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Viewing cable 00HARARE3941, FOREIGN MINISTER ZUMA SHARES VIEWS ON DRC WITH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
00HARARE3941 2000-07-18 15:40 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Harare
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

181540Z Jul 00


                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3047

PAGE 01        HARARE  03941  01 OF 03  181814Z 
ACTION AF-00    

INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00  
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OMB-01   
      PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   
      SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00     
      SAS-00     /005W
                  ------------------6FA339  181814Z /07    
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6640
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RWANDA COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HARARE 003941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2010 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS CF SF
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ZUMA SHARES VIEWS ON DRC WITH 
SPECIAL ENVOY WOLPE 
 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  03941  01 OF 03  181814Z 
CLASSIFIED BY SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE FOR REASONS 1.5 
(B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN MINISTER DR. NKOSAZANA 
DLAMINI-ZUMA AGREED WITH SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE'S 
ASSESSMENT THAT NOTHING WAS MORE DANGEROUS FOR THE FUTURE 
OF THE LUSAKA PROCESS THAN ACQUIESCENCE TO KABILA'S REJECTION 
OF DRC FACILITATOR SIR KETUMILE MASIRE.  ZUMA REVIEWED KABILA'S 
ROLE IN EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE MASIRE, AND COMPLAINED ABOUT 
BROAD COMPLICITY OF STATES IN ISSUING CARROTS TO KABILA, BUT 
NOT APPLYING THE STICK.  IN ZUMA'S VIEW, KABILA'S EFFORTS TO FORM 
HIS OWN CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, REJECT MASIRE, AND FOLLOW AN 
APPROACH THAT EXCLUDES A LARGE PART OF THE CONGO FROM THE 
SOLUTION, EFFECTIVELY SAYS, "TO HELL WITH THE REST OF THE CONGO." 
THIS IS A FORMULA, SHE BELIEVES, FOR THE ULTIMATE PARTITION OF 
THE DRC.  ZUMA MUSED THAT IT WOULD BE TIMELY TO CONVENE AN 
OAU-SPONSORED MEETING OF THE STATE SIGNATORIES TO RESOLVE THE 
MASIRE ISSUE, WITH MASIRE HIMSELF JOINING AFTER CERTAIN BOTTOM 
LINES HAD BEEN WORKED OUT WITH KABILA.  ZUMA WORRIED ABOUT 
THE TENUOUSNESS OF THE LUSAKA ACCORD AND THE MILITARISTIC 
INTENTIONS OF REBEL LEADERS SUCH AS MLC HEAD JEAN PIERRE BEMBA. 
PRESIDENT MBEKI INTENDS TO REVIEW THE SITUATION IN THE DRC AND 
TRY TO CATALYZE NEW ENERGY IN SUPPORT OF LUSAKA.   ZUMA 
CAUTIONED ABOUT PERCEPTIONS OF TOTAL RWANDAN CONTROL OVER 
THE RCD.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RWANDA AND THE RCD IS NOT 
SIMPLE. ACCORDING TO ZUMA, THE GOR NEEDS THE RCD MORE THAN THE 
RCD NEEDS THE GOR, BECAUSE IF THE RCD LINKED UP WITH OR 
OTHERWISE COOPERATED WITH THE INTERAHAMWE, THIS WOULD 
GREATLY ADD TO THE GOR'S SECURITY PROBLEMS. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) GREAT LAKES SPECIAL ENVOY HOWARD WOLPE MET 7/17/00 IN 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  03941  01 OF 03  181814Z 
PRETORIA WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN MINISTER DR. NKOSAZANA 
DLAMINI-ZUMA AT HER HOME ON THE PRESIDENTIAL COMPOUND.  AMBASSADOR 
LEWIS, SPECIAL ADVISOR JOHN PRENDERGAST, DEPUTY SPECIAL ENVOY 
JAMES YELLIN, AND POLCOUNSELOR (NOTETAKER) ACCOMPANIED.  JERRY 
MATSILA, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) ACTING DEPUTY 
DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR AMERICAS, SAT IN ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN SIDE. 
SEPTEL COVERS DISCUSSIONS ON BURUNDI AND CANDIDACY FOR THE 
U.N. SEAT CURRENTLY HELD BY NAMIBIA. 
 
