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Viewing cable 00HARARE3963, SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE'S MEETING WITH FORMER

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00HARARE3963 2000-07-19 12:50 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

191250Z Jul 00


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ6412

PAGE 01        HARARE  03963  01 OF 04  191357Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   CCO-00   TEDE-00  IO-00    OIC-02   PM-00    P-00     
      SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    PMB-00   SAS-00     /002W
                  ------------------7001E8  191357Z /45    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6650
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RWANDA COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 HARARE 003963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/19/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BY SF
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE'S MEETING WITH FORMER 
PRESIDENT MANDELA 
 
REF: (A) STATE 135319, (B) PRETORIA 5558 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  03963  01 OF 04  191357Z 
CLASSIFIED BY SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE FOR 
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE HAD A 
PRODUCTIVE MEETING ON BURUNDI WITH A RECEPTIVE NELSON 
MANDELA ON JULY 17 REGARDING THE STATE OF PLAY OF THE 
ARUSHA AGREEMENT AND PLANS FOR THE JULY 19-20 MEETING 
OF REGIONAL HEADS OF STATE.  WOLPE MADE INROADS ON 
TOPICS SUCH AS THE DANGER OF SIGNING AN AGREEMENT 
PREMATURELY, THE DIFFICULT AND UNRESOLVED NATURE OF 
TRANSITIONAL LEADERSHIP, THE DESIRABILITY OF A 
SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES PRIOR TO A FORMAL SIGNING 
CEREMONY, AND THE NUANCES OF THE POLITICAL PRISONER ISSUE. 
MANDELA WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT ADDITIONAL U.S. FUNDING 
FOR THE ARUSHA PROCESS IS ON ITS WAY, AND LOOKS FORWARD 
TO A PHONE CALL WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON AS THE PRESS OF 
BUSINESS AT CAMP DAVID PERMITS.  IN THAT CONVERSATION, 
MANDELA IS LIKELY TO RAISE HIS CONCERN THAT "ANOTHER 
COUNTRY" BESIDES SOUTH AFRICA PROVIDE SECURITY TO ENSURE 
THE SAFETY OF THE LEADERS OF THE NINETEEN PARTIES 
INVOLVED IN THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS ON THEIR EVENTUAL 
RETURN TO BURUNDI.  WOLPE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DEPUTY SPECIAL 
ENVOY YELLIN, SPECIAL ADVISOR PRENDERGAST, AND A/CG LEONARD 
(NOTETAKER.)  A FOLLOW-ON MEETING WITH ARUSHA FACILITATION 
TEAM MEMBER NICHOLAS HAYSOM FURTHER CLARIFIED THE STATUS 
OF A NEW DRAFT ARUSHA AGREEMENT AND PLANS FOR THE JULY 
19/20 ARUSHA MEETING.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C) S/E WOLPE OPENED THE MEETING BY RELAYING A 
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON IN RESPONSE TO 
MANDELA'S CONCERN ABOUT DELAYS IN DONOR FUNDING FOR 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  03963  01 OF 04  191357Z 
THE ARUSHA PROCESS.  HE ASSURED MANDELA THAT $500,000 
HAD ALREADY ARRIVED IN TANZANIA, AND A FURTHER 
$500,000 HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED AND WOULD BE CONTRIBUTED 
PENDING CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.  FURTHER, WOLPE 
TOLD MANDELA THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON LOOKS FORWARD TO 
SPEAKING WITH HIM REGARDING BOTH THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
BURUNDI, BUT THAT THE PRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AT CAMP 
DAVID HAD DELAYED THEIR CONVERSATION.  MANDELA REPLIED 
THAT HE REALIZED THE U.S. PRESIDENT IS VERY BUSY AT 
CAMP DAVID, AND HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO SPEAK WITH HIM 
AT CLINTON'S CONVENIENCE. 
 
