMS" ARE 
STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY GENERATIONAL AND REGIONAL FACTORS, 
AS WELL AS CPV MEMBERSHIP, THOUGH THESE MATTERS ARE NOT 
DETERMINATIVE.  AS A RULE, YOUNGER AND SOUTHERN VIETNAMESE 
ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO FIT THE MORE OPEN, CANDID PARADIGM. 
UNDER THE CPV UMBRELLA THERE ARE PERSONS IN BOTH CAMPS; 
SOME PERSONS, FOR INSTANCE, JOIN THE CPV FOR PRAGMATIC 
RATHER THAN IDEOLOGICAL REASONS, IN ORDER TO IMPROVE THEIR 
PROSPECTS FOR ADVANCEMENT.  FOR EXAMPLE, PANELIST NGUYEN 
THI MAI THANH, GENERAL DIRECTOR OF THE REE REFRIGERATION 
COMPANY, IS A CPV MEMBER IN HER LATE 40S, AND SHE CLEARLY 
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PAGE 04        HANOI  02777  05 OF 06  261044Z 
IS IN THE REFORMIST CAMP.  SHE LARGELY ESCHEWED IDEOLOGY IN 
HER FORUM PRESENTATION AND FOCUSED ON THE INCREASED 
BUSINESS BENEFITS TO BE DERIVED FROM PRIVATIZATION AND 
GREATER TRANSPARENCY.  IN A MEETING WITH POLOFF AFTER THE 
FORUM, SHE SAID SHE HOPED THE UPCOMING CPV PARTY CONGRESS 
WOULD PRESS FOR GREATER OPENNESS AND DEBATE, AND WOULD 
EMBRACE A PROGRAM OF GREATER ENGAGEMENT WITH THE U.S. AND 
THE REST OF THE WORLD. 
 
20. (C) THE PANELIST WE DEBRIEFED AFTERWARDS JOKED THAT HER 
FRIENDS WERE SAYING "EVEN THE AMERICANS" COULDN'T PULL OFF 
A CANDID PUBLIC FORUM OF VIETNAMESE WOMEN.  SHE ASSESSED, 
HOWEVER, THAT THE FORUM HAD PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN 
HIGHLIGHTING IMPORTANT ISSUES OF CONCERN TO VIETNAMESE 
WOMEN, AND SHE EXPRESSED STRONG INTEREST IN HOLDING A 
FOLLOW-UP SESSION TO DISCUSS MANY OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN 
THE FORUM, INCLUDING EXPLORING LINKS TO MRS. CLINTON'S 
"VITAL VOICES" NETWORK OF WOMEN LEADERS AROUND THE WORLD. 
(NOTE: IN STRATEGIZING WITH THIS PANELIST AND OTHERS HERE 
ABOUT A FOLLOW-UP PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM, THERE ARE SEVERAL 
CLEAR "LESSONS LEARNED" TO ENABLE THE VOICES OF THE NEW, 
MORE OPEN VIETNAM TO BE HEARD.  WE WILL HOLD THE DISCUSSION 
IN ENGLISH, INVITE YOUNGER PARTICIPANTS TO SPEAK FIRST, 
ENCOURAGE QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE, AND NOT ALLOW THE 
CPV "ELDERS" TO CONTROL THE DISCUSSION.  THE TRADEOFF MAY 
BE THAT "OFFICIAL VIETNAM" WILL NOT AGREE TO PARTICIPATE 
UNDER SUCH GROUND RULES.)  END COMMENT. 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
------------------ 
 
21. (C) OUR EXPERIENCE HELPING ORGANIZE THE FIRST LADY'S 
WOMEN'S FORUM POINTED UP SOME OF THE SHARP CONTRASTS 
BETWEEN THE "TWO VIETNAMS" -- AND THE LONG SHADOW THAT THE 
OFFICIAL CULTURE OF CENTRALIZED CONTROL CASTS OVER THE 
BROADER SOCIETY'S CULTURE OF ENTREPRENEURISM.  AS SHOWCASED 
IN THIS FORUM, OFFICIAL VIETNAM'S IMPERATIVE TO SCRIPT 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HANOI  02777  06 OF 06  261045Z 
PUBLIC OPINION SIGNIFICANTLY HOLDS BACK VIETNAM'S MORE 
DYNAMIC LEADERS.  THE EXTENSIVE MANEUVERING OF 
PARTY/GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BEHIND THE SCENES REVEALS THE 
EXTRAORDINARY EXTENT OF CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE 
PATERNALISTIC, TOP-DOWN DECISION-MAKERS OF OFFICIAL 
VIETNAM.  IN "MANAGING" THE REACTION AND PUBLICITY OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S TRIP, THIS GROUP SOUGHT TO LIMIT ACCESS AND TO 
SCRIPT RESPONSES.  AS REPORTED REF B, WHAT THE 
EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR RECEPTION GIVEN TO THE PRESIDENT 
REVEALS IS HOW MUCH OUT OF TOUCH THIS GROUP IS WITH THE 
FEELINGS OF THE VIETNAMESE PUBLIC AT LARGE.  END COMMENT. 
HARTER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL