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Viewing cable 99JAKARTA5612, AMBASSADOR'S NOVEMBER 9 MEETING WITH DEFENSE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
99JAKARTA5612 1999-11-10 09:46 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Jakarta
P 100946Z NOV 99
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC//EAP-PIMBS// PRIORITY 1288
INFO ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
SECDEF WASHDC//ISA-AP//
CJCS WASHDC
JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J51//
DIA WASHDC//DH-3//
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
COMUSF INTERFET //J2//
COMLOG WESTPAC
CDRTAMC HONOLULU HI//COE//
DSCO CP ZAMA JA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 005612 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/09 
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM PINR MILI ID
SUBJECT:  AMBASSADOR'S NOVEMBER 9 MEETING WITH DEFENSE 
MINISTER JUWONO SUDARSONO 
 
1.  (U)  CLASSIFIED BY DATT/ARMA - COL JOSEPH H. DAVES, USA, 
REASON, 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
2.  (C)  SUMMARY:  DURING A FRIENDLY 75 MINUTE DISCUSSION, 
NEWLY APPOINTED MINISTER FOR DEFENSE AND SECURITY DR. 
JUWONO SUDARSONO SIGNALED THAT HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT 
IMPLEMENTING FUNDAMENTAL, LONG TERM MILITARY REFORMS. 
WHILE CLEARLY RECOGNIZING THE TOUGH CHALLENGES AHEAD 
FOR THE MILITARY, MINISTER SUDARSONO SAID ALL THE RIGHT 
THINGS IN DESCRIBING HIS VISION FOR A MORE PROFESSIONAL 
VALUES-BASED ARMED FORCES.  SUDARSONO EXPRESSED 
CONCERN OVER THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
(COI) THAT WILL INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN 
EAST TIMOR.  NOT ONCE DID HE MENTION HIS PREDECESSOR, 
GENERAL WIRANTO. 
 
3.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED THE U.S. DESIRE TO SUPPORT 
THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF INDONESIA, TO HELP BUILD 
STRONG DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND TO HELP INDONESIA 
DEVELOP AN OPEN, MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY.  HE 
EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF SOLVING THE WEST TIMOR 
REFUGEE PROBLEM ONCE AND FOR ALL SO THE NEW GOVERNMENT 
IN JAKARTA WILL RECEIVE THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IT 
DESERVES.  HE ASKED FOR MINISTER SUDARSONO'S ASSISTANCE IN 
ESTABLISHING FORMAL LIAISON BETWEEN INTERFET AND TNI TO 
ADDRESS BORDER ISSUES AND ASSIST WITH OVERLAND RETURN OF 
REFUGEES.  END SUMMARY. 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 03        JAKART  05612  01 OF 04  101034Z 
 
4.  (C)  ON NOVEMBER 9, THE AMBASSADOR PAID AN 
INTRODUCTORY CALL ON THE NEWLY APPOINTED MINISTER OF 
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, DR. JUWONO SUDARSONO.  ALSO IN 
ATTENDANCE WERE FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR MG ALBERT 
PARUNTU, CHIEF OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FIRST ADMIRAL ZULKIFI 
LUBIS AND MILITARY SECRETARY COLONEL BAMBANG HERU 
SUKMADI.  DATT/ARMA ACCOMPANIED THE AMBASSADOR AS 
NOTETAKER. 
 
GUS DUR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT 
---------------------------------- 
5.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR CONGRATULATED SUDARSONO AS 
INDONESIA'S FIRST CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
IN OVER 40 YEARS AND ANNOUNCED WITH PLEASURE THAT 
PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD MEET WITH PRESIDENT WAHID ON 
FRIDAY IN WASHINGTON DC, DESPITE AN EXTREMELY TIGHT 
SCHEDULE AND ONGOING BUDGET NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE 
WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS.  PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS MADE 
TIME TO SEE PRESIDENT WAHID BECAUSE THE U.S. VIEWS GOOD 
RELATIONS WITH THE NEW INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO BE 
CRITICALLY IMPORTANT, HE SAID. 
 