3.  (C) WOLPE THEN SUMMARIZED U.S. CONCERNS OVER THE 
BURUNDI PEACE PROCESS, BORN OF U.S. EXPERIENCES IN 
SIERRA LEONE AND THE ARUSHA PROCESS FOR RWANDA, AND 
SOLICITED MANDELA'S VIEWS.  IN BOTH THESE CASES, 
AGREEMENTS TURNED OUT TO BE UNSUSTAINABLE.  THESE TWO 
CASES ALSO RAISED DIFFICULT ISSUES SIMILAR TO THOSE 
PRESENT IN BURUNDI: ISSUES OF JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY, 
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF KEY PLAYERS OWNING THE FINAL 
NEGOTIATED OUTCOME.  WOLPE CAUTIONED THAT THE U.S. 
IS HEARING NERVOUSNESS FROM ALL SIDES IN BURUNDI 
THAT KEY QUESTIONS (COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY, 
FOR EXAMPLE) HAVE NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT TO CLOSURE. 
 
4.  (C) AT THE SAME TIME, WOLPE UNDERSCORED TO MANDELA 
THE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS THE FORMER PRESIDENT HAD 
MADE AS A FACILITATOR FOR BURUNDI.  HAVING BEEN 
ENGAGED IN THE BURUNDI PROCESS SINCE 1996, WOLPE 
WITNESSED TWO TO THREE WASTED YEARS DUE TO POOR 
FACILITATION AND MISTRUST OF TANZANIA'S ROLE. WOLPE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  03963  01 OF 04  191357Z 
REMINDED MANDELA THAT NOT SO MANY YEARS AGO 
BURUNDIANS HAD SO DEMONIZED ONE ANOTHER AS MURDERS AND 
GENOCIDAIRES THAT IT WAS INCONCEIVABLE THE PARTIES NOW 
AT ARUSHA COULD BE BROUGHT INTO THE SAME ROOM.  WOLPE 
CONTINUED THAT CONVERSATION ON THE CORE ISSUES HAD ONLY 
BEGUN WITH MANDELA'S PARTICIPATION, WHICH GAVE BURUNDIANS 
THE FIRST REAL CONFIDENCE THAT AGREEMENT AT ARUSHA IS 
POSSIBLE.  WOLPE FOUND IT NOTHING SHORT OF REMARKABLE 
THAT THE PARTIES ARE NOT ONLY NOW TALKING TOGETHER, BUT 
ADDRESSING THE MOST SERIOUS QUESTIONS SUCH AS JUSTICE, 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE ARMY, AND TRANSITIONAL LEADERSHIP. 
CURRENTLY, BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE REBELS REALIZE 
THAT THESE ISSUES ARE NOT YET RESOLVED, BUT THAT A 
SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE.  THUS, WHILE MANDELA'S EFFORTS HAVE 
BROUGHT HUGE ADVANCES, TOO PRECIPITOUS A MOVE TOWARD SIGNING 
AN AGREEMENT WOULD RISK SNATCHING DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS 
OF VICTORY.  WOLPE CONCLUDED THAT THE PARTIES, AND IN 
PARTICULAR THE REBELS, MUST BE GIVEN TIME TO DIGEST 
AND GAIN OWNERSHIP OF SUCH PROPOSALS AS 50/50 
TUTSI/HUTU PARTICIPATION IN THE MILITARY. 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ6417 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  03963  02 OF 04  191358Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CCO-00   TEDE-00  IO-00    OIC-02   PM-00    P-00 
      SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    PMB-00   SAS-00     /002W 
                  ------------------7001FC  191358Z /45 
O 191250Z JUL 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6651 
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 HARARE 003963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/19/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BY SF
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE'S MEETING WITH FORMER 
PRESIDENT MANDELA 
 
