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Viewing cable 98ISLAMABAD3474, FOREIGN SECRETARY RAPS USG KNUCKLES ON "ONE-SIDEDNESS" OF

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
98ISLAMABAD3474 1998-05-11 10:17 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Islamabad
O 111017Z MAY 98
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6394
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL KARACHI 
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA J5//
AMCONSUL LAHORE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 003474 
 
 
DEPT ALSO FOR SA/PAB AND S/CT 
LONDON FOR POL:TUELLER 
CENTCOM/CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  5/10/08 
TAGS: PREL PTER AF PK
SUBJECT:  FOREIGN SECRETARY RAPS USG KNUCKLES ON "ONE-SIDEDNESS" OF 
TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF:  A. ISLAMABAD 3446; B. ISLAMABAD 3358 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE ALAN EASTHAM.  REASON:  1.5 (B,D). 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY:  FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAMSHAD AHMED COMPLAINED TO THE 
AMBASSADOR ON MAY 8 ABOUT THE "ONE-SIDED VIEW" OF THE JUST-RELEASED 
USG REPORT ON TERRORISM, LAMENTING THAT INDIA WAS PORTRAYED MORE 
POSITIVELY THAN PAKISTAN.  ACKNOWLEDGING A RECENT RESPITE (WITH THE 
EXCEPTION OF THE APRIL 26/27 KILLINGS OF 22 PEOPLE IN AZAD KASHMIR 
-- REF B), SHAMSHAD URGED THE U.S. TO USE ITS INFLUENCE IN DELHI TO 
STOP INDIAN SUPPORT FOR CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM.  CONCERNING THE 
APRIL 26/27 INCIDENT, SHAMSHAD SAID THE GOP HAD CONSCIOUSLY DECIDED 
NOT TO RETALIATE, BUT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO CONTINUE SUCH RESTRAINT 
IF THERE WERE REPEATS OF SUCH INCIDENTS.  HE NOTED THAT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF INCIDENTS OF THIS NATURE, DIALOGUE WITH INDIA WOULD BE 
DIFFICULT, BUT HE SAID THE GOP NEVERTHELESS LOOKS FORWARD TO A 
SUMMIT MEETING WITH THE INDIANS IN COLOMBO IN JULY TO EXPLORE HOW 
TO PROCEED WITH THE DIALOGUE.  THE AMBASSADOR APPLAUDED THE GOP 
RESTRAINT IN THE WAKE OF THE "SHOCKING" EVENT OF APRIL 26/27 AND 
NOTED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD SHAMSHAD'S POINT THAT SUCH RESTRAINT WOULD 
NOT BE LIMITLESS IF THERE WERE REPEATS OF SUCH TRAGIC INCIDENTS. 
SHIFTING TO AFGHANISTAN, SHAMSHAD SAID THE GOP IS ENHEARTENED BY 
THE TALIBAN AGREEMENT TO RELEASE 1000 TONS OF FOOD FOR BAMIYAN AND 
SAID ISLAMABAD IS PUSHING FOR A COORDINATORS' MEETING BETWEEN THE 
TWO SIDES.  (SEE REF A FOR DISCUSSION CONCERNING THE INDEPENDENT 
POWER PROJECTS.) END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAMSHAD AHMED CALLED IN THE AMBASSADOR 
MAY 8 TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE RECENTLY-RELEASED USG REPORT, "PATTERNS 
OF GLOBAL TERRORISM."  ACCORDING TO SHAMSHAD, THE REPORT GAVE A 
"ONE-SIDED VIEW" OF THE SITUATIONS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.  HE 
POINTED OUT THAT THE PAKISTAN SECTION OF THE REPORT HIGHLIGHTED 
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND THE HARAKAT-UL-ANSAR, WHILE THE INDIA 
SECTION EMPHASIZED THE MILITANCY IN INDIAN-HELD KASHMIR, WHICH -- 
SHAMSHAD STRESSED -- IS ACTUALLY "AN INDIGENOUS FREEDOM STRUGGLE." 
HE DECRIED THAT THE REPORT REFERRED TO NUMEROUS BOMBINGS IN INDIA 
(ASCRIBED TO CROSS-BORDER SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM), WHILE THE REPORT 
MAKES NO MENTION OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS IN PAKISTAN, IN WHICH THE 
INDIANS HAVE HAD A ROLE, HE ADDED.  "WE EXPECTED THE USG TO 
UNDERTAKE AN OBJECTIVE REVIEW OF THE SITUATIONS IN BOTH COUNTRIES," 
HE LAMENTED.  "WASHINGTON," HE CONTINUED, "MUST USE ITS INFLUENCE 
IN DELHI TO STOP GOI SUPPORT FOR CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM." 
FINISHING HIS THOUGHT, SHAMSHAD NOTED THAT IN RECENT WEEKS THERE 
HAS BEEN A "RESPITE" IN INDIAN-SUPPORTED TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN, 
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE APRIL 26/27 SLAYINGS OF 22 KASHMIRIS IN 
AZAD KASHMIR (REF B). 
 
