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Viewing cable 96RIYADH2406, CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH THE DIPLOMAT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
96RIYADH2406 1996-06-19 16:01 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Riyadh
P 191601Z JUN 96
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4895
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL DHAHRAN
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 002406 
 
 
LONDON FOR TUELLER; PARIS FOR ALLEGRONE 
 
E.O.12958: DECL:  06/19/06 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR SA
SUBJECT:  CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH THE DIPLOMAT 
 
1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA THEODORE KATTOUF, REASON 1.5.D. 
 
2.  (C) SUMMARY:  GIVEN KING FAHD'S UNCERTAIN HEALTH, 
CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH APPEARS TO HAVE MOVED INTO THE 
ROLE OF REPRESENTING SAUDI ARABIA'S FACE TO THE OUTSIDE 
WORLD.  WHILE DRAMATIC CHANGES ARE NOT THE HALLMARK OF 
SAUDI GOVERNANCE, ABDULLAH WILL NO DOUBT PUT HIS OWN 
IMPRIMATUR ON SAUDI DIPLOMACY.  HE IS, FOR EXAMPLE, 
ATTUNED TO LOCAL POLITICS AND WILL VIEW SAG'S OVERSEAS 
COMMITMENTS FROM THE OPTIC OF THE EFFECT THAY WILL HAVE 
ON DOMESTIC PRIORITIES.  ALTHOUGH THE CROWN PRINCE HAS 
REPEATEDLY STRESSED HIS COMMITMENT TO CLOSE BILATERAL 
TIES WITH THE U.S., HE HAS SPOKEN FORCEFULLY OF THE NEED 
FOR A JUST PEACE FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND SYRIANS.  WE 
EXPECT ABDULLAH TO BE ACTIVE IN SHAPING AN ARAB 
CONSENSUS THAT KEEPS THE PEACE PROCESS ALIVE, WHILE 
MAINTAINING THE APPEARANCE OF ARAB UNITY AND RESOLVE. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
----------------------------- 
ABDULLAH'S DIPLOMATIC PROFILE 
----------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH BIN ABD AL-AZIZ, LED THE 
SAUDI DELEGATION TO THE JUNE 7-8 TRIPARTITE SUMMIT IN 
DAMASCUS.  ABDULLAH WILL REPRESENT SAUDI ARABIA AT THE 
JUNE 22 SUMMIT IN CAIRO AND PERHAPS ALL FUTURE ARAB 
SUMMITRY. 
 
4.  (C) ALTHOUGH IT IS CLEAR THAT HE STILL MUST BE 
CONSULTED ON KEY DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY ON FOREIGN 
POLICY MATTERS, KING FAHD'S INVOLVEMENT IN DAY-TO-DAY 
AFFAIRS OF STATE REMAINS SPORADIC.  RECENTLY, THE KING 
RECEIVED SULTAN QABUS, AND THE KUWAITI AND BAHRAINI 
FOREIGN MINISTERS IN JEDDAH.  HE ALSO MET IN MECCA THE 
HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENTS LEADING THEIR HAJJ 
DELEGATIONS.  EVEN EARLIER IN THE YEAR, HE HAD A SHORT 
MEETING WITH FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH.  THE MEDIA REPORT 
THE KING PRESIDING OVER MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF 
MINISTERS THAT ISSUE STATEMENTS SPELLING OUT THE SAG'S 
POSITION ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES.  NEVERTHELESS, ALL 
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATS THAT THESE ENCOUNTERS ARE 
TIGHTLY CONTROLLED AFAIRS AND LARGELY PROTOCOLARY IN 
CHARACTER. 
 
5.  (C) WHILE EFFORTS PERSIST TO FUDGE THE ISSUE OF THE 
KING'S PRESENCE AT THE HELM OF STATE, THE CURRENT RUSH 
OF ARAB AND PEACE PROCESS POLITICS IS INCREASINGLY 
FORCING THE AL SAUD TO PERMIT THE HEIR APPARENT TO 
PROJECT THEIR TOP LEADERSHIP.  INDEED, ABDULLAH HAS 
STEPPED IN WHERE A SUBSTANTIVE OFFICIAL SAUDI PRESENCE 
IS REQUIRED.  THUS, THE CROWN PRINCE ATTENDED THE GCC 
SUMMIT IN MUSCAT LAST DECEMBER AND THE RECENT DAMASCUS 
TRIPARTITE SUMMIT.  ON THE OTHER HAND, FOREIGN MINISTER 
PRINCE SAUD AL-FAYSAL REPRESENTED THE SAG AT AN EARLIER 
SYRIA-EGYPT-SAUDI ARABIA SUMMIT IN EGYPT, ALSO IN 
DECEMBER, AND AT THE SHARM AL-SHAYKH ANTI-TERRORISM 
SUMMIT (ILLUSTRATING THE KING'S CONTINUED POLICY 
ENGAGEMENT, FAHD REPORTEDLY OVERRULED ABDULLAH AND 
SULTAN'S RELUCTANCE TO ATTEND THE SUMMIT, INSISTING THAT 
THE SAG BE REPRESENTED). 
 