5.  (C) MANDELA RESPONDED WITH AN OUTLINE OF HIS GAME 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  03963  02 OF 04  191358Z 
PLAN FOR THE AGREEMENT.  THE FACILITATION TEAM 
CIRCULATED DRAFT COMPROMISE PROPOSALS FOR THE FIVE 
COMMITTEES, WHICH WERE CIRCULATED AMONG THE 19 
PARTIES.  DURING THE THREE-WEEK-PLUS EXAMINATION 
PERIOD, MANDELA MET, CONFIDENTIALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY, 
AS WELL AS IN PLENARY, WITH ALL NINETEEN OF THE 
PARTIES.  HE SECURED THE AGREEMENT OF EACH THAT THE 
FINAL PROPOSAL THAT WOULD BE DEVELOPED, BASED ON THE 
VARIOUS PARTIES' COMMENTS ON THE DRAFTS, WOULD BE 
ACCEPTED WITHOUT FURTHER NEGOTIATION OR RECLAMA. THIS 
WAS ESSENTIAL, IN MANDELA'S VIEW, BECAUSE WITH SO 
LITTLE PROGRESS SINCE 1995, ANY NEW COMMENT PERIOD 
WOULD REOPEN A PANDORA'S BOX OF ISSUES THAT WOULD 
BLOCK ANY SUCCESSFUL AGREEMENT. 
 
6.  (C) UNFORTUNATELY, MANDELA SAID, THE FACILITATION 
TEAM HAD NOT YET COMPLETED ITS WORK TURNING ALL THE 
DRAFT PROPOSALS WITH COMMENTS INTO FINAL FORM, WITH 
THE QUESTIONS OF A CEASE-FIRE AND THE HEAD OF THE 
PROVISIONAL INTERIM GOVERNMENT PARTICULARLY 
OUTSTANDING.  HE SAID THAT HE WOULD NEVERTHELESS NOT 
CANCEL THE HEADS OF STATE MEETING JULY 19-20, BUT 
WOULD INSTEAD BRIEF THE REGIONAL LEADERS ON THE 
PARTIES' AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE, AND INFORM THEM THAT 
THE ACTUAL SIGNING WOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL AUGUST 28. 
(NOTE: MANDELA EXPECTS ATTENDANCE AT THE JULY MEETING 
BY THE HEADS OF STATE OF MALI, GHANA, SWAZILAND, BOTSWANA, 
MALAWI, LESOTHO, AND "OF COURSE, GADAFFI," OF LIBYA.) 
MANDELA ADDED THAT HE HAD COUNSELED COMMITTEE NUMBER 
THREE (THE COMMITTEE ON THE CEASE-FIRE AND SECURITY) 
NOT TO INSIST ON A FORMAL REBEL CEASE-FIRE (AS DISTINCT 
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PAGE 03        HARARE  03963  02 OF 04  191358Z 
FROM A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES) 
UNTIL AN ARUSHA AGREEMENT HAD BEEN CONCLUDED.  MANDELA 
ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE STUMBLING BLOCK ON PROVISIONAL 
LEADERSHIP IS THAT EVERY SINGLE PARTY IS VYING TO LEAD 
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT. 
 
7. (C) MANDELA FURTHER SUMMARIZED THE PARTIES' VIEWS 
BY SAYING THAT BUYOYA HAD ALREADY AGREED TO THE 50/50 
ARMY COMPOSITION CONCEPT, AND TO DISMANTLE REGROUPMENT 
CAMPS BY JULY 31.  HE CRITICIZED THE BURUNDIAN 
PRESIDENT'S ADAMANT VIEW OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AS A 
"SENSITIVE ISSUE."  MANDELA RECOUNTED HIS HORROR ON 
TOURING THAT COUNTRY'S PRISONS ON JUNE 12, DISCOVERING 
INMATES LIVING IN FILTH FOR CRIMES SUCH AS BOMBING A 
HOUSE.  AS WAS THE CASE IN SOUTH AFRICA, MANDELA 
CONTINUED, THERE CAN BE NO SETTLEMENT IN BURUNDI AS 
LONG AS POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAIN IN JAIL; THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ENFORCING INTERNATIONALLY 
ACCEPTED DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, SHOULD 
PRESSURE BUYOYA TO RELEASE THEM. 
 
