This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ZAGREB 004931 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/00 
TAGS: 
SUBJECT:  CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL 
          JANVIER, AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN 
 
REF: SARAJEVO 886 
 
¶1.  (U) CLASSIFIED BY PETER W. GALBRAITH, AMBASSADOR, 
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PAGE 02        ZAGREB  04931  01 OF 02  051623Z 
REASON 1.5(B) AND (D) . 
 
¶2.  (C) SUMMARY:  ON DECEMBER 2 A 30-MEMBER CODEL LED BY 
REPRESENTATIVES MOLINARI AND LEVIN VISITED ZAGREB TO 
DISCUSS U.S. PARTICIPATION IN IFOR DEPLOYMENT IN BOSNIA. 
THE CODEL MET WITH SRSG KOFI ANNAN AND GENERAL JANVIER, 
AND LATER WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN.  JANVIER SAID THE "THE 
WAR IS OVER" AND THE MILITARY SITUATION WAS MUCH IMPROVED, 
THOUGH FIGHTING CONTINUED AND CASUALTIES MUST BE EXPECTED. 
ANNAN AND TUDJMAN DISCUSSED THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. 
PARTICIPATION.  BOTH SAID SEPARATELY THAT WHILE DANGERS 
EXIST, NEITHER BELIEVES NATO WILL BECOME ENGAGED IN 
RENEWED WARFARE BECAUSE THE SITUATION HAS FUNDAMENTALLY 
CHANGED SINCE ALL SIDES HAVE SIGNED ON TO A PEACE 
AGREEMENT.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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CODEL MOLINARI MEETS ANNAN AND JANVIER 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) IN A MEETING AT UN PROTECTION FORCE (UNPF) 
HEADQUARTERS, SRSG KOFI ANNAN GAVE AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE 
OF PEACEKEEPING VERSUS PEACE IMPLEMENTATION.  HE ARGUED 
STRONGLY THAT THE UN HAS LAID A SOLID GROUNDWORK FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTING FORCE FOR BOSNIA.  GENERAL JANVIER DESCRIBED 
THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND EMPHASIZED THAT THERE HAD 
NOT BEEN A COMPLETE HALT TO THE FIGHTING, BUT CURRENTLY 
THE UN ENJOYED FULL FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN MOST AREAS OF 
BOSNIA, PARTICULARLY IN SARAJEVO. 
 
¶4.  (C) THE REPRESENTATIVES ASKED WHETHER THE FRENCH 
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PAGE 03        ZAGREB  04931  01 OF 02  051623Z 
CONTINGENT WOULD BE UNDER NATO COMMAND AND EXPRESSED 
CONCERN OVER COMMENTS BY FRENCH GENERAL BACHELET CRITICAL 
OF THE U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIATING THE DAYTON AGREEMENT 
(REF).  ANNAN ASSURED THE REPRESENTATIVES THAT THERE WAS 
NO DOUBT THAT THE FRENCH WOULD BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF 
NATO.  HE SAID THAT GENERAL BACHELET'S COMMENTS WERE 
UNFORTUNATE AND MARRED HIS OTHERWISE OUTSTANDING RECORD 
(AS THE GENERAL WHO LIFTED THE SIEGE OF SARAJEVO). 
GENERAL JANVIER SAID BACHELET'S COMMENTS WERE HIS OFF-THE- 
RECORD PERSONAL OPINIONS AND DID NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF 
EITHER THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT OR MILITARY. 
 
¶5.  (C) REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF IFOR AND THE 
TRANSITION FROM UN TO NATO CONTROL, ANNAN TOLD THE CODEL 
THAT THE ENTIRE UN MILITARY COMMAND WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AND 
ALL COMMAND FUNCTIONS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO NATO.  THE 
ONLY REMAINING UN INVOLVEMENT IN BIH WOULD BE HUMANITARIAN 
ASSISTANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING WITH AN INTERNATIONAL 
POLICE TASK FORCE, AND SUPPORT FOR THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE 
WHO WILL CONTROL CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES. 
 