------------------------------------------- 
BURNISHING CREDENTIALS:  AT HOME AND ABROAD 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) AT HOME, ABDULLAH IS NOW MEETING VIRTUALLY ALL 
HIGH-LEVEL FOREIGN VISITORS TO SAUDI ARABIA (USUALLY ONE 
A DAY AND OFTEN SEVERAL MORE) AND IS CONDUCTING 
WIDELY-PUBLICIZED AND QUITE INTENSE TELEPHONE DIPLOMACY 
WITH ARAB AND OTHER FOREIGN LEADERS.  BY CONTRAST, 
MINDEF SULTAN - LONG CONSIDERED BY FOREIGN PUNDITS AS A 
RIVAL TO ABDULLAH WHO WOULD INTRUDE ON THE CROWN 
PRINCE'S SPACE - IS MUCH LESS VISIBLE AND CLEARLY 
SECONDARY IN THESE FOREIGN CONTACTS.  ALL THIS HAS 
CERTAINLY HELPED BURNISH THE CROWN PRINCE'S DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL CREDENTIALS AND HELPED RAISE HIS RATHER 
LOW PROFILE IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA STEMMING FROM FAHD'S 
PREVIOUSLY JEALOUS OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN POLICY, NOT TO 
MENTION THE CROWN PRINCE'S RETICENCE STEMMING FROM A 
SPEECH IMPEDIMENT. 
 
7.  (C) ABDULLAH'S ACTIVISM ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE 
PERMITS HIM TO PROJECT HIMSELF AS A DE FACTO HEAD OF 
STATE -- A ROLE IN WHICH HE APPEARS TO BE INCREASINGLY 
COMFORTABLE.  ABDULLAH WAS AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT IN 
DAMASCUS AND, BY SAUDI ACCOUNT, WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN 
ENSURING THAT IRAQ NOT BE INVITED TO THE CAIRO SUMMIT. 
OTHER MEETINGS, SUCH AS THE CAIRO SUMMIT, WILL LIKELY 
FURTHER BOOST THE CROWN PRINCE'S STATURE.  IN SHORT, 
DOMESTICALLY, THE SAUDIS ARE GETTING USED TO SEEING 
ABDULLAH IN CHARGE.  ARAB LEADERS ARE LEARNING TO DO THE 
SAME. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
THE INNER CIRCLE:  CONFLICTING ADVICE AND FRUSTRATION 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
8.  (C) AS ABDULLAH BURNISHES HIS CREDENTIALS HERE AND 
ABROAD, WE ARE TOLD THERE IS RISING IMPATIENCE WITHIN 
HIS INNER CIRCLE THAT THE CROWN PRINCE ASSERT HIMSELF 
MORE WITH REGARD TO THE KING; THAT IS, THAT ABDULLAH 
TAKE A MORE VOCAL POSITION ON KEY ISSUES WHICH ARE 
BEFORE THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP.  THIS VIEW, REPORTEDLY 
HELD BY YOUNGER MEMBERS OF ABDULLAH'S FAMILY, HAS BEEN 
COUNTERED BY THE APPROACH OF SENIOR ADVISORS -- 
PRINCIPALLY SHAYKH ABD AL-AZIZ AL-TUWAYJRI -- WHO 
COUNSEL PATIENCE AND RESTRAINT.  TO DATE ABDULLAH HAS 
EMBRACED THE LATTER VIEW, PERHAPS COGNIZANT THAT LITTLE 
WOULD BE GAINED, AND MUCH COULD BE LOST, BY PUSHING THE 
LIMITS OF EXISTING LINES OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 
WITH A KING WHO HAS NEVER BEEN RETICENT TO EXERCISE 
POWER, AND WHO COULD THEORETICALLY, AT LEAST, REMOVE 
ABDULLAH AS HEIR APPARENT. 
 
