Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 98RIYADH4048, SAUDI ARABIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #98RIYADH4048.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
98RIYADH4048 1998-12-02 14:22 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Riyadh
R 021422Z DEC 98
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5917
INFO GCC COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 004048 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT FOR REAP 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PTER SA
SUBJECT:  SAUDI ARABIA:  1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF:  (A) STATE 202128;  (B) CAIRO 03962 
 
1.   THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS 
SET FORTH IN REFTEL. 
 
A.   DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH COUNTRY 
TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1998, INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTION RELATING TO TERRORISM.  PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE 
GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM 
AGAINST OR AFFECTING U. S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG IS CONTINUING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR 
TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 WHICH KILLED 19 U. S. MILITARY 
PERSONNEL.  ALTHOUGH THE SAG REPORTEDLY HAS DETAINED AND 
INTERROGATED SAUDI CITIZENS IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING, IT HAS 
NOT YET BEGUN PROSECUTION OR TAKEN ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION 
REGARDING ANY SUCH PERSONS.  THERE WERE NO OTHER KNOWN TERRORIST 
CASES OR ACTIONS THAT CAME BEFORE THE JUDICIARY IN 1998. 
 
B.   DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION 
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR? 
PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO 
U. S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG REQUESTED THAT CANADA DEPORT SAUDI CITIZEN HANI 
AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1997.  CANADIAN OFFICIALS DETAINED AL- 
SAYEGH IN MARCH 1997 ON CHARGES OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUNE 
1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK.  CANADA DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO THE 
UNITED STATES AFTER DOCUMENTS LINKING HIM TO SAUDI HIZBALLAH WERE 
PRESENTED TO THE COURT.  THE SAG THEN REQUESTED THAT THE USG DEPORT 
AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA TO QUESTION AND PERHAPS PROSECUTE HIM FOR 
HIS ALLEGED ROLE IN THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING.  THE EXTRADITION 
CASE IS STILL PENDING FINAL DECISION WITH THE IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS).  THERE HAVE BEEN MEDIA REPORTS THAT 
THE SAG HAS REQUESTED THAT THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN 
EXTRADITE SAUDI-BORN TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER USAMA BIN 
LADIN.  BIN LADIN, WHO WAS STRIPPED OF HIS SAUDI CITIZENSHIP IN 
1994, WAS INDICTED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1998 BY A U. S. FEDERAL GRAND 
JURY IN NEW YORK, WHICH ALLEGED THAT HE AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN AN 
INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY TO ATTACK U. S. FACILITIES AND TO KILL 
U. S. CITIZENS INCLUDING IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, 
TANZANIA ON AUGUST 7, 1998. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS THAT SAUDI 
AUTHORITIES REQUESTED JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES TO EXTRADITE MUHAMMAD 
AL-MAQDISI, WHO IS SERVING A 15 YEAR SENTENCE IN JORDAN AND HAS 
BEEN LINKED TO THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF USAMA BIN LADIN. 
 
C.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT 
PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. 
 
RESPONSE:  NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S 
PROSECUTION OF PERSONS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS 
WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA.  HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS NOT ENTERED INTO 
EXTRADITION TREATIES WITH MOST OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE 
UNITED STATES.  (NOTE:  EXTRADITION TREATIES EXIST WITH YEMEN AND 
EGYPT AND THE ARAB LEAGUE ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT (REFTEL B) HAS 
EXTRADITION ARTICLES.) 
 
D.   DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION. 
THIS WOULD INCLUDE, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A 
TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST 
GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, 
MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ISLAMIC ULAMA, AND 
OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM IN 
UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY MAKING ATTEMPTS TO ERADICATE 
IDEOLOGICAL/RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM.  THE CROWN 
PRINCE IN HIS OCTOBER WORLD TOUR MADE A POINT TO CONDEMN TERRORISM 
IN ALL ITS FORMS AND TO DENY THAT TERRORISM HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH 
ISLAM.  THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING 
AND HAS SHOWN INCREASED COOPERATION IN ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE USG IN 
ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING. 
 