3. (C) SHUFFLING NOTES, SHAMSHAD GAVE A VIRTUALLY VERBATIM REPEAT 
OF A MAY 4 BRIEFING GIVEN BY MFA ADDITIONAL SECRETARY (SOUTH ASIA) 
TARIQ ALTAF (AND ATTENDED BY POLOFF) ON THE KILLINGS IN AZAD 
KASHMIR.  DESCRIBING THE INCIDENT AS "VERY SERIOUS," SHAMSHAD SAID 
THE INCIDENT WAS THE FIRST "TRANS-LINE OF CONTROL" INCIDENT OF THAT 
NATURE -- "THE ATTACK ACROSS THE LOC VIOLATED THE SANCTITY OF THE 
LINE OF CONTROL, SOMETHING WHICH MUST BE RESPECTED."  PAKISTAN, HE 
SAID, HAS MADE A DELIBERATE DECISION NOT TO RETALIATE TO REDUCE 
RISKS OF THE SITUATION "GETTING OUT OF CONTROL."  HE ADDED THAT THE 
INCIDENT HAS HAD A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PUBLIC OPINION, AND THERE 
MUST BE AN IMMEDIATE END TO SUCH EVENTS, WARNING THAT IF THERE ARE 
MORE SUCH INCIDENTS, "PAKISTAN WOULD FIND IT HARD NOT TO 
RETALIATE."  OBSERVING THAT PAKISTAN CONDEMNS TERRORIST ACTS IN 
INDIAN-HELD KASHMIR, SHAMSHAD DECLARED THAT THERE IS A "QUALITATIVE 
DIFFERENCE" BETWEEN VIOLENT ACTS ON THE INDIAN SIDE -- "THERE'S A 
FREEDOM STRUGGLE UNDERWAY THERE" -- AND THE PAK SIDE, "WHERE THERE 
IS NO SUCH STRUGGLE." 
 
4. (C) SHIFTING FOCUS, SHAMSHAD ASSERTED THAT "PAKISTAN HAS BEEN 
WAITING FOR THE OPPORTUNE TIME TO PICK UP THE THREAD OF INDO-PAK 
DIALOGUE."  HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT DELHI WOULD "ADOPT A SERIOUS 
ATTITUDE" TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENT FOR RESUMING THE DIALOGUE. 
DECLARING THAT THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN NEED TO BE CONVINCED ON THE 
DIALOGUE, SHAMSHAD SAID THAT IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE "NO 
GOVERNMENT CAN AFFORD TO CARRY ON THE TALKS."  SHAMSHAD OBSERVED 
THAT ISLAMABAD NEVERTHELESS IS "EARNESTLY LOOKING FORWARD" TO THE 
TWO PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING IN COLOMBO "TO EXPLORE THE 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR DIALOGUE."  HE SAID ISLAMABAD WOULD SEND 
INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS HIGH COMMISSION IN DELHI TO THIS EFFECT, BUT 
"ONLY AFTER THE CURRENT PUBLIC ATTITUDE SUBSIDES."  WASHINGTON, HE 
ADDED, CAN PLAY A ROLE IN KEEPING TEMPERS LOW.  RETURNING TO HIS 
THEME AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, SHAMSHAD SAID WASHINGTON 
SHOULD AVOID TAKING PRO-INDIAN STANCES WHICH PROVOKE A PAKISTANI 
REACTION, ADDING THAT THE GOP "IS DOING ITS BEST" TO CONTROL THE 
PUBLIC REACTION TO THE RECENTLY-ANNOUNCED MTCR-RELATED SANCTIONS ON 
KHAN RESEARCH LABORATORIES.  THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT THE GOP 
SEEMED TO BE SUCCEEDING IN THAT REGARD AS THE REACTION HAS BEEN 
"MODEST." 
 
