O P 220151Z AUG 98
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 154474 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/02 
TAGS: PREL NAM IZ
SUBJECT: NAM:  FOCUSING ON IRAQ 
 
REF: SECSTATE 145790 
 
(U)  CLASSIFIED BY NEA A/S MARTIN S. INDYK.  REASON: 1.5 (B) 
 
¶1.  (C) IT IS LIKELY THAT IRAQ HAS SENT MESSAGES TO ARAB 
CAPITALS IN RECENT DAYS TO ARGUE THAT SANCTIONS SHOULD BE 
LIFTED BECAUSE IT HAS ALLEGEDLY FULFILLED ITS COMMITMENTS 
UNDER UNSC RESOLUTIONS AND DESTROYED PROHIBITED WEAPONS. 
TARIQ AZIZ MADE THIS ARGUMENT TO UNSCOM CHAIRMAN BUTLER ON 
AUGUST 3/4 IN BAGHDAD AND AGAIN ON AUGUST 5 IN A LETTER TO 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE COUNCIL ISSUED 
A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, DECLARING THAT IRAQ'S ACTION TO 
SUSPEND COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM CONTRAVENED RELEVANT 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS AND THE FEBRUARY 23 MOU. IN 
THE BI-MONTHLY SANCTIONS REVIEW AUGUST 20, THE COUNCIL 
REITERATED THAT IRAQ'S DECISION TO SUSPEND COOPERATION WITH 
UNSCOM AND THE IAEA WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. WE SUSPECT 
THAT IRAQ WILL SEEK TO GAIN ARAB SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION 
PRIOR TO THE NAM MEETING IN DURBAN AUGUST 29. 
 
¶2. (C)   EMBASSIES KUWAIT, RIYADH, MANAMA AND CAIRO SHOULD 
DELIVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO HOST GOVERNMENTS AS SOON AS 
POSSIBLE.  THESE POINTS SUPPLEMENT PREVIOUS DEMARCHES ON 
THE SAME SUBJECT. WE BELIEVE ADDRESSEE COUNTRIES CAN PLAY 
AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENSURING THAT THE NAM AVOIDS ENDORSING 
IRAQ'S CURRENT CHALLENGE TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND 
AVOIDS ANY INDICATION THAT THE NON-ALIGNED ARE ACTING IN A 
MANNER DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. 
 
BEGIN POINTS: 
 
¶3. (C)   IRAQ SHOULD NOT WIN AT THE NAM WHAT IT HAS BEEN 
UNABLE TO WIN AT THE UN: AN ENDORSEMENT OF ITS CLAIM THAT 
IT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTIONS.   IRAQ IS NOT IN 
COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL HAVE STATED PUBLICLY THAT 
IN REFUSING TO COOPERATE FURTHER WITH UNSCOM IRAQ HAS 
VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THE MOU WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL 
AND CONTRAVENED THE RESOLUTIONS. MOST RECENTLY, ON AUGUST 
20, THE COUNCIL MET FOR THE 39TH TIME TO REVIEW IRAQ'S 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS AND DETERMINED QUICKLY THAT 
CONDITIONS DO NOT EXIST FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE 
(SANCTIONS) REGIME. MOREOVER, THE COUNCIL "REITERATED THAT 
THE DECISION BY IRAQ TO SUSPEND COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND 
THE IAEA IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE. THEY VIEW WITH EXTREME 
CONCERN THE CONTINUING REFUSAL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO 
RESCIND ITS DECISION (TO COOPERATE)." 
 
¶4. (U)   IT IS TRUE THAT IRAQ HAS CARRIED OUT SOME 
OBLIGATIONS, AT LEAST PARTIALLY. IT NOT CARRIED OUT 
-OTHERS. THE FOLLOWING IS A SHORT GLOBAL SUMMARY: 
 
OBLIGATION (PER UNSCRS 687, 70V, 715) -- DONE? 
 
FORMAL LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF KUWAIT -- YES 
DOMESTIC LAWS ENFORCING THESE OBLIGATIONS -- NO 
FULLY DECLARE WEAPONS PROGRAMS: 
- NUCLEAR -- NO 
- MISSILES -- NO 
- CHEMICAL -- NO 
- BIOLOGICAL -- NO 
ALLOW UNCONDITIONAL INSPECTION ACCESS -- NO 
CEASE ANY ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL/MOVE/DESTROY -- NO 
ALLOW UNSCOM AIRCRAFT FLIGHTS W/NO INTERFERENCE -- NO 
RETURN ALL KUWAITI PROPERTY SEIZED BY IRAQ -- NO 
FACILITATE ICRC SEARCH FOR UNACCOUNTED KUWAITIS -- NO 
END SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM -- NO 
 