--------------------- 
THE ASSAULT ON MASIRE 
--------------------- 
 
3. (C) WOLPE ADVISED FOREIGN MINISTER ZUMA THAT NAMIBIAN 
PRESIDENT SAM NUJOMA REPORTEDLY HAD EXPRESSED TO KEY U.S. 
CONGRESSMEN THE VIEW THAT THE SADC ALLIES NO LONGER 
SUPPORTED SIR KETUMILE MASIRE AS CONGOLESE NATIONAL DIALOGUE 
FACILITATOR.  WOLPE SAID NOTHING COULD BE MORE DANGEROUS TO 
THE LUSAKA PROCESS THAN TO ACQUIESCE IN KABILA'S REJECTION OF 
MASIRE.  THE ISSUE, WOLPE SAID, IS NOT MASIRE BUT THE 
FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION OF DRC PRESIDENT LAURENT KABILA TO THE 
INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE.  HE NOTED THE POSITIVE RESOLUTION ON 
THE DRC PASSED AT THE OAU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING IN TOGO 
THAT AFFIRMED FULL SUPPORT FOR LUSAKA, AND EXPLICITLY URGED 
THE CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT TO COOPERATE WITH FACILITATOR 
MASIRE.  HE SAID THAT THE USG HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A 
READ-OUT OF ZIMBABWE PRESIDENT ROBERT MUGABE'S RECENT MEETING 
IN LUBUMBASHI WITH KABILA. 
 
4. (C) ZUMA FULLY AGREED WITH WOLPE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGER 
POSED BY ACQUIESCENCE TO KABILA'S REJECTION OF MASIRE, ADDING 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  03941  01 OF 03  181814Z 
THAT "WE HAVE ALL BEEN GIVING CARROTS TO KABILA BUT I DON'T KNOW 
WHAT IS THE STICK. I LEAVE THAT TO YOU."  ZUMA ADDED THAT KABILA IS REJ 
ECTING 
MASIRE, APPOINTING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, AND ACTIVELY 
VIOLATING THE INTEGRITY OF THE CONGO.  THE INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE 
IS MEANT TO ASSURE THAT THE CONGO IS INCORPORATED AS A WHOLE, SHE 
SAID.  IF KABILA IS FORMING A PARLIAMENT, HE IS ACTUALLY SAYING 
"TO HELL WITH THE REST OF THE CONGO."  HE IS EFFECTIVELY 
PARTITIONING THE COUNTRY AND BECOMING A TRUE DICTATOR, EVEN 
JAILING SOME OF HIS MINISTERS. 
 
------------------ 
IS THERE LEVERAGE? 
------------------ 
 
5. (C) WOLPE RESPONDED THAT THE THREATBY ZIMBABWE AND ANGOLA OF 
THEIR MILITARY SUPPORT OF KABILA  WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE ONLY 
EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE ON THE DRC PRESIDENT.  THE USG CONTINUES 
THEREFORE TO SEE MUGABE AND ANGOLAN PRESIDENT DOS SANTOS AS THE 
KEY TO MOVING LUSAKA FORWARD.  MORE GENERALLY, WOLPE SUGGESTED, 
IT IS  THE QUINTET OF EXTERNAL SIGNATORIES (UGANDA, NAMIBIA, 
RWANDA, ZIMBABWE, AND ANGOLA) THAT CONTINUE TO HAVE THE 
STRONGEST INTEREST IN IMPLEMENTING THE LUSAKA ACCORDS.  AN 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3048 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  03941  02 OF 03  181814Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OMB-01 
      PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00 
      SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00 
      SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------6FA33E  181814Z /07 
O 181540Z JUL 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6641 
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 HARARE 003941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2010 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS CF SF
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ZUMA SHARES VIEWS ON DRC WITH 
SPECIAL ENVOY WOLPE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  03941  02 OF 03  181814Z 
EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE BY THE EXTERNAL STATE SIGNATORIES, 
WOLPE SUGGESTED, TO BUILD ON THE OUTCOME OF THE LAST VICTORIA 
FALLS MEETING, CONSOLIDATE THEIR OWN POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING, 
AND SECURE AGREEMENT ON WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO BRING ALL OF THE 
CONGOLESE PARTIES INTO COMPLIANCE WITH LUSAKA.  THE OTHER 
IMPORTANT ELEMENT WOULD BE TO DEVELOP A MEANS OF RE-LAUNCHING 
FACILITATOR MASIRE. 
 
