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Viewing cable 00JAKARTA4700, SECRETARY COHEN'S LUNCH WITH BAMBANG YUDHOYONO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00JAKARTA4700 2000-09-29 09:15 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
R 290915Z SEP 00
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7946
INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
ASEAN COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USMISSION GENEVA 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
DIA WASHDC//DH-3//
SECDEF WASHDC
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 004700 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/10 
TAGS: PREL UNSC PREF UNHCR ID
SUBJECT: SECRETARY COHEN'S LUNCH WITH BAMBANG YUDHOYONO 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR GREG FERGIN FOR 
REASON 1.5(D). 
 
2. (C) SUMMARY.  IN A SEPTEMBER 18 LUNCH, INDONESIAN COORDINATING 
MINISTER FOR POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND SECURITY AFFAIRS BAMBANG 
YUDHOYONO TOLD SECRETARY COHEN THAT ON YUDHOYONO'S MISSION TO NEW 
YORK, HE WILL DESCRIBE IN DETAIL INDONESIA'S AGENDA FOR DISARMING 
AND DISBANDING THE MILITIAS.  HE SAID INDONESIA WOULD FIRST TRY 
PERSUASIVE METHODS AND THEN "REPRESSIVE" METHODS.  THE GOI HAS 
ESTABLISHED A FIRM TIMETABLE FOR DISARMAMENT; POLICE, BACKED UP BY 
THE MILITARY, WILL TAKE COERCIVE MEASURES IF THE MILITIAS DO NOT 
TURN IN THEIR WEAPONS FROM SEPTEMBER 22-24.  YUDHOYONO SAID THAT 
SIX SUSPECTS IN THE ATAMBUA KILLINGS HAVE BEEN DETAINED AND THAT 
OTHER ARRESTS, INCLUDING OF NOTORIOUS MILITIA LEADER EURICO 
GUTERRES, ARE IMMINENT.  YUDHOYONO SAID THAT HE FACES PRESSURE 
FROM ULTRA-NATIONALIST FORCES WITHIN INDONESIAN SOCIETY AND IN THE 
INDONESIAN CABINET.  HE SAID THAT MANY INDONESIANS MISUNDERSTAND 
THE UNSC RESOLUTION AND MISREAD INTERNATIONAL CONCERN AS A THREAT 
TO INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY.  HE SAID DELAYING THE UNSC MISSION 
WOULD HELP DISARM NATIONALIST CRITICS.  HE ALSO URGED COHEN TO 
ALLAY NATIONALIST CONCERNS BY INCLUDING A STRONG STATEMENT OF 
SUPPORT FOR INDONESIA'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN HIS PRESS 
STATEMENT. 
 
3. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED.  SECRETARY COHEN TOLD YUDHOYONO THAT THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY EXPECTS QUICK RESULTS ON DISARMING AND 
DISBANDING THE TIMOR MILITIAS AND ON PROSECUTING THOSE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE MURDERS OF UN PEACEKEEPERS AND THE ATAMBUA MASSACRE OF 
UNHCR STAFF.  COHEN SAID WHEN SENIOR INDONESIAN OFFICIALS DENY 
INDONESIA'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATAMBUA MURDERS OR EVEN BLAME 
FOREIGNERS FOR THE KILLINGS, IT HURTS INDONESIA'S INTERNATIONAL 
IMAGE.  HE SAID THAT THE U.S. IS READY TO SUPPORT INDONESIA'S 
EFFORTS AT MILITARY REFORM, BUT THAT EVENTS OVER THE PAST SIX 
MONTHS HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT TO REESTABLISH MILITARY-MILITARY 
TIES.  COHEN SAID THE "WORLD IS LOOKING AT INDONESIA THROUGH THE 
LENS OF TIMOR," AND URGED YUDHOYONO TO TAKE SWIFT MEASURES, 
INCLUDING ACTION AGAINST EX-INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL 
ACTIVE IN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THE MILITIAS.  STRONG MEASURES 
WOULD SEND A SIGNAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT THE 
INDONESIAN MILITARY IS READY TO TAKE A RESPONSIBLE ROLE IN 
INDONESIAN SOCIETY. END SUMMARY. 
 