5. (C) RESPONDING TO SHAMSHAD'S LENGTHY MONOLOGUE, THE AMBASSADOR 
SAID HE WOULD CONVEY TO WASHINGTON THE GOP'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE 
TERRORISM REPORT.  DODGING THE AMBASSADOR'S SEVERAL QUESTIONS 
CONCERNING WHY THE ATTACKERS IN THE APRIL 26/27 INCIDENT FOCUSSED 
ON ONLY TWO FAMILIES, SHAMSHAD SAID THE KILLERS WANTED TO GIVE THE 
APPEARANCE THAT THE INCIDENT WAS "AN INSIDE JOB."  RESPONDING TO 
ANOTHER QUERY, SHAMSHAD SAID THE GOP WAS SURE THE ATTACKERS HAD 
COME FROM ACROSS THE LOC -- "WE HAVE INTERCEPTS THAT MAKE THAT 
CLEAR," HE NOTED.  TERMING THE INCIDENT "SHOCKING AND 
UNFORGIVABLE," THE AMBASSADOR APPLAUDED THE RESTRAINT THAT PAKISTAN 
HAS EXERCISED IN THE WAKE OF THE INCIDENT, ADDING THAT HE 
UNDERSTANDS SHAMSHAD'S POINT THAT SUCH RESTRAINT WOULD NOT BE 
LIMITLESS IF SUCH INCIDENTS WERE REPEATED.  THE AMBASSADOR 
UNDERSCORED THAT THE INCIDENT SHOULD BE A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION FOR 
THE INDO-PAK DIALOGUE.  RETURNING YET AGAIN TO HIS THEME OF USG 
ONE-SIDEDNESS, SHAMSHAD REGRETTED THAT THE USG HAD NOT ISSUED A 
STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE KILLINGS, REITERATING THAT WASHINGTON DOES 
NOT MENTION THE INDIAN ROLE IN FOMENTING VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN -- 
"FOR US THIS IS VERY HARD TO EXPLAIN TO THE PEOPLE," HE ADDED. 
WARMING TO THIS THEME, SHAMSHAD REGRETTED THE REPORTED WASHINGTON 
DENIAL THAT IT WAS CONSIDERING SANCTIONING INDIA ON THE SAGARIKA 
MISSILE. 
 