6. (C) ZUMA NOTED THAT THE OUTGOING OAU PRESIDENT TRIED TO 
ORGANIZE A JULY 4 MEETING IN ALGIERS.  HOWEVER, AFTER INITIALLY 
ACCEPTING BOUTEFLIKA'S INVITATION, THEN SAID HE WOULD NOT COME 
IF MASIRE WERE PRESENT.  ZUMA SAID SHE THOUGHT A MEETING SHOULD 
STILL BE CALLED, PREFERABLY ONE THAT INCLUDES KABILA.  HOWEVER, 
IF HE DID NOT ATTEND, THE PARTIES SHOULD STILL PROCEED TO MEET 
AND TALK ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT THE CONGO AND THE 
INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE.  ZUMA WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF KABILA 
INSISTS ON THE ABSENCE OF MASIRE, THE LEADERS COULD AGREE TO 
AN INITIAL MEETING WITH KABILA ALONE, INVITING MASIRE TO JOIN 
THE TALKS AFTER THEY HAD REACHED AN UNDERSTANDING WITH KABILA. 
"THE MEETING ITSELF IS IMPORTANT," SHE SAID, "FOR THE PROCESS 
TO BE EVALUATED PROPERLY AND A NEW WAY FORWARD TO BE FOUND." 
 
------------------------ 
LUSAKA HANGS BY A THREAD 
------------------------ 
 
7. (C) ZUMA TOLD WOLPE THAT MLC LEADER JEAN PIERRE BEMBA HAD 
CALLED HER SEEKING ADVICE ON A FUTURE COURSE OF ACTION, AND 
BEMOANING HER EARLIER "ROLE" IN "STOPPING HIS MARCH ON 
KINSHASA."  WOLPE NOTED THAT  ZUMA WAS AMONG SEVERAL 
INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING UN PERMANENT. REPRESENTATIVE HOLBROOKE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  03941  02 OF 03  181814Z 
AND WOLPE HIMSELF, THAT BEMBA HAD BEEN CALLING.  ZUMA SAID 
SHE HAD ADVISED BEMBA TO "CONSULT WIDELY."  BEMBA IN TURN 
INSISTED HE HAD THE CAPACITY TO ADVANCE AND WOULD NOT ALLOW 
HIS FORCES TO BE PUSHED BACK.  HE DID NOT CARE TO HEAR HER 
STATEMENTS ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE LUSAKA ACCORD AND TOLD 
HER THAT LUSAKA MEANS THAT KABILA SHOULD NOT BE ATTACKING HIM. 
BEMBA AFFIRMED, ZUMA SAID, THAT AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED 
LUSAKA STILL HOLDS. BUT HE ALSO TALKED ABOUT THE REALITY OF 
50,000 REFUGEES HAVING BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF KABILA'S 
RECENT OFFENSIVE IN EQUATEUR.  SHE SAID SHE TOLD BEMBA HE 
COULD DEFEND HIMSELF BUT HE SHOULD NOT TAKE THE OFFENSIVE. 
ZUMA TOLD WOLPE PRESIDENT MBEKI WOULD BE LOOKING AT THE 
SITUATION IN THE DRC AND WOULD TRY TO CATALYZE A NEW 
INITIATIVE.  ZUMA EXPRESSED FEAR THAT KABILA WAS NOW PUSHING 
THE CONGOLESE PEOPLE TO A POINT WHERE THE LUSAKA ACCORDS WERE 
IN DANGER OF COLLAPSE.  IF BEMBA PERCEIVES HE IS AGAINST THE 
WALL, SHE TOLD WOLPE, WE ARE IN DANGER OF GOING BACK TO THE 
PERIOD WHICH PRECEDED THE LUSAKA ACCORDS.  TO WOLPE'S COMMENT 
THAT LUSAKA IS NOW HANGING BY A THREAD, ZUMA OBSERVED THAT 
THERE MIGHT NOT EVEN BE A WEEK'S TIME LEFT TO SALVAGE THE ACCORD. 
 