8.  (C) REACTING TO MANDELA'S COMMENTS, WOLPE 
ADDRESSED THREE TOPICS: THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER 
COMMENT ON THE FINAL DRAFT AGREEMENT; THE TIMING OF A 
CEASE-FIRE; AND THE PROFILE OF PRISONERS IN BURUNDI. 
RETURNING TO HIS PREVIOUS PRAISE OF MANDELA'S 
INVALUABLE ROLE AS A THIRD PARTY TO FORWARD A 
COMPROMISE PROPOSAL, AND U.S. CONCERNS FOR THE 
UNSUSTAINABILITY OF INCOMPLETE AGREEMENTS, WOLPE 
QUERIED WHETHER THE JULY 19-20 MEETING COULD NOT BE 
USED TO RESOLVE REMAINING OUTSTANDING ISSUES.  MANDELA 
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PAGE 04        HARARE  03963  02 OF 04  191358Z 
VEHEMENTLY DISAGREED, REITERATING THAT THE PARTIES HAD 
ALREADY HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT, AND ANY 
REOPENING WOULD TORPEDO AN AGREEMENT.  THE JULY 
MEETING WOULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THE 
PARTIES THE FINAL DRAFT, NOT TO START OVER.  THEY WOULD 
BE GIVEN TIME TO DIGEST THE FINAL DOCUMENT, BUT WOULD 
NOT BE ABLE TO AMEND IT. 
 
9.  (C) ON THE SUBJECT OF THE CEASE-FIRE, MANDELA HAD 
IN HIS PRESENTATION DRAWN COMPARISONS FROM SOUTH 
AFRICA'S EXPERIENCE.  MANDELA HAD ONCE HESITATED TO 
AGREE TO SUSPEND THE ANC'S ARMED STRUGGLE, WHICH HE 
SAW AS HIS MOVEMENT'S MAJOR TRUMP CARD IN THE 
NEGOTIATIONS.  EVENTUALLY, HOWEVER, HE ACCEPTED THE 
ARGUMENT THAT DE KLERK NEEDED TO DEMONSTRATE PROGRESS 
TO HIS SUPPORTERS, AND SO MANDELA AGREED TO A 
"SUSPENSION OF HOSTILITIES" -- NOT A FORMAL CEASE-FIRE -- 
IN ORDER TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. 
 
10.  (C) WOLPE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE REBELS NEEDED TO 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ6422 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  03963  03 OF 04  191359Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
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                  ------------------700219  191359Z /45 
O 191250Z JUL 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6652 
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 HARARE 003963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/19/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BY SF
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE'S MEETING WITH FORMER 
PRESIDENT MANDELA 
 
HAVE CONCESSIONS IN HAND BEFORE THEY COULD BE EXPECTED TO 
LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS.  AT THE SAME TIME, WOLPE CAUTIONED, 
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PAGE 02        HARARE  03963  03 OF 04  191359Z 
INSISTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHILE THE 
REBELS CONTINUED TO PROSECUTE THE WAR COULD PUT THE LIVES 
OF THOSE SEEN AS GIVING UP TOO MUCH IN THE FACE OF CONTINUING 
VIOLENCE.  WOLPE STRESSED THE NEED FOR SOME SPACE BETWEEN THE 
AGREEMENT AND ITS FORMAL SIGNING TO GIVE THE REBELS A CHANCE 
TO SHOW GOOD FAITH.  MANDELA UNDERSTOOD THE CONCERN, BUT HE 
ADVOCATED AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY: TO COUNSEL THE REBELS TO 
MAKE A STATEMENT NOW THAT THEY WILL IMPLEMENT A CEASE FIRE 
IMMEDIATELY ON SIGNING AN AGREEMENT.  IN THE ENSUING 
CONVERSATION MANDELA APPEARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS 
NOT CLEAR ALL FIGHTERS HAVE YET COME FORWARD TO JOIN THE 
ARUSHA PROCESS, OR THAT ALL REBEL LEADERS (JEAN BOSCO, 
FOR EXAMPLE) EXERT THE DEGREE OF CONTROL THEY CLAIM. WOLPE 
COMMENTED THAT FORCING A SIGNATURE IF SUCH ISSUES WERE NOT 
CLEARLY RESOLVED COULD PUT MANY PEOPLE AT RISK, PARTICULARLY 
SINCE THE CONGO WAR PROVIDES A READY ESCAPE HATCH FOR 
BURUNDIAN REBELS.  MANDELA AGREED THAT THIS WAS TRUE. 
 