STRONG COMMITMENT TO MILITARY REFORMS 
------------------------------------- 
6.  (C)  MINISTER SUDARSONO SAID HE IS FULLY COMMITTED TO 
MILITARY REFORMS.  AS THE FIRST CIVILIAN DEFENSE MINISTER 
SINCE 1947, HE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT HE "SYMBOLIZES A 
NEW BEGINNING," MAKING IT THAT MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAT 
HE  "TAKE THE RIGHT STEPS."  HE OUTLINED THE MANY 
CHALLENGES FACING THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING THE 
                       CONFIDENTIAL 
 
PAGE 04        JAKART  05612  01 OF 04  101034Z 
VIABLE INSTITUTIONS IN THE INDONESIAN SOCIETY THAT WILL 
SUPPORT AND SUSTAIN GRADUAL DEMOCRATIZATION AND ENABLE 
THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES TO MOVE AWAY FROM THE 
POLITICAL ROLE TNI HAD PLAYED FOR THE PAST 15 YEARS TO 
BECOME A MORE PROFESSIONAL FORCE.  HE SAID THE CURRENT 
PROBLEMS OF THE MILITARY ARE NOT TOTALLY TNI'S FAULT SINCE 
THE ARMED FORCES WERE MISUSED BY THE CIVILIAN 
GOVERNMENT IN THE PAST.  THE ARMY IS NOW ACCEPTING ITS 
NEW ROLE IN A MORE DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, HE SAID. 
 
7.  (C)  MINISTER SUDARSONO EMPHASIZED THE SEVERE IMPACT OF 
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS THAT CAUSED GDP PER CAPITIA IN 
INDONESIA TO PLUMMET FROM USD 1300 IN EARLY 1997 TO ABOUT 
USD 600 PRESENTLY.  THE LOWER MIDDLE CLASS AND POOR HAVE 
BEEN ESPECIALLY HARD HIT, HE SAID.  THAT IS WHY THERE HAS 
BEEN SO MUCH SOCIAL UNREST AND VIOLENCE IN THE COUNTRY; 
SO MANY PEOPLE HAVE LOST THEIR LIVELIHOOD AND HOPE.  THE 
RESULTANT SECURITY PROBLEMS HAVE MADE TNI'S ROLE MORE 
DIFFICULT AND COMPLICATED INTERNAL MILITARY REFORMS. 
SUDARSONO SAID THE ARMED FORCES FIRST NEED TO DEVELOP 
THE RIGHT DOCTRINE, THEN PROCEED WITH MEASURED STEPS TO 
REFORM THE MILITARY INSTITUTION. 
 
8.  (C)  SUDARSONO EXPRESSED CONCERNS ABOUT "THE 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF GLOBAL MARKET ECONOMICS," 
THAT CAN HAVE A DEVASTATING EFFECT ON CERTAIN PARTS OF 
SOCIETY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES LIKE INDONESIA.  THIS IS 
ESPECIALLY TRUE FOR THOSE WITHOUT THE REQUISITE SKILLS TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, HE SAID. 
 
OUR GOAL IS TO HELP INDONESIA SUCCEED 
------------------------------------- 
9.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR TOLD SUDARSONO THAT PEOPLE HAVE 
HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR THE WAHID GOVERNMENT.  THE 
ELECTIONS WERE A "TRIUMPH FOR DEMOCRACY" AND HE HAD 
PERSONALLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE NEW PRESIDENT'S VISION 
FOR THE COUNTRY.  THE AMBASSADOR CONVEYED THE U.S. DESIRE 
TO SUPPORT THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF INDONESIA, TO HELP 
BUILD STRONG DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND TO HELP 
INDONESIA DEVELOP AN OPEN, MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY.  THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE U.S. IS A STRONG, UNITED 
INDONESIA TO SERVE AS AN ANCHOR OF STABILITY FOR THE 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION.  INSTABILITY IN INDONESIA WOULD 
CAUSE PROBLEMS THROUGHOUT ASIA, HE SAID.  IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH INDONESIA'S WANTS AND DESIRES, THE AMBASSADOR SAID 
THE U.S., AS THE OLDEST DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD, IS PREPARED 
TO OFFER EXPERT ASSISTANCE WITH ISSUES OF DEMOCRATIC 
TRANSITION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION, RESTRUCTURING OF THE 
JUSTICE SECTOR AND ECONOMIC REFORMS, IN ADDITION TO CIVIL- 
MILITARY RELATIONS AND MILITARY REFORMS.  OUR GOAL IS TO 
HELP INDONESIA SUCCEED, HE SAID. 
 
