This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4638

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ACTION SSO-00   

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FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6758
INFO NSC WASHDC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RWANDA COLLECTIVE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 004309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR P U/S PICKERING, AF A/S SUSAN RICE, AF PDAS 
NANCY POWELL 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE AND ORR 
 
OSD FOR MCCONNELL 
 
CIA FOR HOUDEK 
 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  04309  01 OF 02  031034Z 
 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG
SUBJECT: EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO 
PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY SPECIAL ADVISOR JOHN PRENDERGAST REASONS 
1.5 B/D. 
 
¶1.  (C) THE FOLLOWING REPRESENTS THE FURTHER ANALYSIS 
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS OF SPECIAL ENVOY WOLPE AND 
SPECIAL ADVISOR PRENDERGAST REGARDING THE LUSAKA PEACE 
PROCESS FOR THE CONGO.  IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN 
TANDEM WITH LUSAKA 3426. 
 
¶2.  (C) AS THE CLOCK CONTINUES TO TICK TOWARDS THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON THE REAUTHORIZATION OF MONUC, 
IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE ONLY WAY THAT 
THE LUSAKA PROCESS CAN BE RESCUED IS IF THE EXTERNAL 
SIGNATORIES - ANGOLA, ZIMBABWE, NAMIBIA, RWANDA AND 
UGANDA - DECIDE TO RAMP UP THEIR COLLECTIVE PRESSURE ON 
THEIR RESPECTIVE CONGOLESE ALLIES.  ALL OF THEM 
ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY SHARE A COMMON INTEREST IN 
IMPLEMENTING THE LUSAKA AGREEMENT, THE BEST MEANS OF 
SECURING STABILITY IN THE REGION. 
 
¶3.  (C) FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE COMMON INTEREST THAT 
ANGOLA, RWANDA AND UGANDA HAVE IN COUNTERING THE THREATS 
POSED TO THEM BY THEIR RESPECTIVE INSURGENCIES OPERATING 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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FROM CONGOLESE SOIL.  OUR MESSAGE HAS RESONATED WITH THE 
PARTIES MOST CLEARLY WHEN WE SPELL OUT THE REPERCUSSIONS 
OF RENEWED WAR RESULTING FROM THE OBSTRUCTION OF THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA.  IF THE WAR RESUMES, THE 
PRIMARY BENEFICIARIES WILL BE THESE INSURGENCIES, 
PRINCIPALLY UNITA, EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWA, AND THE ADF.  THE 
CORE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF ZIMBABWE--AND 
TO A MUCH LESSER EXTENT NAMIBIA--ARE HARMED AS WELL. 
BECAUSE OF THIS DANGER OF ESCALATION, THE EXTERNAL 
SIGNATORIES ALL AGREED WITH OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE 
URGENCY OF THE NEED FOR THEM TO INCREASE THEIR 
COOPERATION WITH EACH OTHER AND TO INTENSIFY THEIR 
PRESSURE ON THEIR CONGOLESE ALLIES IMMEDIATELY.  IF NOT, 
LUSAKA IS DEAD. 
 
¶4. (C) OUR MEETINGS WITH ANGOLAN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
OFFICIALS HAVE FURTHER SENSITIZED US TO THE CHALLENGES 
OF MOVING FROM INTENTIONS TO IMPLEMENTATION IN SUCH AN 
EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY.  IN ORDER TO RESTORE A 
SITUATION IN WHICH THE SELF-DEFINED INTERESTS OF EACH OF 
THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES COME TOGETHER IN A COOPERATIVE 
AND SUSTAINED REGIONAL STRATEGY, A GREAT DEAL OF TRUST 
WILL HAVE TO BE REBUILT, AND SERIOUS DIALOGUE MUST BE 
INITIATED BETWEEN SOME OF THE KEY SIGNATORIES. 
 
¶5.  (C) ANGOLA AND RWANDA HAVE NOT OVERCOME THE SENSE OF 
BETRAYAL BOTH FEEL OVER THE EVENTS OF AUGUST 1998. 
ANGOLA BELIEVES UGANDA AND THE MLC ARE COOPERATING WITH 
UNITA.  ZIMBABWE AND UGANDA ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF 
EACH OTHER'S MOVEMENTS AND INTENTIONS IN EQUATEUR.  AND 
RWANDA AND UGANDA ALMOST EXPECT TO BE UNDERMINED BY EACH 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  04309  01 OF 02  031034Z 
OTHER IN PURSUIT OF THEIR INTERESTS IN THE CONGO. 
 
¶6.  (C) THEREFORE, IT IS CLEAR THAT FOR AN EXTERNAL 
SIGNATORIES STRATEGY TO WORK, IT IS NECESSARY FOR THESE 
PARTIES TO ADDRESS URGENTLY SOME OF THEIR DEEPER 
BILATERAL PROBLEMS. ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES ON A 
BILATERAL BASIS WILL PAVE THE WAY TO BROADER AGREEMENTS 
AMONG ALL OF THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES. 
 
¶7.  (C) OUR MEETINGS DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS HAVE 
DEMONSTRATED THAT THE USG CAN PLAY AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN 
BROKERING THESE BILATERAL CONTACTS AND BUILDING THE 
CONSENSUS AROUND AN EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY.  ALL 
FIVE COUNTRIES HAVE INDICATED THAT THE USG CAN AND 
SHOULD PLAY THAT ROLE. 
 