------------------------ 
JANVIER: THE WAR IS OVER 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) IN RESPONSE TO THE CODEL'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE 
POTENTIAL FOR U.S. TROOPS GETTING CAUGHT IN RENEWED 
WARFARE, ANNAN SAID THAT THE UN HAD RIDDEN OUT THE MOST 
DANGEROUS PERIOD AND THAT WHILE THERE WERE STILL PERILS, 
NATO TROOPS WOULD FACE A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT 
SITUATION; THERE WAS NOW AGREEMENT BY ALL SIDES TO A PEACE 
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PAGE 04        ZAGREB  04931  01 OF 02  051623Z 
AGREEMENT.  JANVIER SAID "THE WAR WAS OVER," HOWEVER THE 
FIGHTING IS NOT.  BIH WAS STILL DANGEROUS AND THAT MEANT 
THERE WOULD BE LOSSES WHICH TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS 
MUST ACCEPT.  JANVIER EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THERE 
WOULD BE NO LARGE SCALE COMBAT BECAUSE NATO FORCES WOULD 
BE A DETERRENT TO ANY GROUP TRYING TO START A FIGHT. 
HOWEVER, HE WARNED, THERE WOULD BE INCIDENTS AND 
RESISTANCE BY SOME ELEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES AS THEY WITHDREW 
FROM AREAS CURRENTLY UNDER THEIR CONTROL. 
 
¶7.  (C) THE CODEL ASKED  HOW MUCH CONTROL MILOSEVIC COULD 
BE EXPECTED TO EXERT OVER THE BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY CHAIN 
OF COMMAND.  ANNAN ASSURED THEM THAT MILOSEVIC HAD 
SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE, BUT THAT SINCE BOSNIA WAS ENTERING 
A PERIOD OF PEACE, MILOSEVIC MUST COMMENT CAUTIOUSLY IN 
ORDER TO DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM WAR CRIMINALS. 
 
¶8.  (C) THE CODEL WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE FUTURE ROLE OF 
GENERAL MLADIC AND WHO WOULD REPLACE HIM.  JANVIER OPINED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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PAGE 01        ZAGREB  04931  02 OF 02  051623Z 
ACTION H-06 
 
INFO  LOG-00   OASY-00  DS-00    EUR-01   TEDE-00  IO-00    ADS-00 
      OIC-02   SS-00    DSCC-00    /009W 
                  ------------------05F285  051623Z /38 
O 051535Z DEC 95 
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8251 
INFO NATO EU COLLECTIVE 
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK 
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECPOLAD// 
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD// 
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 
DIA WASHDC 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ZAGREB 004931 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
USVIENNA ALSO FOR USDEL OSCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/00 
TAGS: 
SUBJECT:  CODEL MOLINARI MEETS SRSG ANNAN, GENERAL 
          JANVIER, AND PRESIDENT TUDJMAN 
 
THAT MLADIC'S DEPUTY GENERAL GERO IS A LIKELY CANDIDATE, 
BUT IS LARGELY AN UNKNOWN.  HOWEVER, GERO HAD ACCEPTED THE 
DAYTON ACCORD.  REPRESENTATIVES ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN 
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PAGE 02        ZAGREB  04931  02 OF 02  051623Z 
ABOUT THE MUJAHADEEN AND THE THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS. 
ANNAN SAID THAT THERE WERE ONLY AN ESTIMATED 700 PRESENT 
IN BIH, INTEGRATED INTO BOSNIAK UNITS. HE SAID IT WAS THE 
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOBH TO GET THEM OUT OF THE COUNTRY 
IN THE ONE MONTH SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT. 
 
------------------------------ 
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) WITH HIS TYPICAL HISTORICAL SWEEP, PRESIDENT 
TUDJMAN TOLD THE CODEL THAT THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM IN THE 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WAS THE CLASH OF WESTERN, EASTERN, AND 
MUSLIM CIVILIZATIONS.  THE UNEQUAL BALANCE OF FORCES AMONG 
THEM WAS THE REASON FOR THE DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA, BUT 
NOW A NEW BALANCE WAS BRINGING AN END TO THE WAR AND THE 
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CROATIA AND SERBIA.  AT 
DAYTON, HE SAID, IT WAS OBVIOUS THE SERBS WANTED AN 
AGREEMENT BECAUSE THEY KNEW THERE WAS NO CHANCE TO WIN IF 
THE WAR CONTINUED.  TUDJMAN ANSWERED CONCERNS ABOUT THE 
DANGER TO U.S. FORCES BY SAYING THAT WHILE SPORADIC 
FIGHTING IS LIKELY, THE SERBS' DESIRE FOR A SOLUTION WOULD 
TRANSLATE INTO NO SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION TO IFOR. 
 