¶5.  (U) THESE OBLIGATIONS ARE NOT DIFFICULT. THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL CLEARLY ENVISIONED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S GOVERNMENT 
COULD IMPLEMENT THEM IN JUST A FEW MONTHS.  HE STILL CAN. 
HE JUST HASN'T DONE IT. IF THERE IS ANY SUBJECT IN ITS 
ENTIRE HISTORY THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS REVIEWED 
THOROUGHLY, REPEATEDLY, AND IN DIRECT DIALOGUE WITH THE 
GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ,  IT IS IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION. THE COUNCIL HAS CONDUCTED A REVIEW OF IRAQ 
SANCTIONS EVERY 60 DAYS SINCE 1991, EXCEPT FOR A PERIOD 
WHEN IRAQ'S CEASEFIRE BREACHES LED TO SUSPENSION. THE 
COUNCIL HAS RECEIVED DETAILED WRITTEN UNSCOM & IAEA 
PROGRESS REPORTS AND VERBAL BRIEFINGS AT LEAST EVERY 6 
MONTHS SINCE 1991.   ON FEBRUARY 23, 1998, THE SYG SIGNED 
THE ANNAN-AZIZ MOU,  IN WHICH "THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ 
FURTHER REITERATES ITS UNDERTAKING TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH 
UNSCOM AND THE IAEA."  UNSCOM PRESENTED IRAQ WITH A WORK 
PLAN TO MAKE PROGRESS IN JUNE AND IN AUGUST, CHAIRMAN 
BUTLER CARRIED WITH HIM AN ACCELERATED WORKPLAN. IRAQ'S 
RESPONSE WAS TO SUSPEND COOPERATION AND TRY TO ACHIEVE 
THROUGH DECLARATION WHAT IT HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVE IN FACT: 
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS OBLIGATIONS. 
 
¶6.  (U) CHEMICAL WEAPONS:    DESPITE MAJOR PROGRESS REPORTED 
BY UNSCOM IN ACCOUNTING FOR SCUD MISSILE CHEMICAL WARHEADS, 
THE IRAQIS HAVE TAKEN A GIANT STEP BACKWARD BY CONTINUING 
TO DENY THE WEAPONIZATION OF VX NERVE AGENT. UNSCOM AND 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS ARE UNANIMOUSLY CONFIDENT OF THE 
SCIENTIFIC ACCURACY OF LABORATORY RESULTS FINDING 
PERSISTENT VX IN FRAGMENTS OF IRAQI SCUD MISSILE WARHEADS. 
MOREOVER, ON JULY 22, 1998, UNSCOM REPORTED IN A LETTER TO 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT IRAQ HAD REFUSED 
TO ALLOW AN UNSCOM CHIEF INSPECTOR TO TAKE, OR EVEN COPY, A 
DOCUMENT FOUND IN IRAQI AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS THAT GAVE AN 
ACCOUNTING OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS USED DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ 
WAR. THIS DOCUMENT WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE IN HELPING 
UNSCOM ESTABLISH A TRUE MATERIAL BALANCE  (THAT IS, KNOWN 
IMPORTS/PRODUCTION MINUS KNOWN USE EQUALS WHAT UNSCOM NEEDS 
TO DESTROY) FOR IRAQI CHEMICAL MUNITIONS--A MANDATORY TASK 
FOR UNSCOM. THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TOLD 
AMBASSADOR BUTLER THAT "IRAQ. WOULD NEVER GIVE IT TO THE 
COMMISION." 
 
¶7.    (U) BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:  IN JULY 1998 UNSCOM ASSEMBLED 
YET ANOTHER GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS TO MEET WITH 
IRAQI COUNTERPARTS FOR REVIEW OF IRAQI DECLARATIONS ON THE 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM. AGAIN, THE IRAQIS PRESENTED NO 
NEW MATERIAL.  THE EXPERTS THUS FOUND, AGAIN, THAT IRAQ'S 
DECLARATIONS ARE NOT ADEQUATE FOR CREDIBLE VERIFICATION. 
THIS CONCLUSION COVERED WEAPONS (SCUD MISSILE BW WARHEADS, 
R-400 BW BOMBS, DROP-TANKS TO BE FILLED WITH BW, AND SPRAY 
DEVICES FOR BW), PLUS PRODUCTION OF BW AGENTS (BOTULINUM 
TOXIN, ANTHRAX, AFLATOXIN, AND WHEAT COVER SMUT), AS WELL 
AS BW AGENT GROWTH MEDIA. 
 
¶8. (U) LONG RANGE MISSILES: UNSCOM EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN 
RICHARD BUTLER REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON AUGUST 5 
THAT UNSCOM AND IRAQ HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE 
ACCOUNTING OF BOTH CBW AND CONVENTIONAL SCUD MISSILE 
WARHEADS, AS WELL AS THE MATERIAL BALANCE OF MAJOR 
COMPONENTS FOR SCUD ENGINE PRODUCTION. HOWEVER, NO 
PROGRESS WAS REPORTED IN ACCOUNTING FOR THE UNIQUE SCUD 
PROPELLANT POSSESSED BY IRAQ, AND THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME 
MINISTER REFUSES TO ALLOW FURTHER DISCUSSION OF IRAQ'S 
CONCEALMENT PROGRAM, INCLUDING THE HIDING OF SCUD WARHEADS. 
 