¶8.  (C) MOST URGENT IS THE REQUEST FROM RWANDA TO HELP 
BROKER A DIALOGUE WITH ANGOLA.  OUR ANGOLAN 
INTERLOCUTORS ARE CLEARLY INTERESTED, AND WILL AWAIT 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ4639 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  04309  02 OF 02  031034Z 
ACTION SSO-00 
 
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R 031031Z AUG 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6759 
INFO NSC WASHDC 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC 
CIA WASHDC 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 HARARE 004309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR P U/S PICKERING, AF A/S SUSAN RICE, AF PDAS 
NANCY POWELL 
 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE AND ORR 
 
OSD FOR MCCONNELL 
 
CIA FOR HOUDEK 
 
LONDON FOR PFLAUMER 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  04309  02 OF 02  031034Z 
 
PARIS FOR BISA WILLIAMS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CG
SUBJECT: EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY FOR THE CONGO 
PEACE PROCESS: NEXT STEPS 
 
FINAL APPROVAL FROM PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS.  ANGOLA ALSO 
MAY BE INTERESTED IN A SIMILAR EXERCISE WITH UGANDA. 
ZIMBABWE AND UGANDA MAY ALSO REQUIRE SUCH AN INITIATIVE, 
OR AT THE VERY LEAST FOR US TO CONTINUE TO CARRY 
MESSAGES BACK AND FORTH AS WE HAVE DONE DURING THE PAST 
FEW WEEKS. 
 
¶9.  (C) NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE.  THE KEY SIGNATORIES 
APPEAR SERIOUS ABOUT REACHING SOME DEEPER 
UNDERSTANDINGS.  THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY WILL 
NOT BE SUSTAINABLE UNLESS SOME OF THESE SERIOUS 
BILATERAL ISSUES OF TRUST ARE NOT ADDRESSED. 
 
¶10.  (C) THE USG'S ROLE CAN AND SHOULD BE A MULTIFACETED 
ONE.  WE CAN ACT AS FACILITATORS FOR THE ACTUAL POL-MIL 
BILATERAL DIALOGUES, OR AT LEAST PASS IMPORTANT MESSAGES 
BACK AND FORTH.  WE CAN HELP FIND COMMON APPROACHES TO 
SPECIFIC SECURITY THREATS ON A BILATERAL BASIS.  WE CAN 
OFFER IDEAS ON HOW TO APPROACH OR PRESSURE THE CONGOLESE 
PARTIES WHEN THEY OBSTRUCT THE PROCESS.  WE CAN SUPPORT 
THEIR DIALOGUE AND THEIR PLANNING FOR DDRR, AN ISSUE 
THAT ALL OF THEM FEEL DEEPLY ABOUT BUT TOWARDS WHICH 
THEY HAVE DIFFERENT APPROACHES.  WE CAN OFFER IDEAS ON 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  04309  02 OF 02  031034Z 
(AND CONSIDER SUPPORTING) INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS TO 
STRENGTHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ANY BILATERAL OR 
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS THAT EMERGE 
FROM THESE MEETINGS.  FOR EXAMPLE, WE CAN CONSIDER HOW 
THE UNITA SANCTIONS COMMITTEE -- WITH OUR SUPPORT -- 
COULD HELP MONITOR OR INVESTIGATE ANY ALLEGATION OF 
COOPERATION BETWEEN UNITA AND THE MLC, RCD, GOR, OR GOU. 
WE COULD RESURRECT THE IDEA OF SUPPORTING THE DEPLOYMENT 
OF MONITORS IN KEY AIRSTRIPS IN THE DRC TO ENSURE 
AGAINST EASY RESUPPLY BY UNITA OR THE EX- 
FAR/INTERAHAMWE.  WE COULD HELP ELABORATE A COMMON 
STRATEGY FOR SEPARATING THE GENOCIDAIRES LEADERSHIP FROM 
THE RANK AND FILE MILITIA, A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF WHICH 
PROBABLY HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH THE EVENTS OF 1994.  WE 
CAN EXPLORE HOW THE UNSC SANCTIONS COMMITTEE CHARGED 
WITH ADDRESSING RESUPPLY OF THE EX-FAR/INTERAHAMWE MIGHT 
WORK TOGETHER IN SOME WAY WITH THE UNITA SANCTIONS 
COMMITTEE TO FURTHER COMMON SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN THE 
REGION.  THESE ARE JUST A FEW OF THE WAYS THAT THE USG 
CAN CONTRIBUTE TO SUPPORTING THE NECESSARY BUILDING 
BLOCKS FOR A SUCCESSFUL EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES STRATEGY. 
 
¶11.  (C) A FINAL CAUTION: SUCH A STRATEGY WILL REQUIRE 
SOME PATIENCE.  OUR MEETINGS AND THE RECENT POLITICAL 
COMMITTEE SESSION INDICATE A DEMONSTRABLE SHIFT TOWARDS 
TARGETING ANY SIGNATORY THAT THREATENS THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA.  BUT THESE REGIONAL LEADERS 
HAVE A TRACK RECORD OF WORKING VERY SLOWLY IN ACTUALLY 
IMPLEMENTING PROFOUND SHIFTS IN STRATEGY.  ALL OF THEM 
NOW CLEARLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT KABILA IS THE PRIMARY 
OBSTACLE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LUSAKA (WITH J.P. 
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PAGE 04        HARARE  04309  02 OF 02  031034Z 
BEMBA A DISTANT BUT SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT SECONDARY 
OBSTACLE).  BUT IT MAY TAKE SOME TIME FOR SPECIFIC 
ACTIONS TO MATERIALIZE IN SUPPORT OF DISLODGING THE 
STATUS QUO.  USG ASSISTANCE IN BROKERING BILATERAL 
UNDERSTANDINGS WILL IN TURN UNDERGIRD BROADER CONSENSUS 
- BUILDING AMONG THE EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES, IN THE 
CONTEXT OF A PROCESS AND PACE THAT NECESSARILY MUST BE 
OWNED BY THEM. 
 
IRVING 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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