8. (C) ZUMA TOLD WOLPE THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW IF PRESIDENT MBEKI 
HAD YET SPOKEN WITH MUGABE ABOUT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS.  SHE 
HAD RECEIVED NO READ-OUT OF THE RECENT LUMUMBASHI BETWEEN 
BETWEEN MUGABE AND KABILA. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE RWANDA/RCD-G RELATIONSHIP 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
9. (C) WOLPE TOLD ZUMA THAT IN HIS CURRENT TRAVEL IN THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        HARARE  03941  02 OF 03  181814Z 
REGION, HE WOULD AGAIN ATTEMPT TO GET THE PARTIES TO THE 
DRC CONFLICT TO FOCUS ON MOVING FORWARD ON THE DISARMAMENT, 
DEMOBILIZATION, RESETTLEMENT AND REINTEGRATION (DDRR) OF 
THE NON-STATE SIGNATORIES.  WOLPE EXPLAINED THAT ACCELERATED 
DISCUSSION OF DDRR MAY BE A WAY OF SECURING MORE RAPID 
DISENGAGEMENT OF THE ARMED PARTIES.   WOLPE SAID HE WOULD 
ALSO BE DISCUSSING THE EVOLVING KISANGANI SITUATION. 
RCD-GOMA (RCD-G) TROOPS ARE STILL IN KISANGANI WITH THE 
ACQUIESCENCE OR ENCOURAGEMENT OF RWANDA.  DEPLOYMENT OF 
MONUC TO KISANGANI WILL BE KEY TO SECURING FULL 
DEMILITARIZATION OF THE CITY, AND A PAKISTANI CONTINGENT 
MAY BE READY TO DEPLOY. 
 
10. (C) ZUMA CAUTIONED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RWANDA 
AND THE RCD IS NOT SIMPLE.  THE IMPRESSION HAS BEEN CREATED, 
SHE SAID, THAT RWANDA'S POWER OVER THE RCD EXTENDS TO THE 
POINT WHEREBY IF THE RCD WAS ORDERED BY RWANDA TO SIGN AN 
AGREEMENT, IT WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO COMPLY.   SHE 
SAID SHE HAD ASKED RWANDA ABOUT THIS RELATIONSHIP.  SHE WAS 
TOLD THAT RCD MEMBERS LIVED WITHIN THEIR OWN COUNTRY AND 
WERE NOT MERE EXTENSIONS OF RWANDA.  IN FACT, THE RWANDANS 
HAD EXPAINED TO HER, ZUMA SAID, THAT  RWANDA NEEDED THE 
RCD MORE THAN THE RCD NEEDED RWANDA.  THE RCD HELD A POWER 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ3051 
 
PAGE 01        HARARE  03941  03 OF 03  181815Z 
ACTION AF-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   CIAE-00  DODE-00  SRPP-00  VC-00    H-01     TEDE-00 
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     AC-01    NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OMB-01 
      PA-00    PM-00    PRS-00   ACE-00   P-00     SP-00    SSO-00 
      SS-00    TRSE-00  T-00     USIE-00  PMB-00   DRL-02   G-00 
      SAS-00     /005W 
                  ------------------6FA34D  181815Z /07 
O 181540Z JUL 00 
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6642 
INFO NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY 
RWANDA COLLECTIVE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 HARARE 003941 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR A/S RICE AND PDAS POWELL 
 
