O 081045Z MAY 00
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7557
INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY DHAKA 
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
USMISSION GENEVA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000968 
 
LONDON FOR SUTPHIN 
CINCPAC FOR FPA TWINING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/10 
TAGS: MOPS PREL CE
SUBJECT: LTTE OFFERS TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY:  RICHARD H. SMYTH, DCM.  REASON(S): 
1.5(D), (E). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  WITH THE SRI LANKAN ARMY HAVING PULLED 
BACK TO NEW DEFENSIVE LINES AND A SLOWDOWN IN LTTE 
ADVANCES OVER THE WEEKEND ON THE JAFFNA FRONT, THE LTTE 
HAS OFFERED A TEMPORARY CEASE-FIRE TO ALLOW GSL FORCES 
TO "WITHDRAW FROM THE UNFAVORABLE THEATER OF WAR WITH 
DIGNITY AND HONOR." THE OFFER PRESENTS THE GSL WITH A 
NUMBER OF DILEMMAS AND MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS; 
GOVERNMENT SOURCES ARE SAYING THAT THEY ARE "STUDYING 
THE OFFER."  COUNTRIES ABLE TO ASSIST IN AN EVACUATION, 
IF ASKED, ARE GOING TO HAVE TO CAREFULLY EVALUATE THE 
RELATIVE PERMISSIVENESS OF THE LTTE OFFER. END SUMMARY. 
 
LTTE PRESS RELEASE 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (U) AT 0935(L), THE LTTE OFFICE IN LONDON ISSUED THE 
FOLLOWING PRESS RELEASE: 
 
BEGIN QUOTE: 
 
"THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM (LTTE) WISHES TO 
STATE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO DECLARE A TEMPORARY CEASE- 
FIRE SUSPENDING ALL ARMED HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE SRI 
LANKAN ARMED FORCES TO FACILITATE THE BELEAGUERED 
GOVERNMENT TROOPS TO BE EVACUATED SAFELY FROM THE JAFFNA 
PENINSULA. 
 
"OUR PROPOSED CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES WILL COME INTO 
EFFECT AS SOON AS THE SRI LANKA GOVERNMENT INDICATES TO 
US, WITHOUT DELAY, ITS WILLINGNESS TO OBSERVE THE SAME. 
WE CALL UPON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS TO SUPERVISE AND ASSIST THE ORDERLY EVACUATION OF 
TROOPS. 
 
"THE LEADERSHIP OF THE LIBERATION TIGERS HAS MADE THIS 
DECISION AS A GESTURE OF GOODWILL TO PREVENT ESCALATION 
OF VIOLENCE AND BLOODBATH AND TO CREATE A CONGENIAL 
ENVIRONMENT FOR SRI LANKAN SOLDIERS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE 
UNFAVORABLE THEATER OF WAR WITH DIGNITY AND HONOR. 
 
"WE CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA TO CONSIDER 
OUR PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY AND RESPOND POSITIVELY WITHOUT 
DELAY.  A POSITIVE RESPONSE, WE ARE CONFIDENT, WILL 
CREATE CORDIAL CONDITIONS FOR A PERMANENT CEASE-FIRE, 
PEACE, TALKS, AND NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT FOR 
THE TAMIL NATIONAL QUESTION.  WE ALSO WISH TO INDICATE 
TO THE SRI LANKA GOVERNMENT THAT IT WILL BEAR TOTAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES OF HEAVY 
MILITARY CASUALTIES IF IT REJECTS OUR PROPOSAL FOR DE- 
ESCALATION AND CONTINUES THE WAR EFFORT." 
 
END QUOTE. 
 
 
CONTEXT 
------- 
 
¶3. (C) THE MEASURED TONES OF THE STATEMENT -- 
PARTICULARLY THE EMPHASIS ON AVOIDING A BLOOD-BATH AND 
HOLDING OUT THE PROSPECT OF THE CEASE-FIRE BEING A 
PRECURSOR TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE "TAMIL 
NATIONAL QUESTION" (WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING 
INDEPENDENCE) -- SHOULD PLAY WELL WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY INDIA, AS IT WRESTLES WITH 
IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE RESPONSES TO THE JAFFNA 
OFFENSIVE. 
 
¶4. (C) THE OFFER COMES AFTER INDIA HAS REJECTED ARMED 
INTERVENTION AND AS THE JAFFNA BATTLELINES HAVE BECOME 
RELATIVELY STABILIZED, WITH GSL FORCES ESTABLISHING A 
MAIN DEFENSIVE LINE RUNNING SOUTH-SOUTHWESTWARDS FROM 
POINT PEDRO TO THE JAFFNA LAGOON.  WEEKEND REPORTS OF 
COMBAT SUGGESTED LOW- TO MODERATE INTENSITY MORTAR/ 
ARTILLERY EXCHANGES RATHER THAN INFANTRY OPERATIONS. 
BOTH GOVERNMENT AND LTTE FORCES NEED A BREATHER;  WITH 
ITS RECENTLY ACQUIRED HEAVY ARTILLERY, HOWEVER, THE LTTE 
COULD INTENSIFY ITS OFFENSIVE AGAINST LARGELY 
DEMORALIZED GSL FORCES AFTER A RELATIVELY SHORT BREAK. 
 
 
QUESTIONS AND DILEMMAS 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) THE LTTE STATEMENT DOES NOT ADDRESS CERTAIN 
ISSUES ESSENTIAL FOR THE GSL'S FULL CONSIDERATION OF THE 
OFFER -- AND THEREIN LIES MANY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S 
DILEMMAS.  THE STATEMENT DOES NOT INDICATE WHETHER A 
PERMISSIVE WITHDRAWAL WOULD INCLUDE ARMS AND EQUIPMENT, 
NOR IS ANY TIME-LINE OTHER THAN "SOON" INDICATED. 
 