"BREAKTHROUGH ON AFGHANISTAN" 
----------------------------- 
 
6. (C) TURNING TO THE RECENT AFGHANISTAN STEERING COMMITTEE TALKS 
IN ISLAMABAD BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE, 
SHAMSHAD SAID THE TALKS HAD BEEN "A GOOD SUCCESS, A MAJOR 
BREAKTHROUGH, THE FIRST TIME IN A FEW YEARS THAT THE SIDES SAT 
TOGETHER FACE-TO-FACE."  HE GAVE THE U.S. AND HIS OWN GOVERNMENT 
CREDIT FOR THE MEETINGS.  PAKISTAN'S DESIRE, HE ADDED, IS TO 
FACILITATE THE AFGHANISTAN DIALOGUE PROCESS, AND HE RECOUNTED PAK 
EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT THE TALKS.  HE NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE FIVE 
DAYS OF TALKS HAD BEEN "INCONCLUSIVE," ONE SHOULD NOT BE 
DISCOURAGED -- "PAKISTAN IS KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH ALL PARTIES." 
TAKING CREDIT FOR THE RECENT TALIBAN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THEY WOULD 
ALLOW 1000 TONS OF FOOD AID INTO BAMIYAN PROVINCE, SHAMSHAD SAID 
THIS "MAKES QUITE CLEAR THAT IF YOU DEAL WITH THE TALIBAN, THEN YOU 
CAN GET EVERYTHING."  THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT "MAYBE NOT 
EVERYTHING."  WHAT IS IMPORTANT, SHAMSHAD UNDERSCORED, IS HOW ONE 
DEALS WITH THE TALIBAN.  SCORING THE TALIBAN ANNOUNCEMENT AS A 
POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, SHAMSHAD SAID THE GOP IS NOW PUSHING FOR A 
"COORDINATORS' MEETING" BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES -- "PAKISTAN IS 
INTENSIFYING ITS EFFORTS TO GET THE TWO SIDES BACK TOGETHER SOON; 
WE MUST NOT LOSE THE MOMENTUM."  HE PROMISED TO KEEP THE AMBASSADOR 
FULLY INFORMED OF THE GOP'S PROGRESS ON THE AFGHANISTAN FRONT. 
 
7. (C) NOTING AGREEMENT WITH THE GOP ON AFGHANISTAN, THE AMBASSADOR 
OBSERVED THAT HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING 
AS "A STEP FORWARD" RATHER THAN A BREAKTHROUGH.  HE ALSO EXPRESSED 
APPRECIATION FOR THE GOP'S CONTRIBUTION IN HELPING MAKE THE MEETING 
HAPPEN.  SHAMSHAD SAID NORTHERN LEADER PROFESSOR RABBANI HAD 
RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO THE TALIBAN ANNOUNCEMENT ON ALLOWING 1000 
TONS OF FOOD AID INTO BAMIYAN AND WAS NOW CONSULTING HIS ALLIANCE 
COLLEAGUES.  THE FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID DIVERGENCE WITHIN THE 
NORTHERN ALLIANCE WAS "THE BIGGEST PROBLEM," TO WHICH THE 
AMBASSADOR RESPONDED WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT THE TALIBAN, TOO, 
HAD TROUBLES WITHIN ITS OWN RANKS.  SUPPORTING THE NOTION OF A 
COORDINATORS' MEETING, THE AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. AND 
PAKISTAN ARE "ON THE SAME WAVE-LENGTH."  THE MOST IMPORTANT THING, 
THE AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED, IS THAT THE SIDES CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN 
AGREEMENT ON "NO MILITARY OFFENSIVES."  ALL SIDES, HE UNDERSCORED, 
MUST STAY FOCUSSED ON THIS ESSENTIAL POINT. 
 
8. (C) DREDGING UP AN OLD THEME, SHAMSHAD CALLED FOR AN ARMS 
EMBARGO ON AFGHANISTAN AND ASSERTED THAT PAKISTAN IS READY TO 
COOPERATE ON THIS.  HE SAID ISLAMABAD IS "SURPRISED" THAT THE SIX 
PLUS TWO PROCESS IS "SO CASUAL" ON THE NEED FOR AN EMBARGO. 
RESPONDING, THE AMBASSADOR QUOTED UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE LAKHDAR 
BRAHIMI AS SAYING THAT IF PAKISTAN AND IRAN AGREE TO CUT OFF ARMS, 
THEN THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR AN EMBARGO, AND, WITHOUT PAK- 
IRANIAN AGREEMENT, AN EMBARGO WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. 
 
9. (C) COMMENT:  THIS MEETING WAS VINTAGE SHAMSHAD, WHO DUTIFULLY-- 
AND WITH SOME PLEASURE -- LAMBASTED AMERICA ON THE LATEST 
PERCEIVED SLIGHT, BUT WAS BEREFT OF ANY FRESH THINKING ON HOW BEST 
TO PROCEED IN STRENGTHENING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP OR ON HOW TO 
WORK TOGETHER MOST CONSTRUCTIVELY IN ADVANCING PEACE IN 
AFGHANISTAN.  BUT, WE HAVE LEARNED NOT TO EXPECT TOO MUCH. 
 
 
EASTHAM