Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 99PRETORIA12830, SOUTH AFRICA AND SADC'S SECURITY ORGAN

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #99PRETORIA12830.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
99PRETORIA12830 1999-10-22 13:37 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Pretoria
P 221337Z OCT 99
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8077
INFO SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRETORIA 012830 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/21/99 
TAGS: PREL MASS SF
SUBJECT:  SOUTH AFRICA AND SADC'S SECURITY ORGAN 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY POLCOUNS MDRAGSDALE, REASONS 1.5(B) AND (D). 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY.  SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN 
MINISTERS WILL TAKE PART IN AN OCTOBER 26 - 27 SPECIAL 
MINISTERIAL SESSION IN SWAZILAND ON REFORM OF THE ORGAN ON 
POLITICS, DEFENSE, AND SECURITY (THE ORGAN).  PARTICIPATION 
OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD ADDRESS SAG CONCERN THAT ANY 
DECISIONS MADE ON THE ISSUE HAVE THE BLESSING OF THE SADC 
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.  THE MINISTERIAL FOLLOWS ON THE HEELS 
OF A SUCCESSFUL WORKING SESSION IN PRETORIA THE WEEK OF 
SEPTEMBER 27 - OCTOBER 1 ORGANIZED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN, 
ZIMBABWEAN, AND SWAZI MINISTERS OF DEFENSE.  THE MOST 
SUCCESSFUL ELEMENT OF THE WORKING SESSION WAS ZIMBABWEAN 
COMPREHENSION (FINALLY) OF THE SAG'S POSITION THAT THE 
ORGAN MUST BE INTEGRATED INTO THE OVERALL SADC STRUCTURE. 
STRESSING THAT SADC MEMBERS SOMETIMES VIEW SWAZILAND AS A 
SOUTH AFRICAN "SATELLITE," THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SADC 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS TOLD POLOFF ON OCTOBER 7 THAT ANY 
DECISION ON ORGAN REFORM NEEDED TO APPEAR TO BE A WIDER 
INITIATIVE THAN THAT OF SOUTH AFRICA, ZIMBABWE, AND 
SWAZILAND.  ALTHOUGH THE SAG REMAINS WORRIED THAT ZIMBABWE 
WILL IN THE END BALK AT FULL ORGAN-SADC INTEGRATION, SOUTH 
AFRICA IS NONETHELESS GOING TO SWAZILAND WITH THE HOPE THAT 
THE SPECIAL MINISTERIAL WILL RESULT IN SADC ENDORSEMENT FOR 
ORGAN REFORM.  END SUMMARY. 
 
BACKGROUND ON SADC AND THE SECURITY ORGAN 
========================================= 
 
2.  (C)  BEFORE SADC CAN ADDRESS REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 
IN AN ORGANIZED FASHION, MEMBER STATES MUST FIRST AGREE ON 
SADC'S ROLE WITH REGARD TO POLITICAL, DEFENSE, AND SECURITY 
ISSUES.  FOR THAT TO TAKE PLACE, THE STATUS OF SADC'S 
ORGAN, (AS WELL AS THE INTERSTATE DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
COMMITTEE (ISDSC)) MUST BE CLEARLY DEFINED.  ALTHOUGH 
MEMBER STATES ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF THE ORGAN DURING THE 
SADC HEADS OF STATE SUMMIT IN MASERU IN 1996, THE ORGAN IS 
MAINTAINED SEPARATELY AT THE HEADS OF STATE LEVEL.  ITS 
CHAIR, ZIMBABWEAN PRESIDENT MUGABE, VIEWS THE ORGAN AS A 
PARALLEL AND EQUAL BODY NEITHER DIRECTLY LINKED NOR 
ACCOUNTABLE TO SADC OR THE ISDSC.  HOWEVER, UNLIKE SADC, 
NEITHER THE ORGAN NOR THE ISDSC (WHICH IS CHAIRED BY 
SWAZILAND) POSSESS SECRETARIATS, WHICH HAS LIMITED BOTH 
BODIES' POTENTIAL SCOPE OF ACTION. 
 