DESIRE FOR IMPROVED BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
10.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO GET 
BACK TO A NORMAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH INDONESIA. HE 
SAID THE U.S. LOOKS FORWARD TO HAVING SUDARSONO VISIT 
WASHINGTON AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO MEET WITH 
SECRETARY COHEN AND PERHAPS SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS; 
CINCPAC ADMIRAL BLAIR ALSO LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING HIM 
AND ADMIRAL WIDODO, HE SAID.  MINISTER SUDARSONO SAID 
THAT BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS CURRENTLY IS THE MOST 
CRUCIAL AREA OF INDONESIA-U.S. RELATIONS.  THE AMBASSADOR 
EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPEDITING WEST TIMOR 
REFUGEE RETURNS AS AN ACTION THAT WOULD HELP OPEN THE 
DOOR TO CLOSER DEFENSE COOPERATION. 
 
GOALS AND VISION FOR MILITARY REFORMS 
------------------------------------- 
11.  (C)  IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUERY ON GOALS 
AND VISION FOR MILITARY REFORMS, MINISTER SUDARSONO SAID 
THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT IS TO REVISE THE LONG-TERM 
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.  AGAIN, SUDARSONO SAID IT IS 
IMPORTANT TO QUICKLY RESTORE BILATERAL MILITARY 
RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY IMET (THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM).  SUDARSONO SAID HE 
WOULD LIKE TO SEND A CORE GROUP OF 15 TO 20 OF TNI'S BEST 
AND BRIGHTEST OFFICERS FROM ALL THREE SERVICES (INCLUDING 
JUNIOR, MID-GRADE AND SENIOR OFFICERS FROM EACH SERVICE) 
TO THE U.S. FOR IMET TRAINING.  THIS "HORIZONTALLY 
INTEGRATED" GROUP OF OFFICERS WOULD BE KEPT TOGETHER FOR 
THE NEXT 10 TO 15 YEARS AND EMPLOYED IN LONG TERM 
PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF MILITARY REFORMS, HE SAID. 
 
12.  (C)  CONTINUING, SUDARSONO SAID THAT INDONESIA MUST 
DEVELOP COLLABORATIVE AND AFFORDABLE MUTUAL SECURITY 
ARRANGEMENTS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS (SPECIFICALLY MENTIONING 
SINGAPORE AND AUSTRALIA).  "OUR BIG PROBLEM IS MONEY," HE 
SAID.  IT WILL BE HARD TO CONVINCE THE NEW LEGISLATURE TO 
GIVE THE DEFENSE MINISTRY MORE MONEY UNDER CURRENT 
CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. 
 