4. (U) ON SEPTEMBER 18, SECRETARY COHEN AND AMBASSADOR GELBARD MET 
OVER LUNCH WITH INDONESIAN COORDINATING MINISTER FOR POLITICAL, 
SOCIAL, AND SECURITY AFFAIRS BAMBANG YUDHOYONO.  CHIEF OF STAFF 
FOR TERRITORIAL AFFAIRS LT. GENERAL AGUS WIDJOYO, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 
UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES BODNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
DEFENSE KENNETH BACON, AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 
SKIP BOYCE ALSO ATTENDED THE LUNCH. 
 
-------------------- 
YUDHOYONO: GOI PLANS 
-------------------- 
 
5. (C) YUDHOYONO SAID THAT ON HIS MISSION TO NEW YORK HE WOULD 
EXPLAIN THE CURRENT SITUATION IN WEST TIMOR, CONVEY THE GOI'S 
RESPONSE TO UNSC RESOLUTION 1319, DESCRIBE THE GOI'S PLAN OF 
ACTION FOR DISBANDING AND DISARMING THE MILITIAS AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF THOSE GUILTY OF CRIMES, AND DISCUSS HOW THE GOI CAN 
WORK WITH UNTAET ON REPATRIATION OF TIMOR IDPS.  YUDHOYONO SAID 
THAT THE GOI WOULD FIRST TAKE A "PERSUASIVE APPROACH" IN DISARMING 
THE MILITIAS.  YUDHOYONO HAD MET ON SEPTEMBER 14 WITH MILITIA 
LEADERS AS PART OF THAT PERSUASIVE APPROACH AND THE MILITIA 
LEADERS HAD PROMISED TO TURN IN THEIR WEAPONS.  YUDHOYONO FEELS 
CONFIDENT THAT THE MILITIAS WILL DISARM VOLUNTARILY, BUT THE GOI 
HAS SET A STRICT TIMETABLE FOR COMPLIANCE.  IF THE MILITIAS DO NOT 
TURN OVER THEIR WEAPONS DURING THE THREE-DAY PERIOD SEPTEMBER 22- 
24, THE INDONESIAN POLICE, BACKED UP BY THE MILITARY, WILL 
IMPLEMENT THE "REPRESSIVE" PHASE OF DISARMING THE MILITIAS. 
YUDHOYONO SAID THAT A PERIOD OF MONITORING AND FOLLOW UP WILL ALSO 
BE REQUIRED BECAUSE THE MILITIAS MAY HAVE MANY HIDDEN CACHES OF 
ARMS.  HE SAID THAT DISARMING THE MILITIAS WOULD BE A LONG 
PROCESS. 
 
------------------ 
ARRESTS PROCEEDING 
------------------ 
 
6. (C) YUDHOYONO SAID THE PROSECUTION OF THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
KILLINGS AT ATAMBUA IS PROCEEDING.  SIX SUSPECTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN 
ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATAMBUA KILLINGS.  OTHER ARRESTS, 
IN CONNECTION WITH THIS AND OTHER INVESTIGATIONS, ARE IMMINENT. 
YUDHOYONO SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT NOTORIOUS MILITIA LEADER 
EURICO GUTERRES WOULD SOON BE ARRESTED, THOUGH NOT ON CHARGES 
RELATED TO THE ATAMBUA KILLINGS.  SECRETARY COHEN AND AMBASSADOR 
GELBARD REVIEWED THE EVIDENCE PLACING GUTERRES AT ATAMBUA ON THE 
DAY OF THE KILLINGS.  YUDHOYONO INITIALLY SAID THAT EURICO MIGHT 
HAVE BEEN IN WEST TIMOR BECAUSE OF THE DEATH THE PREVIOUS DAY OF 
MILITIA LEADER OLIVIO MORUK.  THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE 
SIX-HOUR TRAVEL TIME BETWEEN KUPANG AND ATAMBUA MEANT THAT 
GUTERRES MUST HAVE DEPARTED BY 5:30 A.M. TO ARRIVE IN ATAMBUA. 
THIS WAS EVIDENCE OF GUTERRES'S PREMEDITATED MALICE.  YUDHOYONO 
FINALLY SAID THAT THE POLICE WILL HAVE TO BUILD A CASE TO LINK 
GUTERRES DIRECTLY TO THE CRIMES. 
 