¶9.    (U) NUCLEAR: ON MAY 14, THE COUNCIL STATED IT WOULD BE 
PREPARED TO TRANSITION THE NUCLEAR FILE TO LONG TERM 
MONITORING, ONCE THE IAEA WAS SATISFIED THAT IRAQ HAD 
ANSWERED OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS APPROPRIATELY. IN THE IAEA'S 
"INTERIM REPORT" TO THE UNSC ON JULY 29, THE IAEA REPORTED 
THAT IRAQ HAD PROVIDED NO NEW INFORMATION AND THAT IT HAD 
MADE NO PROGRESS.   IRAQ HAD EVEN FAILED TO TAKE SUCH EASY 
MEASURES AS PASSING LEGISLATION PROHIBITING ACTIVITY 
CONTRARY TO UNSCR 687. ON AUGUST 11,  1998,  IAEA DIRECTOR- 
GENERAL ELBARADEL WROTE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL THAT IRAQ'S AUGUST 5 DECISION TO SUSPEND ITS 
COOPERATION WITH UNSCOM AND THE IAEA "MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE 
FOR THE ....... TO INVESTIGATE. REMAINING QUESTIONS AND 
CONCERNS...," AND THAT IRAQ'S DECISION WILL ALLOW ONLY 
"LIMITED IMPLEMENTATION" OF MONITORING THAT WILL "FALL FAR 
SHORT OF FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OMV PLAN AND RESULT IN 
A SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED LEVEL OF ASSURANCE" THAT IRAQ IS 
NOT RENEWING ITS PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. 
UNTIL IRAQ RESUMES COOPERATION AND SATISFIES THE IAEA'S 
REQUESTS, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS TRANSITIONING 
THAT FILE. 
 
¶10. (U) UNSCOM: UNSCOM IS AN INDEPENDENT UN AGENCY, 
CREATED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.   IT REPORTS REGULARLY TO 
THE COUNCIL, AND HAS THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL. 
UNSCOM HAS HAD TWO EXECUTIVE CHAIRMEN: SWEDISH AMBASSADOR 
ROLF EKEUS AND AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR RICHARD BUTLER. THEY 
WERE STRONG, INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMATS BEFORE 
COMING TO UNSCOM, AND THEY'VE BEEN STRONG, INDEPENDENT 
LEADERS AT UNSCOM. ON AUGUST 5,   IRAQ INFORMED UNSCOM 
CHAIRMAN BUTLER THAT IT WAS CEASING COOPERATION WITH 
UNSCOM'S DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES.  THE COUNCIL REACTED, 
CALLING THIS STEP TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE.   ON AUGUST 12, 
UNSCOM EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN BUTLER WROTE TO THE PRESIDENT OF 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL THAT "IRAQ'S ACTIONS BRING TO A HALT 
ALL OF THE DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION AND 
PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHTS OF THE COMMISSION TO 
CONDUCT ITS MONITORING OPERATIONS." ON AUGUST 18, THE 
COUNCIL PRESIDENT REPLIED ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL, 
REITERATING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE COUNCIL FOR IAEA AND 
UNSCOM TO FULLY IMPLEMENT THEIR MANDATES AND NOTING THAT 
IRAQ IS OBLIGED TO COOPERATE WITH THEM IN THEIR ACTIVITIES, 
INCLUDING INSPECTIONS. CHAIRMAN BUTLER WROTE TO IRAQI 
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AUGUST 19, AGAIN EXPRESSING A 
WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE COOPERATION, BUT THAT APPROACH WAS 
DECISIVELY REBUFFED BY THE IRAQIS. THE COUNCIL WILL 
CONTINUE TO ADDRESS IRAQ'S UNILATERAL DECISION NOT TO 
COOPERATE WITH UNSCOM AND THE IAEA. 
 
¶11. (U) IN SHORT, IRAQ HAS REFUSED TO COOPERATE FURTHER 
WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL OR ITS INSTRUMENTS. IN THIS 
SITUATION, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE NAM AVOID ANY STEP THAT 
WOULD INDICATE DAYLIGHT BETWEEN THE POSITION OF THE UN AND 
ITSELF. 
 
¶12. (U) ADDITIONAL POINTS FOR KUWAIT ONLY: 
 
WE APPRECIATE YOUR CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS TO FIGHT THESE 
IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO CIRCUMVENT THE UNSC BOTH IN CARTAGENA AND 
IN THE LEAD-UP TO THE DURBAN NAM.  YOUR PERIODIC UPDATES TO 
OUR AMBASSADOR AND DAS NEUMANN CONCERNING THE PROGRESS OF 
YOUR EFFORTS HAVE HELPED US CONSIDERABLY IN DETERMINIG OUR 
NAM STRATEGY. 
 
WE WILL BE WORKING ON THIS ISSUE ON THE MARGINS OF THE 
CONFERENCE ITSELF, AND WILL LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM 
YOUR DELEGATION THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS. 
 
WE WILL BE USING THE PRECEDING POINTS WITH THE EGYPTIANS, 
BAHRAINIS AND SAUDIS. YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW FROM IT IN YOUR 
DISCUSSIONS WITH NAM PARTICIPANTS, AS WELL. 
 
END POINTS 
 
 
ALBRIGHT