3.  (C)  ALTHOUGH THE ORGAN CHAIRMANSHIP IS ONLY A ONE-YEAR 
TERM, SUCCESSION HAS BEEN HELD UP OVER DIFFERENCES ABOUT 
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SADC.  PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF DIFFERENCES 
BETWEEN SADC'S PREVIOUS CHAIR, FORMER SOUTH AFRICAN 
PRESIDENT MANDELA AND MUGABE, DISCUSSION ON THE ORGAN'S 
STRUCTURE HAS BEEN CONTINUALLY SIDELINED.  ALTHOUGH SADC 
TASKED A WORKING GROUP, COMPRISED OF MOZAMBIQUE, MALAWI, 
AND NAMIBIA, IN EARLY 1998 TO STUDY THE ISSUE, NEITHER THE 
ISSUE NOR THE GROUP'S RECOMMENDATION WERE EVEN ADDRESSED AT 
THE 1998 SADC SUMMIT IN MAURITIUS.  HOWEVER, DURING THE 
1999 SUMMIT IN MAPUTO (WHERE SOUTH AFRICA PASSED ON THE 
SADC CHAIRMANSHIP TO MOZAMBIQUE AND THEREBY REMOVED THE 
PERSONAL TENSION BETWEEN MANDELA AND MUGABE FROM THE 
EQUATION), DISCUSSION WAS RE-OPENED AND A COMMITMENT WAS 
MADE TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE, RESULTING IN THIS RECENT ROUND 
OF SOUTH AFRICAN, ZIMBABWEAN, AND SWAZI MEETINGS. 
 
FROM MINISTERS TO WORKING GROUP 
=============================== 
 
4.  (C)  IN AN OCTOBER 7 MEETING, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS' (DFA) DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SADC POLITICAL AFFAIRS 
HORST BRAMMER TOLD POLOFF THAT HE HAD BEEN UNEXPECTEDLY (HE 
WAS SCHEDULED FOR ANNUAL LEAVE) DRAFTED THE WEEK OF 
SEPTEMBER 27 - OCTOBER 1 TO MEET WITH ZIMBABWEAN AND SWAZI 
COUNTERPARTS ON THE ISSUE OF REFORM OF THE ORGAN FOR 
POLITICS, DEFENSE, AND SECURITY.  THE WEEK-LONG 
"BRAINSTORMING" SESSION CONSISTED OF 2-PERSON DELEGATIONS 
(ONE FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL AND ONE DEFENSE MINISTRY 
OFFICIAL) FROM EACH OF THE THREE COUNTRIES.  ACCORDING TO 
BRAMMER, THIS UNEXPECTED WORKING SESSION CAME ABOUT AS A 
DIRECT RESULT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN, ZIMBABWEAN, AND SWAZI 
DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETINGS IN PRETORIA THE WEEK BEFORE 
(THE WEEK OF SEPTEMBER 21).  ALTHOUGH BRAMMER WELCOMED THE 
INITIATIVE AND NOTED THAT INITIAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN 
REACHED ON NEXT STEPS, HE NONETHELESS WORRIED THAT THE 
DEFENSE MINISTERS WERE CIRCUMVENTING THE SADC STRUCTURE IN 
THEIR QUEST FOR RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE. 
 
5.  (C)  AS BRAMMER EXPLAINED, PERMITTING MINISTERS OF 
DEFENSE TO DECIDE ON SADC ISSUES WITHOUT FIRST COORDINATING 
WITH THE SADC COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CREATED A "PROBLEM OF 
PRINCIPLES."  CITING THE EXAMPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO AND ZIMBABWEAN, ANGOLAN, AND 
NAMIBIAN INTERVENTION IN THE DROC (NOMINALLY IN SADC'S 
NAME), BRAMMMER STRESSED THAT ALLOWING THE MINISTERS OF 
DEFENSE TO "SOLVE" THE ORGAN PROBLEM ADDED TO THE OVERALL 
WEAKENING OF SADC LEGITIMACY.  THEREFORE, BRAMMER 
EMPHASIZED THAT THE SAG WOULD INSIST THAT ANY FOLLOW-ON 
MEETINGS BE INCLUSIVE AND ANY MINISTERIALS ADDRESSING THE 
ISSUE INCLUDE FOREIGN MINISTERS.  (COMMENT.  IN AN OCTOBER 
21 CONVERSATION, BRAMMER APPEARED SATISFIED THAT THE 
OCTOBER 26 - 27 MINISTERIAL WILL MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
 