11.  (C) WOLPE THEN BROACHED THE SUBJECT OF 
POLITICAL PRISONERS, DESCRIBING THE ISSUE AS VERY 
COMPLICATED.  WHILE IT WAS CLEAR, WOLPE SAID, THAT 
BURUNDIAN PRISONERS LIVED IN INTOLERABLE CONDITIONS AND 
THAT MOST HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED DUE PROCESS, THE 
DEFINITIONAL ISSUE WAS COMPLICATED.  RECALLING THE 1993 
DEATHS OF SOME 150,000 BURUNDIANS IN HUTU MASSACRES OF 
TUTSI AND TUTSI ARMY REPRISALS AGAINST HUTU, HE NOTED 
THAT THE UNITED NATIONS CALLED MANY OF THESE KILLINGS 
"ACTS OF GENOCIDE."  WHILE THE UN MAY HAVE ERRED IN 
APPLYING THIS LABEL, THIS TERMINOLOGY IS NOW VERY MUCH 
A PART OF THE BURUNDIAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND DEBATE. IN 
POINT OF FACT, WOLPE SAID, MANY BURUNDIAN PRISONERS ARE 
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PAGE 03        HARARE  03963  03 OF 04  191359Z 
NOT INCARCERATED MERELY FOR POLITICALLY-INSPIRED ACTS 
OF VIOLENCE, BUT FOR ETHNICALLY INSPIRED KILLINGS.  THE 
QUESTION OF HOW TO GIVE BOTH HUTUS AND TUTSIS COMFORT 
AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT FOR THESE ACTS IS VERY IMPORTANT. 
 
12.  (C) IN OTHER TOPICS, MANDELA DEMONSTRATED HIS 
APPRECIATION OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE POST-ACCORD ERA. 
HE SAID HE HAD SECURED FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S 
AGREEMENT TO HOST AN INTERNATIONAL DONORS' CONFERENCE 
TO HELP REORIENT BURUNDI'S AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY TO 
JOB-CREATING INDUSTRY. MANDELA WILL ALSO ASK COUNTRIES-- 
INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES--TO ACCEPT BURUNDIAN 
STUDENTS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, TO BEGIN REDRESSING THE 
COUNTRY'S SKILLS DEFICIT.  WOLPE AGREED THAT THESE 
SUGGESTIONS ARE USEFUL IN FOCUSSING THE PARTIES' 
ATTENTION TO THE NEED AND VALUE OF SECURING A PEACE, 
AND IN GIVING BURUNDIANS NEW HOPE. 
 
13.  (C) MANDELA ALSO WORRIED ABOUT THE PROCESS BY 
WHICH THE BURUNDIAN PEOPLE, THE ULTIMATE ARBITERS OF 
ANY ACCORD, WOULD ACCEPT THE RESULTS NEGOTIATED BY THE 
VARIOUS PARTIES.  CLEARLY, PARTY REPRESENTATIVES AND 
THE REBELS MUST EVENTUALLY RETURN TO BURUNDI TO DEFEND 
THE OUTCOME OF THE AGREEMENT.  THIS COULD BE A 
DANGEROUS PROCESS FOR THE LEADERS CONCERNED, AND 
MANDELA HAD ASKED UN SECRETARY GENERAL KOFFI ANNAN FOR 
UNITED NATIONS BODYGUARDS FOR EACH PARTY.  RECOGNIZING 
THE UN WOULD INEVITABLY BE SLOW TO RESPOND, MANDELA 
SAID HE INTENDED TO ASK SOME OTHER COUNTRY TO PROVIDE 
THAT SERVICE, SINCE SENDING SOUTH AFRICANS WOULD 
APPEAR TOO FORWARD ON MANDELA'S PART. MANDELA FELT HE 
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PAGE 04        HARARE  03963  03 OF 04  191359Z 
MUST DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. 
 