¶10.  (C) ASKED ABOUT THE SIZE OF THE FORCE, TUDJMAN 
RESPONDED THAT A LARGE FORCE WAS NOT NEEDED IN EASTERN 
SLAVONIA (ALTHOUGH HE EXPECTED U.S. PARTICIPATION AT THE 
HEAD OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION), BECAUSE THE 
SERBS HAVE AGREED TO REINTEGRATION.  BOSNIA REQUIRED A 
LARGE PRESENCE, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE DEEP DIVIDE 
BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND SERBS.  WITHOUT A LARGE FORCE, NEITHER 
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PAGE 03        ZAGREB  04931  02 OF 02  051623Z 
SIDE WOULD LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS.  HE SAID THAT UNDER 
CURRENT CONDITIONS THE 5:2:2 ARMS RATIO (FRY:CROATIA:B-H) 
WAS ACCEPTABLE, HOWEVER, A DIFFERENT RATIO MIGHT BE 
NECESSARY LATER. 
 
¶11.  (C) CODEL MEMBERS ASKED TUDJMAN ABOUT THE MUJAHADEEN 
PRESENCE AND IF THE GOC WOULD ASSIST IN THEIR 
IDENTIFICATION AND REMOVAL. TUDJMAN SAID IT WAS NOT KNOWN 
HOW MANY ARE PRESENT IN BOSNIA, PERHAPS 3-4,000. HE HAD 
LITTLE DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD LEAVE SINCE THEY 
COMMANDED LITTLE TRUST ON THE PART OF LOCAL MUSLIMS.  HE 
OPINED THAT THEY WOULD NOT OPPOSE THE OVERWHELMING FORCE 
OF IFOR.  DEFENSE MINISTER SUSAK ADDED THAT THE GOC WOULD 
"HELP THE MUJAHADEEN LEAVE." 
 
¶12.  (C) TUDJMAN SAID THAT THE GOC WOULD COOPERATE WITH 
THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL AS LONG AS THE PROCEEDINGS 
REMAINED UNBIASED.  HE ASSURED THE CODEL THAT THE GOC 
WOULD EXERT LEVERAGE OVER THE BOSNIAN CROATS TO STOP 
LOOTING AND BURNING IN AREAS THAT ARE DUE TO BE RETURNED 
TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS.  HE ADDED THAT TENSIONS IN BIH ARE 
COMPLEX AND THAT ALTHOUGH ISOLATED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
CONTINUE, THE BOSNIAKS AND CROATS HAD SUCCEEDED IN 
PREVENTING WIDER CONFLICT THROUGH THE FEDERATION. 
 
¶13.  (C) WHEN ASKED WHY THE U.S. SHOULD PARTICIPATE ON THE 
GROUND AND NOT JUST PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT AND AIR 
POWER, TUDJMAN SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS THE LAST REMAINING 
SUPERPOWER AND MUST BE THE FOUNDATION FOR A PEACEFUL 
SOLUTION; THAT IS A ROLE THAT CANNOT BE ESCAPED. THE 
TROUBLES OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD BE A EUROPEAN 
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PAGE 04        ZAGREB  04931  02 OF 02  051623Z 
ISSUE, BUT EUROPE HAD NO POLITICAL UNITY AND COULD NOT 
DEAL WITH SUCH A COMPLEX ISSUE AS BOSNIA. 
 
¶14.  (U) CODEL MOLINARI DID NOT CLEAR THIS MESSAGE PRIOR 
TO DEPARTURE FROM ZAGREB ON DECEMBER 3. 
 
¶15.  (U) SARAJEVO -- MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. 
 
GALBRAITH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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