ZIMBABWE SEES THE LIGHT 
======================= 
 
6.  (C)  WITH GREAT RELIEF, BRAMMER NOTED THAT HARARE HAS 
FINALLY BEGUN TO "UNDERSTAND" THE SOUTH AFRICA POSITION ON 
THE ORGAN ISSUE.  LAMENTING THE FACT THAT ZIMBABWE HAD 
PERMITTED THE ORGAN ISSUE TO BECOME A PERSONAL ONE (ON THE 
SIDE OF PRESIDENT MUGABE), BRAMMER STRESSED THAT THE SAG 
HAS FINALLY BEEN ABLE TO CONVINCE AT LEAST THE ZIMBABWEAN 
DEFENSE MINISTER THAT SOUTH AFRICA DID NOT WANT TO TAKE 
OVER THE ORGAN, ONLY ENSURE ITS INTEGRATION INTO THE 
OVERALL SADC STRUCTURE.  ACCORDING TO BRAMMER, THE 
ZIMBABWEANS NOW HAVE A CLEARER IDEA AS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF 
ORGAN INTEGRATION.  RECALLING THAT THE SAG HAD USED THREE 
KEY POINTS TO CONVINCE THE ZIMBABWEANS OF THIS, BRAMMER 
INDICATED THAT THE ZIMBABWEANS FOUND THE KEY POINT OF 
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION THE MOST COMPELLING (COMMENT. 
THE SAG HAS STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT THE ORGAN MUST BE PART 
OF SADC OR ELSE IT WOULD NOT QUALIFY AS AN ACTOR IN 
INTERNATIONAL MANDATES, SUCH AS UN CHAPTER 6 0R 7 ACTION. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
7.  (C)  BRAMMER ADDED THAT ONE OF THE SAG'S OTHER TWO 
POINTS HAD BEEN THAT SOUTHERN AFRICAN POLITICAL ISSUES ARE 
INTRICATELY TIED TO SADC ECONOMIC ONES (I.E., RESOURCE 
CONFLICT CAUSES POLITICAL INSTABILITY), SO THE ORGAN SHOULD 
BE TIED TO SADC FORMALLY.  LASTLY, THE SAG HAD FOCUSED 
ATTENTION ON ZIMBABWE'S POCKETS, NOTING THAT THE COST OF 
REPLICATING INSTITUTIONS (I.E., A SECRETARIAT FOR BOTH THE 
ORGAN AND SADC) WOULD BE A WASTE OF ALREADY SCARCE 
MONTETARY RESOURCES.  IN THE END, ACCORDING TO BRAMMER, THE 
ZIMBABWEANS AT THE WEEK-LONG CONFERENCE (AND IMPLICITELY 
THE ZIMBABWEAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE) ACCEPTED ALL THREE 
ARGUMENTS, WHICH SOMEWHAT SURPRISED, BUT CERTAINLY PLEASED, 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION. 
 
BUT WILL ZIMBABWE PLAY BALL? 
============================ 
 
8.  (C)  ON THE OTHER HAND, BRAMMER TOLD POLOFF THAT EVEN 
DAYS AFTER THIS SUCCESSFUL WORKING COMMITTEE MEETING, 
REPORTS FROM HARARE INDICATED THAT MUGABE WAS BALKING AT 
LENDING FURTHER SUPPORT TO THE DEFENSE MINISTERS' SCHEME. 
EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER ZIMBABWE'S COMMITMENT TO REFORM, 
BRAMMER COMPLAINED THAT NOT ONLY ZIMBABWE, BUT INCREASINGLY 
NAMIBIA TOO CONTINUED TO TRY TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR 
INDEPENDENCE FROM SOUTH AFRICA.  (COMMENT.  BRAMMER 
ACCOUNTED FOR NAMIBIA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE ZIMBABWE- 
ANGOLA-NAMIBIA DEFENSE PACT AS JUST THAT - WINDHOEK'S SHOW 
OF INDEPENDENCE.  DFA SENTIMENT IS THAT NAMIBIA HAS THE 
RIGHT IDEA, BUT SEEMS TO ALWAYS DEMONSTRATE IT THE WRONG 
WAY.  END COMMENT.)  ACCORDING TO BRAMMER, ZIMBABWE WILL 
CONTINUE TO APPROACH THE ISSUE THROUGH BILATERAL DIALOGUE 
(I.E., LEADER TO LEADER), UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED, AND 
ONLY THEN COMMIT TO LARGER INITIATIVES (I.E., SADC REFORM 
OF THE ORGAN).  BRAMMER STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE 
MAJORITY OF SADC STATES SUPPORT THE ORGAN'S INTEGRATION 
INTO SADC (FOR WHICH THE SAG IS KEENLY LOBBYING), IN THE 
END, ZIMBABWE WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO AGREE 
 
COMMENT 
======= 
 
9.  (C)  FOREIGN MINISTER ZUMA WILL ARRIVE IN SWAZILAND 
WELL-BRIEFED ON THE ORGAN ISSUE (DFA OFFICIALS BRIEFED HER 
OVER A THREE-DAY PERIOD IN CAPE TOWN EARLIER THIS WEEK). 
THE SAG, AWARE THAT MUCH OF MUGABE'S APPARENT COOPERATION 
ON THE ISSUE IS DUE TO HIS CURRENT "RAPPROCHEMENT" WITH 
MBEKI, WILL TRY TO CAPITALIZE ON IT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, 
AND TRY FOR CONCRETE COMMITMENTS AT THE MINISTERIAL.  AT 
THE SAME TIME, THE SAG WILL SEEK TO ENSURE AT THE 
MINISTERIAL THAT ORGAN REFORM BECOMES AN INCLUSIVE PROJECT 
AND NOT A DEAL STRUCK BY A FEW IN THE BACK ROOM FOR MANY. 
END COMMENT. 
 
JOSEPH