¶6. (C) WHILE THE GSL COULD CONTINUE TO HOLD OUT IN 
JAFFNA FOR SOME TIME, THE FORCES' SITUATION IS UNTENABLE 
UNLESS SOME IMAGINATION AND FORCEFULNESS IS DEMONSTRATED 
AND THE INITIATIVE REGAINED, A SCENARIO UNLIKELY OVER 
THE SHORT TERM.  WHILE IT MIGHT MAKE SOUND MILITARY 
SENSE TO HAVE THE ARMY 'LIVE TO FIGHT ANOTHER DAY,' 
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUES WOULD ARGUE FOR PRESIDENT 
KUMARATUNGA NOT TO GO DOWN IN HISTORY AS THE LEADER THAT 
CAPITULATED -- EVEN IN A WITHDRAWAL "WITH HONOR" -- TO 
THE LTTE. 
 
¶7. (C) THE VAGUENESS OF THE LTTE STATEMENT ARGUES 
AGAINST THE GSL'S IMMEDIATE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER -- 
BUT EVEN A STATEMENT INDICATING MORE INFORMATION IS 
NECESSARY WOULD SIGNAL A WAVERING (WITH ITS POLITICAL 
COST) IN THE GOVERNMENT'S RESOLVE TO HOLD JAFFNA, THE 
ONE GREAT MILITARY PRIZE OF KUMARATUNGA'S GOVERNMENT. 
SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT DECIDE TO SEEK ADDITIONAL 
INFORMATION, LTTE CONDITIONS COULD PROVE SO TOTALLY 
UNACCEPTABLE (TOO SHORT A TIME FRAME, PREEMPTIVE 
DISARMING OF GOVERNMENT FORCES, ETC.) THAT A CEASE-FIRE 
WOULD PROVE IMPOSSIBLE, LEAVING THE LTTE ON THE FIELD AS 
THE PARTY THAT MAGNANIMOUSLY OFFERED PEACE ONLY TO BE 
REJECTED.  PERHAPS THE GREATEST DILEMMA OF ALL IS IF THE 
GSL ACCEPTED THE CEASE-FIRE IN PRINCIPLE, BUT COULD NOT 
ARRANGE FOR TRANSPORTATION; SRI LANKAN SHIPPING ASSETS 
ALONE ARE INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT OF A TIMELY WITHDRAWAL 
OF ITS TROOPS. 
 
REACTIONS 
--------- 
 
¶8. (S) IN RESPONSE TO THE BARRAGE OF QUESTIONS FROM THE 
PRESS, GOVERNMENT SOURCES ARE PUBLICLY SAYING THAT THE 
"OFFER MUST BE STUDIED." ACCORDING TO DATT SOURCES, THE 
SRI LANKAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP'S REACTION AS OF LATE 
AFTERNOON CAN BE PARAPHRASED AS "NUTS." 
 
¶9. (C) THE ICRC DELEGATION IN COLOMBO SAYS IT IS 
DELIGHTED WITH THE LTTE'S OFFER, WHILE DISTURBED BY THE 
SANGUINARY LAST SENTENCE.  THEY HAD RECEIVED NO PRIOR 
NOTIFICATION OF THE LTTE'S OFFER, AND, IN FACT, SAY THEY 
HAVE HAD NO DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE LTTE REGARDING THE 
POSSIBILITY AND MODALITIES OF ICRC OVERSIGHT OF A 
MILITARY EVACUATION.  THEIR IMMEDIATE PLANS ARE TO DO 
NOTHING, BUT WAIT AND SEE IF THE GSL AND/OR LTTE COME 
DIRECTLY TO THEM WITH A REQUEST TO PLAY AN INTERMEDIARY 
ROLE. 
 
¶10. (C) NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR WESTBORG WAS UNAWARE OF THE 
LTTE PRESS RELEASE WHEN AMBASSADOR SPOKE WITH HIM BY 
PHONE LATE THIS AFTERNOON.  WESTBORG'S IMMEDIATE 
REACTION TO THE NEWS WAS THAT IT COULD REPEAT COULD 
PROVIDE AN OPENING FOR TALKS BUT HE HAD MANY QUESTIONS. 
IF THE LTTE CONSULTED WITH GON REPS IN LONDON OR OSLO ON 
THIS CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS, NORWAYS MAN 
IN COLOMBO WAS LEFT OUT OF THE LOOP. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) WHETHER THE LTTE OFFER IS SERIOUS OR NOT (AND 
HERE WE AGAIN NOTE THAT THE LTTE SET THE OFFER UP IN A 
MANNER ALLOWING EASY WITHDRAWAL OF THE RUG), THE 
ORGANIZATION HAS ALREADY SCORED SOME REAL PSYOPS POINTS 
WITH THE TROOPS UNDER THREAT IN JAFFNA AND POTENTIALLY 
WITH ELEMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HOPING FOR 
A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN SRI LANKA. 
 
¶12. (C) WHETHER THE GSL REJECTS OR ACCEPTS THE OFFER -- 
AND WE BELIEVE A REJECTION IS MOST LIKELY -- THE OFFER 
ITSELF AND THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE WILL LIKELY FIGURE 
HEAVILY IN THE EXTENDED DEFENSE DEBATE SCHEDULED TO 
BEGIN IN PARLIAMENT TOMORROW AS WELL AS IN THE 
DELIBERATIONS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES THAT SRI LANKA HAS 
APPROACHED FOR ONE KIND OR ANOTHER OF ASSISTANCE. 
 
DONNELLY