-------------------- 
NATIONALIST PRESSURE 
-------------------- 
 
7. (C) YUDHOYONO SAID THAT, AS IN ANY DEVELOPING COUNTRY, THERE 
ARE "ULTRA-NATIONALIST" ELEMENTS IN SOCIETY AND IN THE CABINET. 
HE SAID THAT HE ADVOCATES WORKING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
AND FACING UP TO INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS, BUT FACES STRONG PRESSURE 
FROM THE NATIONALISTS.  MANY INDONESIANS, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF 
PARLIAMENT AND OFFICIALS MISREAD INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OVER TIMOR 
AND OTHER TOPICS AS A THREAT TO INDONESIAN SOVEREIGNTY. 
NATIONALISM HAD CAUSED CONSIDERABLE TROUBLE FOR YUDHOYONO 
PERSONALLY.  FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TAKEN A GREAT DEAL OF 
FLAK FOR ADVOCATING A POLICY OF COOPERATION WITH INTERFET. 
SIMILARLY, RESISTANCE FROM OLDER OFFICERS IN THE MILITARY HAD 
STYMIED YUDHOYONO'S BLUEPRINT FOR MILITARY REFORM, WHICH HAD BEEN 
AGREED UPON TWO YEARS AGO.  HE ASKED FOR U.S. SUPPORT AND PATIENCE 
OVER THE LONG TERM. 
 
------------ 
UNSC MISSION 
------------ 
 
8. (C) YUDHOYONO SAID THAT INDONESIANS, AND SPECIFICALLY 
"ULTRANATIONALISTS," MISUNDERSTAND THE UN THESE INDONESIANS EQUATE 
ANYTHING RELATED TO THE UN WITH UN PEACEKEEPING OR A UN TRIBUNAL. 
SUCH SENTIMENTS HAD LED TO INDONESIAN RESISTANCE TO THE UNSC 
MISSION ON WEST TIMOR.  YUDHOYONO SAID THAT THE MISSION WOULD BEST 
BE DELAYED SO THAT IT COULD CONFIRM INDONESIAN PROGRESS ON THE 
WEST TIMOR CRISIS RATHER THAN COME UP WITH "A NEW PACKAGE" ON WEST 
TIMOR.  RESISTANCE TO THE MISSION, HE SAID, MIGHT BE OVERCOME 
MERELY BY CHANGING THE TIMING.  IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR GELBARD 
NOTED THAT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN TWO WEEKS SINCE THE KILLINGS AND IN 
THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE ACTIONS, FURTHER DELAY WAS INCREASINGLY 
DIFFICULT.  YUDHOYONO ALSO SAID THAT A DELEGATION OF "BLUE BERETS" 
MIGHT BE LESS INFLAMMATORY TO NATIONALIST PASSIONS THAN A UNSC 
MISSION.  (NOTE: YUDHOYONO'S REFERENCE TO "BLUE BERETS" PROBABLY 
MEANT UN MILITARY OBSERVERS.)  THE SECRETARY AND THE AMBASSADOR 
REBUTTED THAT IT WAS HARD TO BELIEVE THAT A GROUP OF SIX DIPLOMATS 
WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS MORE THREATENING THAN A MILITARY DELEGATION. 
MOREOVER, THERE WAS A PRECEDENT FOR THE MISSION IN LAST YEAR'S 
UNSC MISSION.  FINALLY, INACCURATE, AND PICAYUNE, INDONESIAN 
CRITICISM OVER THE DATES LISTED IN THE UNSC RESOLUTION WAS NOT 
BECOMING EITHER. 
 
