R 121651Z MAR 97
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7313
INFO UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
ALGERIA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 000952 
 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  3/14/2007 
TAGS: PINS PTER KISL AG
SUBJECT:  NEW ARMED GROUPS JOINING THE OLD FIS? 
 
REF:  A)  FBIS LD 1502183497  B)  ALGIERS 864 
      C)  96 ALGIERS 250, 632 AND 1062 
      D)  ALGIERS 931  E)  FBIS MM1212143096 
      F)  FBIS MM1109104796 
 
¶1.  (U)  CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RONALD NEUMANN, 
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶2.  (C)  SUMMARY:  THE ABILITY OF THE LONG-BANNED 
ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT (FIS) TO RESTRAIN THE 
ISLAMIST ARMED GROUPS HERE IS QUESTIONABLE.  OVER 
TIME, HOWEVER, THE BARBAROUS ATROCITIES OF THE ARMED 
ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA) MAY BE WORKING IN THE FIS' FAVOR 
AMONG ISLAMIST ARMED GROUPS.  THERE ARE SIGNS, 
ALBEIT SMALL AND TENTATIVE, THAT MORE GROUPS ARE 
CLAIMING LOYALTY TO THE ORIGINAL FIS LEADERSHIP OF 
ABASSI MADANI AND ALI BENHADJ (JAILED SINCE 1991). 
THERE ARE ALSO SOME HINTS THAT THESE GROUPS ARE 
JOINING OR AT LEAST WORKING TOGETHER.  THEY HAVE 
CALLED FOR MORAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE 
ISLAMIC "MOVEMENTS" (INCLUDING, PERHAPS, IRAN).  THE 
NEW EFFORTS TOWARDS COORDINATION OR UNITY MAY NOT 
SUCCEED IN THE END; THE ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS ON THE 
WHOLE REMAIN SERIOUSLY SPLIT IN TERMS OF IDEOLOGY 
AND LEADERSHIP.  WE SEE NO SIGN THAT THEY ARE 
STRONGER MILITARILY.  IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE GIVEN 
NO INDICATION THEY WILL BE LOYAL TO THE FIS 
LEADERSHIP IN EXILE, UNDER REBAH KEBIR IN GERMANY. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
 
A NEW FIS ATTACK ON THE GIA 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  THERE ARE SOME SMALL, AND STILL TENTATIVE, 
INDICATIONS THAT THE ISLAMIC SALVATION FRONT (FIS) 
IS TRYING TO REASSERT CONTROL OVER THE ARMED GROUPS 
ONCE LOYAL TO THE ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA).  THE 
TREND SO FAR APPEARS LIMITED MAINLY TO CENTRAL 
ALGERIA.  THE FEBRUARY 1997 ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE 
ISLAMIC LEAGUE FOR THE (ISLAMIC) CALL AND FOR DJIHAD 
(IN FRENCH, LIDD) EMPHASIZES THE LEAGUE'S LOYALTY TO 
ABASSI MADANI AND ALI BENHADJ (SEE REFS A AND B). 
(IT ALSO PRAISES THE MEMORY OF ANOTHER FIS LEADER, 
MOHAMED SAID, THE LEADER OF THE FIS' DJAZAIR'IST 
WING.)  FOUR MEN SIGNED THE COMMUNIQUE.  THE FIRST 
TWO, ALI BENHADJER AND MAHFOUD RAHMANI HIGHLIGHTED 
THEIR STATUS AS FIS OFFICIALS ELECTED TO PARLIAMENT 
IN 1991; THE THIRD, YOUSSEF BOUBRAS, NOTES THAT HE 
WAS THE FIS PRESIDENT OF THE BOUIRA OFFICE AND LATER 
A MEMBER OF THE FIS EXECUTIVE OFFICE. 
 
¶4.  (S)  THE LIDD COMMUNIQUE SINGLES OUT THE 
GOVERNMENT'S "PLOT" AGAINST THE ISLAMIC DJIHAD IN 
ALGERIA AS BEING EMBODIED IN THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 
ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA).  THE CAMPAIGN, THE LIDD 
SAID, DEVIATED INTO KILLING THE "BEST SCHOLARS, 
PREACHERS AND MOUJADHIDINE."  IT THEN SAID THAT 
FAITHFUL MUSLEM SOLDIERS ARE, THEREFORE, QUITTING 
THE GIA.  IT CALLS ON THOSE YOUNG MEN IN THE GIA TO 
UNDERSTAND THAT MASSACRES ARE NOT JUSTIFIABLE UNDER 
ISLAM, BUT RATHER ARE THE WORK OF THE ALGERIAN 
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. 
 