E.   DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1998 BY 
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE:  INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR 
TOWERS BOMBING.  IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO 
STRENGTHEN SECURITY PROTECTION OF U. S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC 
PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE AUGUST BOMBINGS OF U. S. 
EMBASSIES IN EAST AFRICA AND A THREAT AGAINST U. S. FACILITIES IN 
OCTOBER.  INTERNATIONALLY, AT THE TUNIS MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF 
ARAB LEAGUE INTERIOR MINISTERS IN JANUARY, THE SAG JOINED IN THE 
UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF AN ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION ACCORD WHICH 
HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR FOUR YEARS.  THE ACCORD AIMS TO 
ENHANCE INTER-ARAB COOPERATION REGARDING EXTRADITION OF CONVICTED 
TERRORISTS, IMPROVE INFORMATION EXCHANGES ABOUT TERRORISTS' 
WHEREABOUTS, FINANCES AND SUPPORT NETWORKS, AND STRENGTHEN CONTROLS 
ON TRAVEL AND INFILTRATION OF TERROR SUSPECTS THROUGH ARAB 
COUNTRIES.  THE ACCORD (SEE REFTEL B), SIGNED IN CAIRO ON APRIL 22, 
CONTAINS A PLEDGE NOT TO ORDER, FINANCE, OR COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS, 
TO PREVENT TERRORIST CRIMES AND TO FIGHT AGAINST THEM.  THIS 
AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN RIYADH ON 
SEPTEMBER 28.  AT THE 66TH SESSION OF THE GCC MINISTERIAL COUNCIL 
HELD IN RIYADH IN MARCH, THE GCC MINISTERS REJECTED "ALL FORMS OF 
VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM WHEREVER THEY COME FROM."  AT A DOHA MEETING 
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) MINISTERS, ALSO 
IN MARCH,  THE MEMBERS URGED ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO CONDEMN TERRORISM 
IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS, NOT TO PROVIDE SANCTUARY FOR TERRORISTS, AND 
TO HELP BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE.  THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR 
CALLED ON MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND U. N. MEMBER STATES TO REACH AN 
ANTI-TERRORISM ACCORD SIMILAR TO THE ONE SIGNED BY ARAB LEAGUE 
NATIONS IN APRIL.  FINALLY, AT THE UNGA 53RD SESSION IN SEPTEMBER, 
THE SAUDI ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER REJECTED ANY LINK BETWEEN THE 
RELIGION OF ISLAM AND TERRORISM, AND STATED THAT "THE KINGDOM 
REJECTS VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN ANY FORM OR SHAPE."  HE CALLED 
FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS THROUGH THE U. N. TO BRING ABOUT THE 
TERMINATION OF TERRORISM AND CALLED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
TO FIGHT THE SHELTERING OF TERRORISTS. 
 
F.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING 
(BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS 
OR THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC 
RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC 
PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR 
PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR 
TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON 
TERRORISM ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG DOES NOT FINANCIALLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES.  ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE 
THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES 
OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR 
DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT 
THIS IS ENFORCED CONSISTENTLY.  NONETHELESS, THERE CONTINUE TO BE 
ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT PRIVATE FUNDS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
THE SAG CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM.  HOWEVER, SHEIKH AHMAD 
YASIN, THE FOUNDER OF HAMAS, VISITED SAUDI ARABIA FOR HAJJ AND 
MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND MET CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH IN APRIL. 
 
G.   HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT 
OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE?  (THE SEVEN 
GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND 
SUDAN.) 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG DID NOT MAKE ANY OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS 
SUPPORTING ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST 
REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE.  HOWEVER, THE SAG ALLOWED A LIBYAN 
AIRCRAFT CARRYING 105 HAJJ PILGRIMS TO LAND AT JEDDAH'S 
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON MARCH 29 AND TO DEPART THE SAME DAY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UNSC SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON LIBYA. 
 
H.   DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1997, POSITIVE OR 
NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, 
INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC.  WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE? 
 