USUN FOR HOLBROOKE 
 
NSC FOR GAYLE SMITH 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2010 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS CF SF
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ZUMA SHARES VIEWS ON DRC WITH 
SPECIAL ENVOY WOLPE 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 02        HARARE  03941  03 OF 03  181815Z 
OVER RWANDA WITH DEADLY CONSEQUENCE -- THE ABILITY TO LINK 
WITH THE INTERAHAMWE, LOCATED IN THE CONGO, TO OPERATE IN 
GOMA ANDOTHER AREAS.  THE RCD IS NOT AN EXILE ORGANIZATION, 
HERRWANDAN COLLEAGUES HAD TOLD HER, SO WHY DO PEOPLE THINK 
RWANDA CAN DICTATE TO THEM?  ZUMA SAID THE RWANDANS TOLD HER 
THEY CAN ONLY HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RCD THAT IS OF 
VIRTUAL EQUALS.  IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CONGOLESE, 
ZUMA SAID, SHE HAS VERIFIED THE COMPLEXITY OF THIS RELATIONSHIP. 
YES, RWANDA HAS SOME INFLUENCE WITH THE RCD, BUT IT IS NOT TO 
THE EXTENT PEOPLE THINK. 
 
11. (C) WOLPE COUNTERED THAT THE RCD-G'S PRESENCE IN KISANGANI 
SERVES RWANDA'S STRATEGIC CONCERNS.  INDEED, RWANDA NEEDED 
THE RCD-GOMA, BECAUSE RWANDA FEARED THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF 
MONUC DEPLOYMENT, KABILA OR THE MLC MIGHT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF 
THE VACUUM CREATED BY RWANDAN AND UGANDAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE 
CITY.  ZUMA, EFFECTIVELY CONTRADICTING HER EARLIER EMPHASIS ON 
RCD-G'S AUTONOMY, SAID SHE DID NOT THINK RCD-G WAS STRONG ON 
ITS OWN.  IF RWANDA PULLED OUT OF THE DRC, ZUMA SAID, IT IS 
UNLIKELY THE RCD COULD PREVENT KABILA'S FORCES FROM COMING 
INTO KISANGANI. 
 
12. (C) ZUMA RETURNED TO HER POINT THAT TO TREAT RCD-GOMA 
SIMPLY AS THE SURROGATE OF RWANDA WOULD INEVITABLY CREATE 
PROBLEMS. RCD-G MEMBERS, SHE SAID, MAKE THE POINT THAT THEY 
ARE NOT FOREIGNERS IN KISANGANI AND RESENT ANY SUGGESTION 
THAT THEY BE TREATED LIKE FOREIGNERS IN THEIR OWN LAND. 
THAT IS WHY, ZUMA ASSERTED, THAT THE RCD-GOMA BELIEVES ITS 
PRESENCE IN KISANGANI IS NOT A VIOLATION OF THE DEMILITARIZATION 
AGREEMENT THAT UGANDA AND RWANDA HAD REACHED WITH MONUC. 
ZUMA WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN, FROM WOLPE, THAT RCD-GOMA'S 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        HARARE  03941  03 OF 03  181815Z 
BIZIMA KARAHA HAD PRESENTED TO WOLPE IN NEW YORK A SIGNED 
COPY OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT THAT THE RCD-GOMA HAD ENTERED 
INTO DIRECTLY WITH MONUC, TO ACCEPT THE SAME DEMILITARIZATION 
TERMS THAT UGANDA AND RWANDA HAD PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED.  WOLPE 
TOLD ZUMA OF KARAHA'S DISCOMFORT WHEN HE WAS CONFRONTED WITH 
THE RCD-GOMA'S BACKSLIDING FROM THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT. 
 
13.  (C) COMMENT. THE FOREIGN MINISTER APPEARS TO HAVE A 
PARTICULARLY SOFT SPOT IN HER HEART FOR RWANDA, ACCEPTING AT 
FACE VALUE SOME ASSERTIONS OF BOTH RWANDA AND RCD-GOMA THAT 
SHOULD PROBABLY BE SCRUTINIZED MORE CAREFULLY.   HOWEVER, 
IN ALMOST ALL RESPECTS, THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S ASSESSMENT 
OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LUSAKA PROCESS CLOSELY TRACKS THAT 
OF THE USG.  END COMMENT. 
 
IRVING 
 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
>