¶5.  (S)  THE LIDD COMMUNIQUE TOUCHES ONLY BRIEFLY ON 
RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES.  IT STRONGLY 
DENOUNCES PAST FRENCH COLONIAL POLICY IN ALGERIA. 
(IT MAKES NO MENTION OF THE U.S.)  IT ALSO CALLS ON 
"OTHER ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS" TO PROVIDE SPIRITUAL AND 
MATERIAL AIDE TO THE ALGERIAN DJIHAD.  (COMMENT: 
THE LIDD MIGHT LOOK TO THE IRANIANS AND OTHERS FOR 
ASSISTANCE.  WE RECALL THAT THE IRANIANS HAVE 
DENOUNCED PUBLICLY THE GIA'S CAMPAIGN OF 
INDISCRIMINATE CAR BOMBINGS IN ALGERIA AS THE WORK 
OF ALGERIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.  END COMMENT.) 
 
¶6.  (C)  THE GIA'S MURDER OF MOHAMED SAID AND HIS 
FOLLOWERS IN LATE 1995 SPURRED A NUMBER OF LOCAL GIA 
MEMBERS TO QUIT THE GROUP IN EARLY 1996 (SEE REFS C, 
D).  AN APPARENTLY GENUINE "AL-DJIHAD" BULLETIN FROM 
THE SPRING OF 1996 CLAIMED THAT THESE GROUPS 
EXTENDED FROM THE LARBAA AND MEDEA REGIONS SOUTH OF 
THE CAPITAL (THE MEDEA GROUP LED BY ALI BENHADJER) 
TO BOUSAADA ON THE HIGH PLATEAU.  WE REPORTED LAST 
YEAR THAT SOME OF THESE GIA SPLINTERS WERE 
SYMPATHETIC TO MOHAMED SAID AND HAD REGROUPED UNDER 
THE BANNER OF THE OLD DJAZAIR'IST AL-FIDA GROUP. 
 
¶7.  (C)  IN THE FEBRUARY 1997 LIDD COMMUNIQUE, THE 
FOURTH SIGNER IS "AHMED ABOU EL-FIDA," SAID TO BE 
THE COMMANDER OF THE AL-FIDA.  (COMMENT:  WE DO NOT 
KNOW EXACTLY WHO AHMED ABOU AL-FIDA IS.  ACCORDING 
TO A WELL-INFORMED JOURNALIST, WHO HAS SOURCES IN 
THE ALGERIAN SECURITY SERVICES, HIS REAL NAME IS 
ABDELLAH SEDOUKI (NFI).  WE HAVE OBTAINED AN 
APPARENTLY GENUINE COMMUNIQUE FROM AHMED ABOU 
AL-FIDA CLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JANUARY 28 
KILLING OF ABDELHAK BENHAMOUDA, PRESIDENT ZEROUAL'S 
ALLY.  END COMMENT.)  THE LIDD COMMUNIQUE, THUS, 
SUGGESTS THAT AL-FIDA OF CENTRAL ALGERIA HAS 
RETURNED FULL CIRCLE FROM THE GIA TO THE FIS. 
 
¶8.  (C)  IN ADDITION, THE LIDD'S MAHFOUD RAHMANI 
COMES FROM M'SILA, WHILE YOUSSEF BOUBRAS COMES FROM 
BOUIRA.  (A LAWYER IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH FIS 
LEADERS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE ALGERIA TOLD US JANUARY 
28 OF A MID-JANUARY AMBUSH AGAINST THE ALGERIAN ARMY 
WHICH KILLED DOZENS OF SOLDIERS IN BOUIRA.)  THUS, 
THE LIDD SUGGESTS, ALBEIT TENTATIVELY, THAT ARMED 
GROUPS LOYAL TO THE FIS NOW EXTEND FROM MEDEA EAST 
TO BOUIRA AND PERHAPS EVEN TO M'SILA AND BOUSAADA TO 
THE SOUTHEAST. 
 

¶8.  (S)  (COMMENT:  IF/IF THIS IS TRUE, IT IS A 
DIFFERENT PICTURE OF THE ARMED GROUPS FROM WHAT WE 
SAW IN LATE 1994 AND THROUGHOUT 1995 AND 1996. 
DURING THAT TIME, THERE WERE FEW SIGNS THAT THE FIS, 
DEFINED AS THE LEADERSHIP OF ABASSI MADANI AND ALI 
BENHADJ, HAD THE LOYALTY OF ANY ARMED GROUPS OUTSIDE 
THE ISLAMIC SALVATION ARMY (AIS) GROUPS IN THE 
JIJEL/SKIKDA REGION IN THE EAST AND THE 
RELIZANE/MASCARA/SIDI BEL ABBES REGION IN THE WEST. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
 