WEST TIMOR REFUGEE RETURNS A TOP PRIORITY 
---------------------------------------- 
13.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR PROVIDED IMPRESSIONS FROM HIS 
RECENT VISIT TO WEST AND EAST TIMOR.  HE HAD BEEN 
IMPRESSED, HE SAID, BY THE SINCERITY OF WEST TIMOR 
GOVERNOR PIET TALLO AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN 
THEIR DESIRE TO RESOLVE THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN WEST TIMOR. 
OFFICIALS IN WEST TIMOR ARE POSITIVELY MOTIVATED AND THE 
U.S. GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE 
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IN WEST TIMOR, AS WELL AS EAST TIMOR, 
HE SAID.  HOWEVER THE REFUGEES MUST BE GIVEN A FREE CHOICE. 
THERE ARE STILL PROBLEMS WITH MILITIA MEMBERS IN THE 
REFUGEE CAMPS PREVENTING THE FREE MOVEMENT OF THOSE 
WHO WISH TO RETURN.  THE MILITIAS ARE UNDERMINING THE 
GOVERNOR'S AUTHORITY, THE AMBASSADOR SAID.  THIS IS A 
PROBLEM BECAUSE EAST TIMOR IS STILL GETTING IN THE WAY OF 
THE STRATEGIC ISSUE - THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S 
ABILITY TO SUPPORT INDONESIA IN THIS NEW MORE DEMOCRATIC 
PHASE OF THE NATION'S HISTORY.  IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE 
REFUGEE ISSUE BE SOLVED ONCE AND FOR ALL TO GAIN THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT IN JAKARTA THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IT 
DESERVES.  MINISTER JUWONO RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THIS 
MESSAGE AND PROMISED TO WORK TOWARD THIS GOAL. 
 
NEED FOR LIAISON BETWEEN TNI AND INTERFET 
----------------------------------------- 
14.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR MINISTER SUDARSONO'S 
ASSISTANCE IN ESTABLISHING FORMAL LIAISON BETWEEN 
INTERFET AND TNI TO ADDRESS BORDER ISSUES AND ASSIST WITH 
OVERLAND RETURN OF REFUGEES.  INTERFET COMMANDER MG 
COSGROVE HAS ACTIVEY SOUGHT, BUT SO FAR HAS BEEN UNABLE 
TO SET UP ANY FORMAL COORDINATION PROCESS ON BORDER 
ISSUES WITH TNI.  SUCH A LIAISON ARRANGEMENT IS CRITICALLY 
IMPORTANT TO LOWER TENSIONS, PROMOTE MUTUAL 
UNDERSTANDING, TO FACILITATE MOVEMENTOF REFUGEES BACK 
ACROSS THE BORDER INTO EAST QIMOR, AND AVOID ANY FURTHER 
UNFORTUNATE BORDEQ INCIDENTS BETWEEN INTERFET AND 
INDONESIAN SECRITY FORCES.  THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS 
SUCHCOOPERATION.  EXISTING "AD HOC" COMMUNICATIONS ARE 
SIMPLY NOT ADEQUATE TO FACILITATE THE FLOW OF PEOPLE AND 
COMMERCE ACROSS THE BORDER.  WITH HEAVY RAINS ALREADY 
STARTED, A BROAD CONFIDENCE BUILDING MECHANISM IS 
URGENTLY NEEDED TO FACILITATE REFUGEE RETURNS, HE SAID. 
 
15.  (C)  IN RESPONSE TO MINISTER SUDARSONO'S SUGGESTION 
THAT THE ISSUE BE TAKEN UP WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THE 
AMBASSADOR EMPHATICALLY REMONSTRATED THAT THE 
PROBLEM IS ON THE GROUND.  IT IS TOTALLY NECESSARY TO HAVE 
PROVISIONS FOR DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN SECURITY 
FORCES TO LOWER TENSIONS AND AVOID FURTHER ACCIDENTS. 
SUDARSONO AGREED THAT A PARALLEL DIPLOMATIC AND 
PRAGMATIC APPROACH IS NEEDED TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM AND 
PROMISED TO HELP. 
 