14.  (C) COMMENT: WHILE WOLPE'S MEETING ELICITED NO 
CLEAR PLEDGE TO ABANDON A SET SIGNING DATE, THE 
DISCUSSION DID BRING ABOUT SEVERAL IMPORTANT OPENINGS. 
MANDELA CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD OUR FOCUS ON THE DANGER OF 
PREMATURE SIGNATURE WITH REMAINING UNRESOLVED ISSUES, 
NAMELY THAT SUCH AN ACTION COULD COST LIVES.  AS FOR 
MANDELA'S PROTESTATIONS ABOUT THE FINALITY OF THE 
REVISED AGREEMENT, WORKING COMMITTEE CHAIR (AND 
MANDELA ADVISOR) NICHOLAS HAYSOM LATER CLARIFIED 
THAT HE IS INTERACTING WITH VARIOUS PARTIES TO SHARE 
THE EARLY DRAFT OF THE FINAL PROPOSAL, AND THAT THERE 
REMAINS "SPACE FOR FURTHER INTERACTION." AT THE END 
OF THE CONVERSATION, MANDELA ACTUALLY VERBALIZED THE 
NEED FOR A "CEASE FIRE BEFORE SIGNING," BUT U.S. 
PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTOOD, AND NICHOLAS HAYSOM'S 
SUBSEQUENT COMMENTS SUPPORTED, THAT MANDELA PROBABLY 
ACTUALLY REFERRED TO AN ADVANCE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN 
AGREED CEASE-FIRE THAT WOULD TRIGGER IMMEDIATELY ON 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ6429 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  03963  04 OF 04  191359Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
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                  ------------------700235  191359Z /45 
O 191250Z JUL 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6653 
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 HARARE 003963 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/19/10 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BY SF
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE'S MEETING WITH FORMER 
PRESIDENT MANDELA 
 
SIGNING.  (NOTE: HE MAY ALSO HAVE MEANT A SUSPENSION OF 
HOSTILITIES BEFORE SIGNATURE, SOMETHING HE IS SEEKING 
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PAGE 02        HARARE  03963  04 OF 04  191359Z 
FROM THE TWO REBEL GROUPS. END NOTE.)  MANDELA IS ALSO 
CLEARLY AWARE THAT THE SELECTION OF TRANSITIONAL 
LEADERSHIP IS BOTH DIFFICULT AND UNRESOLVED.  HAYSOM SAID 
MANDELA'S POSITION IS THAT THE SIGNING MUST NOT BE HELD 
UP WHILE A LEADER IS SELECTED, PARTICULARLY SINCE MANDELA 
FEELS IT IS NOT HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO CHOOSE AN INTERIM 
LEADER; HOWEVER, SEVERAL PARTIES DO NOT WANT TO SIGN 
WITHOUT RESOLVING THIS ISSUE.  HAYSOM FELT ONE ACCEPTABLE 
COMPROMISE WOULD BE FOR CURRENT PRESIDENT BUYOYA TO 
GOVERN THE SIX MONTH IMPLEMENTATION PERIOD IN A DEPARTING 
EXERCISE OF GOVERNMENT CIVILIANIZATION BEFORE THE 
TRANSITION ACTUALLY BEGINS.  FINALLY, MANDELA APPARENTLY 
TOOK WOLPE'S DISCUSSION OF THE NEED TO DISTINGUISH 
BETWEEN DIFFERING CATEGORIES OF BURUNDIAN PRISONERS 
ON BOARD. 
 
15.  (U) MANDELA AND WOLPE PARTED BY OBSERVING THAT 
THE PROCESS IS GOING FORWARD, AND THAT THEY WOULD WORK 
TOGETHER IN ARUSHA LATER THIS WEEK TO FURTHER THAT 
END.  IRVING 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
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