ANOTHER GIA SPLIT:  AL-BAQAOUN 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C)  THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE OTHER 
IN-FIGHTING INSIDE THE GIA DURING THE PAST YEAR (SEE 
REF D ABOUT WESTERN ALGERIA, FOR EXAMPLE).  NOTABLY, 
GIA GROUPS AROUND CHLEF IN DECEMBER 1996 REPORTEDLY 
REBELLED AGAINST THE CORE GIA UNDER ANTAR ZOUABRI 
AND ELECTED A FORMER FIGHTER FROM AFGHANISTAN NAMED 
SLIMANE MAHERZI AS THEIR LEADER, ACCORDING TO THE 
SOMETIMES WELL-INFORMED LONDON NEWSPAPER ASH-SHARQ 
AL-AWSET (REF E).  MAHERZI, WHOSE WAR NAME IS 
ABDERAHMANE ABOU DJAMIL, WAS ALSO REPORTED TO BE THE 
LEADER OF AL-BAQAOUN 'ALA AL-'AHD, ACCORDING TO THE 
OFTEN WELL-INFORMED LONDON NEWSPAPER AL-HAYAT (REF 
F).  ACCORDING TO THESE LONDON PRESS SOURCES, ABOU 
DJAMIL'S BASE OF OPERATION IS WEST OF THE CAPITAL 
BETWEEN CHLEF AND BLIDA. 
 
¶10.  (C)  WHILE MAHERZI APPEARS TO HAVE SPLIT WITH 
THE GIA UNDER ZOUABRI, IT IS NOT CLEAR IF HE HAS 
ALIGNED WITH BENHADJER'S LIDD AGAINST THEIR COMMON 
ENEMIES, ZOUABRI AND THE ALGERIAN ARMY.  A 
WELL-INFORMED ALGERIAN JOURNALIST ASSERTED THAT 
AL-BAQAOUN IS PART OF THE LEAGUE (SEE REF B).  THE 
FRENCH EMBASSY PROVIDED US A COPY OF A POSSIBLY 
GENUINE JANUARY 1997 AL-BAQAOUN COMMUNIQUE WHICH 
CONFIRMED AL-FIDA KILLED ABDELHAK BENHAMOUDA AND 
CALLED AL-FIDA THE FAITHFUL'S "COLLEAGUES."  THE 
COMMUNIQUE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED THE MURDER AND THE 
AL-FIDA CLAIM OF RESPONSIBILITY; IT SUGGESTS THAT 
THE TWO GROUPS MIGHT BE IN REGULAR CONTACT.  IN 
ADDITION, THE SEPTEMBER 1996 AL-BAQAOUN COMMUNIQUE 
REFERS TO THE UNJUSTIFIED GIA KILLING OF "PREACHERS 
AND MOUJAHIDINE"--LANGUAGE IDENTICAL TO THAT OF THE 
AL-FIDA AND THE LIDD IN FEBRUARY 1997.  MOREOVER, 
THE OATH IN THE GROUP'S NAME IS, BY ALL ACCOUNTS, 
ONE OF LOYALTY TO MADANI AND BENHADJ, JUST AS THAT 
EXPRESSED BY BENHADJER (SEE REFS B AND D). 
 
¶11.  (C)  NOT ALL SIGNS SUGGEST THAT AL-BAQAOUN 
DEFINITELY HAS JOINED WITH AL-FIDA, AND HENCE TO THE 
LIDD.  THE AL-BAQAOUN COMMUNIQUE ABOUT BENHAMOUDA 
WAS IN FRENCH, WHICH MADE SOME OBSERVERS WHO SAW IT 
IMMEDIATELY SUSPICIOUS THAT THE COMMUNIQUE WAS A 
GOVERNMENT-PRODUCED FAKE.  WE HAVE ALSO RECEIVED AN 
APPARENTLY GENUINE FEBRUARY 1997 AL-BAQAOUN 
COMMUNIQUE, IN ARABIC, WHICH STRONGLY DENOUNCES 
THOSE WHO WOULD NEGOTIATE WITH THE ALGERIAN 
GOVERNMENT.  THE SEPTEMBER 1996 COMMUNIQUE DID SO AS 
WELL.  SINCE MADANI AND BENHADJ DID TALK WITH THE 
GOVERNMENT IN 1994 AND 1995, ABOU DJAMIL'S LOYALTY 
TO THEM WOULD HAVE TO BE QUESTIONABLE IF EITHER 
COMMUNIQUE IS GENUINE. 
 