------------------------------- 
COHEN: WORLD WAITING FOR ACTION 
------------------------------- 
 
9. (C) SECRETARY COHEN SAID THAT WEST TIMOR WAS THE MAIN TOPIC OF 
DISCUSSION DURING HIS ENTIRE VISIT.  THE U.S. AND THE ENTIRE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY EXPECT THE GOI TO TAKE SWIFT, STRONG 
ACTION TO DISBAND AND DISARM THE MILITIAS AND TO BRING TO JUSTICE 
THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLINGS OF UN PEACEKEEPERS AND FOR THE 
ATAMBUA MASSACRE.  HE SAID THAT WHEN SENIOR INDONESIAN OFFICIALS 
PUBLICLY DISPUTE INDONESIAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROBLEMS IN 
WEST TIMOR AND EVEN BLAME THE ATAMBUA KILLINGS ON FOREIGNERS (AS 
HAD BEEN STATED MORE THAN ONCE BY THE DEFENSE MINISTER), IT WAS 
NOT HELPFUL TO INDONESIA'S IMAGE.  SECRETARY COHEN HAD ALSO BEEN 
DISAPPOINTED BY THE DEFENSE MINISTER'S STATEMENT THAT THE MILITARY 
WAS NOT ABLE TO DISARM THE MILITIAS.  SUCH STATEMENTS INDICATE 
THAT INDONESIA IS NOT FACING UP TO ITS OBLIGATION TO SOLVE THE 
PROBLEMS IN WEST TIMOR.  AMBASSADOR GELBARD SAID THAT THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, HAVING PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED GUARANTEES OF 
THE UNHCR WORKERS' SAFETY, WAS NOW ADAMANT THAT INDONESIA DO MORE 
THAN MAKE COMMITMENTS, BUT TAKE REAL ACTION.  COHEN SUGGESTED THAT 
IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO MOVE AGAINST THE EX-MILITARY 
WHO TRAIN AND EQUIP THE MILITIAS.  WHEN YUDHOYONO EQUIVOCATED OVER 
POSSIBLE EX-MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, AMBASSADOR GELBARD SAID THERE IS 
SOLID EVIDENCE THAT THE MILITIAS HAVE RECEIVED SMALL-UNIT TRAINING 
AND NEW ARMS AND MATERIEL FROM MILITARY SOURCES. YUDHOYONO SAID 
THAT HE HAD ASKED ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION THAT THE REGIONAL 
MILITARY COMMAND INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF EX-MILITARY OFFICERS' 
INVOLVEMENT. 
 
------------- 
MILITARY TIES 
------------- 
 
10. (C) YUDHOYONO DESCRIBED HOW INDONESIA WANTS TO MOVE TOWARD A 
MORE PROFESSIONAL AND EFFECTIVE MILITARY.  HE REQUESTED THAT THE 
U.S. ESTABLISH BETTER MILITARY TO MILITARY TIES TO ASSIST 
INDONESIA'S EFFORTS.  COHEN SAID THAT THE U.S. LOOKED FORWARD TO 
THE TIME WHEN CONDITIONS ALLOW THE REESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY TO 
MILITARY TIES.  COHEN SAID THAT PERSONALLY HE GENERALLY ADVOCATES 
IMET AND OTHER MILITARY TIES; HOWEVER, CONTINUING CONCERNS OVER 
TIMOR IN PARTICULAR HAVE KEPT STRICT CONGRESSIONAL PROHIBITIONS 
SOLIDLY IN PLACE.  HE NOTED THAT THE USG HAD PROVIDED C-130 PARTS 
AS A GESTURE OF GOOD WILL.  UNFORTUNATELY, DETERIORATING EVENTS 
OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS HAVE NOW UNDERMINED PROGRESS AT 
REESTABLISHING MILITARY TIES.  SECURITY IN TIMOR WAS BETTER A YEAR 
AGO, HE SAID.  WHEN TIES ARE GRADUALLY REESTABLISHED, THE U.S. 
WILL CONCENTRATE FIRST ON THE NAVY, AIR FORCE, AND MARINES BEFORE 
MOVING TO THE ARMY, WHERE REFORM EFFORTS HAVE LAGGED.  YUDHOYONO 
SAID THAT HE ALWAYS PREFERS FRANK DIALOGUE AND DIALOGUE.  FOR 
EXAMPLE, HE FOUND THE SECRETARY'S AND AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS STRONG 
BUT USEFUL BECAUSE THEY WERE FRANKLY STATED. 
 
------------- 
NEED A SIGNAL 
------------- 
 
11. (C) COHEN SUMMED UP BY SAYING THAT THE U.S. AND OTHER 
COUNTRIES WERE LOOKING TO INDONESIA TO SEND A SIGNAL.  IF ACTION 
IS TAKEN IN A SHORT TIME TO ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IT WILL 
SEND A POWERFUL MESSAGE THAT THE MILITARY IS READY TO PLAY A MORE 
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN INDONESIA AND THAT INDONESIA IS READY TO PLAY 
A MORE POSITIVE INTERNATIONAL ROLE.  FAIRLY OR NOT, COHEN SAID, 
"THE WORLD IS LOOKING AT INDONESIA THROUGH THE LENS OF EAST 
TIMOR."  THE U.S. HAS A SELFISH INTEREST IN PROMOTING THE 
STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF A UNIFIED INDONESIA, WHICH WOULD HAVE 
A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE ENTIRE REGION.  COHEN CALLED ON THE GOI 
TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO HELP INDONESIA. 
A STRONG INDONESIA IS EVERYONE'S GOAL, HE SAID 
 
GELBARD