MILITIA STATUS 
-------------- 
16.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HOPE THAT IN THE FUTURE, 
EAST TIMOR WILL BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A CLOSE AND POSITIVE 
RELATIONSHIP WITH ITS BIG NEIGHBOR, INDONESIA, AND SAID IT IS 
FORTUNATE THAT XANANA GUSMAO IS A MODERATE AND 
REASONABLE PERSON.  MINISTER SUDARSONO AGREED THAT IT 
WAS A GOOD THING THAT XANANA WAS TREATED WELL DURING 
HIS DETENTION IN JAKARTA.  "XANANA STILL HAS MANY FRIENDS 
HERE," HE SAID.  SUDARSONO SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF 
XANANA WOULD SEND MORE SIGNALS OF RECONCILIATION TO 
THOSE PRO-INTEGRATION SUPPORTERS REMAINING IN WEST TIMOR. 
THE GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO ENCOURAGE THOSE MILITIA 
MEMBERS WHO DO NOT WANT TO RETURN TO EAST TIMOR TO 
LEAVE WEST TIMOR AND SETTLE ELSEWHERE IN THE COUNTRY 
WITH GOVERNMENT HELP.  HOWEVER, MANY WOULD LIKE TO 
RETURN IF THEIR SAFETY COULD BE GUARANTEED.  THEY WOULD 
PREFER TO WAIT IN WEST TIMOR AND MANY HAVE REFUSED TO 
LEAVE THE ISLAND, HE SAID. 
 
CONCERN OVER AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
17.  (C)  MINISTER SUDARSONO SAID THAT THE SYMBOLISM OF THE 
HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS IN WEST AND EAST TIMOR MATCHES GUS 
DUR'S RECONCILIATORY PHILOSOPHY AND VISION.  AT THE SAME 
TIME, SUDARSONO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY (COI) THAT WILL 
INVESTIGATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN EAST TIMOR.  THE 
AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT IS FORTUNATE MARZUKI DARUSMAN, 
THE NEW INDONESIAN ATTORNEY GENERAL AND HEAD OF THE 
NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (KOMNAS HAM), HAS 
EXCELLENT CREDIBILITY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. 
A CREDIBLE KOMNAS HAM INVESTIGATION WITH THE FULL 
COOPERATION OF THE INDONESIAN MILITARY WOULD DIMINISH 
THE PRESSURE FOR INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT, HE SAID. 
HOWEVER, THE AMBASSADOR ADDED, THE HEAD OF THE COI, 
SONIA PICADO, A PERSONAL FRIEND AND A TRUE PROFESSIONAL, 
WOULD TAKE A REASONABLE, LOW KEY APPROACH TO THE 
INVESTIGATION WITHOUT RESORTING TO A MEDIA CIRCUS. 
KOMNAS HAM SHOULD WORK QUIETLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
COI AND AVOID PUBLIC CONFRONTATION, HE SAID. 
 
18.  (C)  THE AMBASSADOR MENTIONED SEVERAL ISSUES IN 
CLOSING.  HE SAID AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE PLANS TO VISIT 
JAKARTA ON 19 OR 20 NOVEMBER AND WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE TO 
MEET SUDARSONO AND OTHER KEY MINISTERS.  THE AMBASSADOR 
MENTIONED RECENT DIFFICULTIES IN OBTAINING TNI FLIGHT 
CLEARANCE TO OPERATE THE USDAO C-12 AIRCRAFT IN COUNTRY, 
ASKING FOR THE MINISTER'S ASSISTANCE TO RESOLVE THIS 
PROBLEM AND EMPHASIZING THE NEED FOR EMBASSY MEMBERS 
TO TRAVEL FREELY IN THE COUNTRY.  THE AMBASSADOR 
EXPRESSED THE STRONG DESIRE FOR CONTINUED CLOSE 
COOPERATION ON COUNTER-TERRORISM MATTERS AND OFFERED 
TO SEND AN EMBASSY REPRESENTATIVE TO PROVIDE MINISTER 
SUDARSONO WITH A DETAILED BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT. 
FINALLY, THE AMBASSADOR BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE U.S. 
LEGISLATION ON MILITARY TRANSPARENCY AND PROVIDED 
MINISTER SUDARSONO WITH A MORE DETAILED NON-PAPER ON THE 
ISSUE.  MINISTER SUDARSONO WAS ALREADY GENERALLY 
KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE LEGISLATION. 
 
 
MYERS