 
¶12.  (C)  MEANWHILE, THE FIS LEADERSHIP IN EXILE HAS 
UNDERGONE OTHER TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE PAST MONTH. 
MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT EXPELLED KHEIREDINE KHERBANE 
FROM ITS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.  OUR FIS LAWYER SOURCE 
TOLD US MARCH 10 THAT KHERBANE TOO OFTEN STRAYED 
PUBLICLY FROM THE OFFICIAL FIS LINE.  IN ADDITION, 
HE SAID, KHERBANE'S CONTACTS IN LONDON WITH PERSONS 
THOUGHT LINKED TO THE GIA MADE KEBIR AND OTHER FIS 
OFFICIALS NERVOUS.  HE ADDED THAT THE EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE HAS APPOINTED ABDELKRIM OULD ADDA, A 
PROFESSOR ORIGINALLY FROM MOSTAGANEM AND A KEBIR 
AIDE, TO BE THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE'S SPOKESMAN. 
THIS SOURCE BELIEVES THE CHANGES TO THE EXECUTIVE 
COMMITTEE AIM AT CONSOLIDATING KEBIR'S AUTHORITY 
OVER THE COMMITTEE. 
 
 
COMMENT: 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  COMPARED TO ANALYSES OF ALGERIA'S 
SPLINTERED ARMED ISLAMIST GROUPS, ECONOMICS IS AN 
EXTREMELY PRECISE SCIENCE.  LOCAL RIVALRIES, 
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, AND THE GROUPS' INSTINCTIVE 
PENCHANT FOR SECRECY AND NAME CHANGES, NOT TO 
MENTION FAKE COMMUNIQUES AND OTHER PRESSURE FROM THE 
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT, MAKE ALL JUDGEMENTS HIGHLY 
PRONE TO ERROR.  NONETHELESS, WE HAZARD THAT THE 
FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: 
 
--  THE RUTHLESS TACTICS OF ANTAR ZOUABRI AND THE 
"CORE" GIA HAVE ALIENATED SUBSTANTIAL PARTS OF THE 
GROUP'S MEMBERS; 
 
--  THERE ARE NEW (OR RENEWED) GROUPS IN CENTRAL 
ALGERIA WHO EITHER BY COMMUNIQUE OR BY THEIR VERY 
NAME HAVE LEFT THE GIA AND AGAIN CLAIM LOYALTY TO 
THE TRADITIONAL FIS LEADERSHIP OF ABASSI MADANI AND 
ALI BENHADJ; 
 
--  THESE GROUPS' LOYALTY TO THE TRADITIONAL FIS 
LEADERSHIP, CREATES A NEW ALIGNMENT OF ISLAMIST 
FORCES BOTH IN CENTRAL ALGERIA, AND PERHAPS EVEN 
NATIONALLY, COMPARED TO THE DISPOSITION OF 1994 OR 
1995; 
 
--  IN ADDITION, THE FIS APPEARS TO STILL HAVE THE 
LOYALTY OF THE ISLAMIC SALVATION ARMY, LOCATED IN 
EASTERN AND WESTERN ALGERIA; 
 
--  IT STILL SEEMS TOO EARLY TO KNOW IF EFFORTS BY 
GROUPS LIKE ALI BENHADJER'S LIDD TO MERGE OR ALLY 
WITH OTHER ARMED GROUPS, LIKE AL-BAQAOUN, HAVE, IN 
FACT, SUCCEEDED; 
 
--  EFFORTS TO UNIFY ARE SIGNIFICANT MAINLY IN TERMS 
OF POLITICAL ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER;  AND 
 
--  TENTATIVE EFFORTS TO UNIFY THEIR RANKS DOES NOT 
MEAN THESE ARMED GROUPS ARE STRONGER MILITARILY; 
RATHER, THEIR EFFORTS MAY BE IN RESPONSE TO 
TREMENDOUS PRESSURE FROM THE "CORE" GIA AND THE 
ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT. 
 
¶14.  (C)  WHILE THE LIDD, AL-FIDA AND AL-BAQAOUN 
COULD BE LOYAL TO THE FIS AS PERSONIFIED BY ABASSI 
MADANI AND ALI BENHADJ, NOWHERE HAVE WE SEEN THEM 
EXPRESS LOYALTY TO THE FIS LEADERSHIP IN EXILE UNDER 
REBAH KEBIR.  (INDEED, SOME OF THE AL-BAQAOUN 
COMMUNIQUES IMPLICITLY ATTACK THE EXILES.)  THUS, 
THE EXILE LEADERSHIP IS UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO DO 
MUCH TO REDUCE VIOLENCE.  EVEN THE EXTENT OF MADANI 
AND BENHADJ'S ABILITY TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY THE 
ONGOING VIOLENCE IS QUESTIONABLE (AFTER ALL, THESE 
GROUPS MAY USE THEM AS A RALLYING POINT ONLY BECAUSE 
THEY ARE IN NO POSITION TO GIVE ORDERS). 
 
NEUMANN