9.  (C) THE SHIFTING LINES OF AUTHORITY, AND UNCERTAINTY 
OVER WHETHER AND WHEN THE KING WILL WEIGH IN ON MATTERS, 
HAS GENERATED FRUSTRATION AMONG THE CROWN PRINCE'S 
CLOSEST SUPPORTERS.  A FORMER U.S. MILITARY ADVISOR TO 
THE SANG AND CLOSE FRIEND OF SHAYKH TUWAYJRI FOR OVER 
TWENTY YEARS DESCRIBES TUWAYJRI AS "DEPRESSED" OVER THE 
CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS WITHIN THE HIGHEST COUNCILS OF 
THE RULING FAMILY.  TUWAYJRI REPORTEDLY HAS HAD TO 
SUFFER BROADSIDES FROM YOUNGER ABDULLAH FAMILY MEMBERS 
WHO CHARGE THAT TUWAYJRI IS OLD, OUT OF TOUCH, AND NO 
LONGER DISPENSES SOUND ADVICE TO THE CROWN PRINCE. 
TUWAYJRI'S VISIBLE PRESENCE AT THE TRIPARTITE SUMMIT IN 
DAMASCUS, AND HIS RECENT REGIONAL TRAVELS ON BEHALF OF 
ABDULLAH, TO SYRIA AND MOROCCO, HOWEVER, REAFFIRM THAT 
ABDULLAH HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS LONG-STANDING 
CONFIDANTE.  INDEED, TUWAYJRI WILL ACCOMPANY HIM TO 
CAIRO ON JUNE 21. 
 
------------------------- 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
------------------------- 
 
10.  (C) WHILE ABDULLAH WILL QUIETLY BEGIN TO PUT HIS 
OWN IMPRIMATUR ON SAUDI DIPLOMACY, WE WILL ALSO BE 
WATCHING TO SEE IF AND HOW THE CONVENTIONAL THINKING ON 
ABDULLAH -- MORE ATTUNED TO SYRIAN AND ARAB CONCERNS -- 
IS TRANSLATED INTO ANY SPECIFIC AGENDA.  IN ADDITION TO 
ARAB AND BROADER MUSLIM INTERESTS, AS WE HAVE REPORTED 
BEFORE (RIYADH 29), ABDULLAH IS ATTUNED TO THE DOMESTIC 
POLITICS OF SAUDI ARABIA, ITS SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AND 
THE AFFECT THAT THE SAG'S OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS WILL HAVE 
ON DOMESTIC PRIORITIES OR ON THE VERY CONSERVATIVE SAUDI 
POPULACE.  THAT SAID, CHANGE IS NOT A HALLMARK OF SAUDI 
GOVERNANCE AND ABDULLAH, WHO HAS BEEN FAITHFULLY 
DEFERENTIAL TO FAHD, HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT HE IS 
SEEKING ANY DRAMATIC REVERSAL OF CURRENT POLICIES. 
 
11.  (C) THE CROWN PRINCE HAS REPEATEDLY AND 
EMPHATICALLY STRESSED HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO A 
STRONG U.S.-SAUDI BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND APPEARS 
ANXIOUS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE WILL KEEP U.S. POLICY 
INTERESTS FIRMLY IN VIEW.  WE EXPECT THIS TO CONTINUE. 
AT THE SAME TIME, ABDULLAH HAS SPOKEN FORCEFULLY ABOUT 
ARAB RIGHTS AND FEAR THAT A STALEMATE IN THE PEACE 
PROCESS WILL ONLY SPAWN THE POPULARITY OF EXTREMISTS. 
HE BELIEVES THAT IT PROFITS THE AL SAUD AND THE U.S. 
LITTLE, IF BY ACCEDING TO U.S. WISHES, THE RULING FAMILY 
ALIENATES KEY DOMESTIC CONSTITUENCIES.  UNDER ABDULLAH'S 
INCREASING INFLUENCE, WE EXPECT THE SAG TO ADHERE 
CLOSELY TO THE ARAB CONSENSUS, INCLUDING:  ESTABLISHMENT 
OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF 
LAND FOR PEACE.  ABDULLAH HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED HIS 
PERSONAL BOTTOM LINE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS -- 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM. 
 
12.  (C) OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE U.S. IS WHETHER 
ABDULLAH WILL SEEK TO PLAY A MORE FORCEFUL AND ACTIVIST 
ROLE IN ARAB COUNCILS THAN HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN THE 
CASE FOR THE SAG.  ABDULLAH'S LONGSTANDING TIES TO ASAD 
MAY GIVE HIM A SPECIAL INFUENCE WITH THE SYRIANS, BUT 
THE REVERSE IS MORE LIKELY TO PROVE TRUE.   HIS FORCEFUL 
LINE ON IRAQI PARTICIPATION AT THE CAIRO SUMMIT IS 
PERHAPS A HARBINGER OF GREATER EFFORTS TO SHAPE ARAB 
POSITIONS RATHER THAN REACT TO THEM. 
 
13.  (C) SEE RIYADH 29 (NOTAL) FOR MORE BIOGRAPHIC 
INFORMATION ON CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH. 
 
 
KATTOUF