RESPONSE:  THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBING OF U. S. EMBASSIES IN DAR ES 
SALAAM AND NAIROBI FURTHER HEIGHTENED AWARENESS AND CONCERN ABOUT 
ATTEMPTS THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN SAUDI ARABIA, FOLLOWING THE 1995 AND 
1996 ATTACKS AGAINST U. S. TARGETS.  ALL OF THESE ATTACKS MET WITH 
OFFICIAL CONDEMNATION, AND HAVE SPURRED GREATER COOPERATION AMONG 
SAUDI SECURITY ORGANS IN ADDRESSING INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES.  THE 
SAG HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INTENSIFIED ITS DIALOGUE WITH GCC AND OTHER 
ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES ON COMBATING TERRORISM.  THE SAUDI ANTI- 
TERRORISM STANCE WAS GIVEN A WORLD-WIDE STAGE DURING THE CROWN 
PRINCE'S MONTH-LONG VISIT TO EUROPE, THE U. S., AND ASIA.  THE 
SAUDI GOVERNMENT REMAINS CONCERNED WITH A CONTINUED TERRORIST 
PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY THOSE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF 
USAMA BIN LADIN, A TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER OF SAUDI 
ORIGIN, AND DOWNGRADED ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT 
IN SEPTEMBER.  BIN LADIN WAS INDICTED IN NEW YORK IN NOVEMBER FOR 
PROMOTING TERRORISM. 
 
I.  DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH 
RESPECT TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, 
SPECIFIC U.S. REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR COOPERATION AND 
EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TERRORIST GROUPS 
DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES.  DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF 
THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES, 
INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE 
SPECIFIC REQUESTS. 
 
RESPONSE:  BEGINNING WITH THE 1996 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA OF A USG 
INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM FOLLOWING THE 1995 OPM/SANG 
BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG ENTERED INTO UNPRECEDENTED, 
COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY ISSUES WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE 
PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES.  THIS INTEREST AND 
PARTICIPATION HAS CONTINUED AND SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THROUGHOUT 
1998.  THE USG AND SAG EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS IN THE 
REGION.  CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM AND 
SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO OCCURRED.  FOLLOWING 
THE 1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG FURTHER 
INCREASED COOPERATION.  FBI DIRECTOR LOUIS FREEH VISITED SAUDI 
ARABIA TWICE IN 1996 TO COORDINATE INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH SAUDI 
INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE NAIF.  THE FBI MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY 
STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICE IN THE U. S. EMBASSY.  WHILE 
COOPERATION THROUGHOUT 1998 ON THE KHOBAR TOWERS INVESTIGATION WAS 
STRONG, FOLLOWING THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS IN AUGUST IT WAS 
INCREASED FURTHER. 
 
J.   IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING 
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN 
ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR 
INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON: 
 
     (I)  THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN APPREHENDING, 
CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THE ACT; AND 
 
     (II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED 
STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE:  (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH 
THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS 
BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS.  IN THIS REGARD, ON APRIL 
22, 1996 FOUR SAUDI NATIONALS PUBLICLY CONFESSED TO COMMITTING THE 
OPM/SANG BOMBING OF NOVEMBER 1995 AND THEY WERE EXECUTED ON MAY 31. 
THE SAG HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USG, ALTHOUGH EARLIER STAGES OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP DID NOT ALWAYS MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF USG OFFICIALS. 
SAUDI OFFICIALS AND THE FBI HAVE WORKED CLOSELY ON MANY 
INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND CONTINUE TO 
CONSULT CLOSELY ON THE STATUS OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING 
INVESTIGATION. 
 
          (II) THE SAG HAS DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE 
OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, AND EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS.  IT MADE 
AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE AT AL 
KHARJ, WHERE MOST U. S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, 
AND A VERY LARGE RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, 
SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL.  THE SAG 
SPENT MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
IMPROVEMENTS.  THE SAG ALSO WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL 
TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI 
ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U. S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES 
GENERAL IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN.  USG AND SAG OFFICIALS FROM THE 
HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY 
OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA. 
 
K.   IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING 
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U. S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE 
DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS 
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. 
 
RESPONSE:  THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON THREATS 
DIRECTED AT U. S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO LIAISE 
CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST 
AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM.  THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO THE RAPID 
DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT OF 
PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE 
DETERRENTS. 
 
FOWLER